Archer v. Town of Houlton, Docket No. 00-244-B-H (D. Me. 9/12/2001)

Decision Date12 September 2001
Docket NumberDocket No. 00-244-B-H.
PartiesEDWARD ARCHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF HOULTON, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

DAVID M. COHEN, Magistrate Judge.

The defendants, the Town of Houlton, the Houlton Police Department, Darrell A. Malone, Allan Bean, and the Maine Municipal Association, each move for summary judgment on all counts asserted against them by the plaintiffs, Edward Archer, Troy O'Bar and A. John Hyman, in this action arising out of the availability of certain positions in the Houlton Police Department in 1996. The plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment to the effect that certain factual findings made by the Maine Labor Relations Board in a related proceeding must be taken as established for purposes of this proceeding. In their opposition to the defendants' motions, the plaintiffs state that they "are voluntarily dismissing" Counts 5-8, 21-24, 37-40, 55-56, 58-59, 61-62, 64-65, 68-69, 72-73, 76-77, 80-81, 84-85, and 88-99 of their 108-count complaint. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Summary Judgment Motions of Defendants Town of Houlton, et al. ("Plaintiffs' Houlton Opposition") (Docket No. 32) at 1-2. This statement was filed with the court after answers and motions for summary judgment had been filed by the defendants and without the stipulation required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii). Accordingly, voluntary dismissal of these counts is not available at this time. Treating the statement as one of agreement that summary judgment may be entered on those counts as requested by the respective defendants against whom they are asserted, I recommend that the court grant summary judgment on those counts and will not address them further. I recommend that the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment be denied, that the motions of the defendant police department and the Maine Municipal Association be granted, and that the motions of the remaining defendants be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In this regard, `material' means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. . . . By like token, `genuine' means that `the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party. . . .'" McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir. 1997). Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "This is especially true in respect to claims or issues on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof." International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

II. Factual Background

The following material facts are appropriately supported in the parties' statements of material facts and are undisputed.

The Town of Houlton (sometimes hereafter referred to as the "Town") has a council/manager form of government. Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendants Town of Houlton, Houlton Police Department, Darrell Malone and Allan Bean ("Houlton SMF") (Docket No. 16) ¶ 4; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants Town of Houlton, Houlton Police Department, Darrell Malone and Allan Bean's "Statement of Material Facts" ("Plaintiffs' Responsive Houlton SMF") (Docket No. 33) ¶ 4. At the time of the relevant events, the Houlton Police Department had 19 employees, including the chief, three sergeants and three corporals. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff Archer was a police officer with the Town from 1985 to 1997. Id. ¶ 1. He was a sergeant at all relevant times. Id. He resigned from the Houlton Police Department in February 1997 to accept a position as chief of police in Lincoln, Maine. Id. Plaintiff Hyman began working as a police officer with the Town in 1991 and was a patrol officer at all relevant times. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff O'Bar began working for the Houlton Police Department as a dispatcher in 1987 or 1988. Id. ¶ 3. He became a police officer in the early 1990s. Id.

In 1994 and 1995 the Town and the Maine Association of Police, the bargaining agent for a union unit composed of dispatchers, patrol officers, corporals and sergeants, were engaged in negotiations for a successor collective bargaining agreement. Id. ¶ 6. Defendants Malone, the police chief, and Bean, the town manager, were among the negotiators for the Town. Id. Plaintiff Archer was a shop steward and among the negotiators for the union. Id. On November 29, 1995 the parties executed a new contract. Id. ¶ 7.

Defendant Malone has served as the chief of police for the Town since 1984. Id. ¶ 8. As such, he reports to the town manager. Id. Before becoming chief, Malone served as the shop steward for the police union for several years beginning in 1971. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Bean was town manager in Houlton from August 1994 to December 26, 2000. Id. ¶ 13.

On November 19, 1995 Malone announced openings for the positions of corporal and patrol sergeant with applications due by December 15, 1995. Id. ¶ 14. In a memorandum dated December 20, 1995 Malone announced an opening for the position of staff sergeant detective for which applications were due by December 29, 1995. Id. ¶ 15. The union contended that James Skehan, who ultimately was promoted to the staff sergeant detective position, was not eligible for that promotion. Id. ¶ 18.

On January 5, 1996 Archer filed a class-action grievance pertaining to the criteria used by Malone to determine eligibility to compete for these positions. Id. ¶ 19. On January 17, 1996 Archer filed two grievances: one alleging failure of the Town to negotiate the terms and conditions of the newly-created position of staff sergeant detective and one alleging that Malone had failed to abide by a new contractual term concerning the cleaning of uniforms. Id. ¶ 20. Malone denied the grievances. Id. ¶ 21. Archer advanced the grievance concerning eligibility for promotion to the town manager, who also denied it. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25. The union filed for arbitration of this grievance. Id. ¶ 25. Arbitration was held and the arbitrator ruled that the minimum qualifications for promotion established by Malone did not violate the contract. Id. ¶ 26.

On December 21, 1995 Malone announced that a written examination would be administered by defendant Maine Municipal Association ("MMA"). Id. ¶ 34. The MMA is a nonprofit advisory organization that is an instrumentality of its member municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. Defendant Maine Municipal Association's Statement of Material Facts ("MMA's SMF") (Docket No. 9) ¶ 1; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Maine Municipal Association's "Statement of Material Facts" ("Plaintiffs' Responsive MMA SMF") (Docket No. 25) ¶ 1. MMA's involvement in the 1996 testing for the Houlton Police Department began when Malone called David Barrett, then the assistant director of personnel for the MMA, and said he needed to schedule an exam. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. The Houlton Police Department used a four-part promotional process in 1996. Id. ¶ 7. It included the written exam administered by Barrett, an oral interview panel with some law enforcement professionals, an evaluation tool used by the police chief, and seniority points. Id. The chief's subjective evaluation is supposed to be done without knowledge of applicants' scores in the other components of the process. Houlton SMF ¶ 41; Plaintiffs' Responsive Houlton SMF ¶ 41. At the end of the 1996 promotional process, Barrett compiled the scores from the four parts. MMA's SMF ¶ 8; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 8. MMA did not administer the oral boards (oral interview panel). Id. ¶ 12. All of the plaintiffs took the written exam. Houlton SMF ¶ 35; Plaintiffs' Responsive Houlton SMF ¶ 35.

MMA typically informs the hiring authority of each component score only at the end of the entire process when the final scores are released. Id. ¶ 40. Within a few days after the January 4, 1996 written exam, which Barrett corrected at his office, Archer and several other officers asked Malone if they could have the scores of their written exams. MMA's SMF ¶¶ 15, 23; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶¶ 15, 23. Archer and the others received their scores from Malone within a very short period of time after making this request. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.

After the written test, the candidates ranked as follows: Archer, O'Bar, Dana Duff, Maurice Ellis, Thomas Donahue, Hyman, Skehan, and Terry Beaton. Houlton SMF ¶ 48; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 48. The oral interview board for the positions of patrol sergeant and corporal was conducted on January 12, 1996. Id. ¶ 49. The ranking of the candidates for these positions, after the scores for the written examination, oral board and seniority were combined, was as follows: Ellis, O'Bar, Hyman, Duff, Skehan, Donahue and...

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