Archer v. Retter

• Decision Date: 18 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:20-cv-00759-DSF (JDE)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: JOHN ARCHER, JOVAN NEALY, an MARCUS DIGGS, and 42 Absent Unamed Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, v. STEPHEN RETTER, DOE's 1 thru 10, and CCHCS et al., Defendants.

JOHN ARCHER, JOVAN NEALY, an MARCUS DIGGS, and 42 Absent Unamed Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, v. STEPHEN RETTER, DOE's 1 thru 10, and CCHCS et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:20-cv-00759-DSF (JDE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION

March 18, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

I.INTRODUCTION

On January 24, 2020, John Archer and Marcus Diggs ("Plaintiffs"), prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") at California State Prison in Lancaster, California (the "Prison"), proceeding pro se, presented for filing a "Civil Rights Complaint," citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983" or "§ 1983"), identifying themselves, Jovan Nealy and "42 Absent Un[n]amed" persons as plaintiffs, although only Plaintiffs signed the Complaint, and Stephen Retter, Does 1-10, and "CCHCS" as defendants. Dkt. 1 ("Complaint") at 1, 12.

On January 29, 2020, after being advised of the defects set forth herein, Plaintiffs were ordered to, within 30 days, either file an amended complaint or file a notice of an intent to proceed with the Complaint as alleged. Dkt. 5 ("Order"). Although Plaintiff Archer requested and received additional time to pay the unpaid filing fee (Dkt. 12, 13), Plaintiffs did not seek additional time to otherwise comply with the Order and did not file an amended complaint or a notice of intent within 30 days of the Order.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b), the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and seeks damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief and therefore must be dismissed.

II.SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on their own behalf and purportedly on behalf of "500 similarly situated" and seek a declaration "that they have a right not to have their personal and families['] private Doctor[-]patient privileged information of Health care randomly stored in one place of practice that can be easily sought after and stolen and/or hacked for fraud[u]lent schemes in iden[t]ity fraud used for criminal activities, and further . . . enjoin the enforcement in cooperation of investigation, related to business activities and job procedures that need be 'Ceased' because security protocols ha[d] been and [are] a failure." Complaint, ¶ 1 (ellipsis in original). Plaintiffs seek to proceed "as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated . . . who are incarcerated across the State of California's 34 prisons." Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege defendant Retter is CCHCS's "CEO Administrator," Doe #1 is a medical recordsdirector, Doe #2 is a health care records technician supervisor, and DOE #3 is a health care records technician. Id. ¶¶ 7-10, 15. Plaintiffs assert that on or about May 20, 2016, CCHCS mailed a letter to members of the class stating that health care and other sensitive information may have been stolen from an unattended laptop. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs claim: "Defendants craft[i]ness has been misleading by fraud[u]lent explanations . . . about how this whole situation came about in the seriousness of security breach in its carelessness to follow work policy and procedures . . ." causing Plaintiffs to, although suffering no physical injury or illness, but instead "fear of fraud" and a "threat of fear by identity theft/fraud." Id. ¶¶ 16-18.

Plaintiffs allege three "causes of action": (1) "defendants" breached "it's [sic] duty of security to protect health care information"; (2) "Defendants with malice intent and careless disregard in that of foreseeability and certainty of plaintiffs and others in class similarly situated are in and uneasy position of future risk of identity fraud; and (3) Defendants Stephen Retter CEO and designee administrator of CCHCS" and Does 1-3 "caused injury" to Plaintiffs by not properly monitoring employees and security. Complaint, ¶¶ 19-27. Plaintiffs seek a restraining order, injunctive relief prohibiting "defendants" from "harassment to become a [nuisance] for filing the lawsuit" and damages, among other things. Id. at pp. 11-12.

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b), a district court must dismiss a complaint by a prisoner seeking redress against a governmental entity or official when such a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks damages from a defendant immune from such relief. A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreriv. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended). When screening a complaint to determine whether it states a viable claim, courts apply the same standard used to evaluate a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

A complaint must allege enough facts to provide both "fair notice" of the claim being asserted and "the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While detailed factual allegations are not required, a complaint with "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]" and "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement" would not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing a complaint, factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). But, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pro se complaints are "liberally construed" and held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). But "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

If a complaint is found deficient, a court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it is possible the defects can be corrected, especially if the plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that "[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment"). If, after careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06; see, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "there is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment" where an amendment would not cure the "basic flaw" in the pleading).

IV.DISCUSSION

A. The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Section 1983 creates a civil right of action for violations of constitutional or other federal rights committed by persons acting under color of law. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). It "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nev. ex rel. Nev. Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)) (quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege a defendant, acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiffs federal rights. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A defendant is not liable under Section 1983 absent a causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the deprivation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). Aplaintiff must "set forth specific facts" establishing the defendant's "individual fault." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains]." (alterations in original)).

Thus, in a civil rights action, a supervisor is not liable for a subordinate's conduct under a theory of respondeat superior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Instead, a plaintiff must show there is "sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation." Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). To hold a supervisor officer liable, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the supervisor: (1) personally participated in or directed the alleged violations; (2) knew of the...