Archie v. State, CR-93-2117

Citation711 So.2d 477
Decision Date13 January 1995
Docket NumberCR-93-2117
PartiesJimmy A. ARCHIE, Jr. v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Jimmy A. Archie, Jr., pro se.

James H. Evans, Jeff Sessions, and Bill Pryor, attys. gen., and Alice Byrne, Department of Corrections, for appellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

The appellant, Jimmy A. Archie, Jr., appeals from the circuit court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In his petition, Archie asserts the following: in 1980, he was convicted of first degree robbery and rape and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of 50 years' imprisonment; on October 6, 1981, he was placed on incentive good time (IGT) status provided for by Act No. 182, 1975 Ala.Acts 176, No. 182 (July 29, 1976), which was codified as Ala.Code 1975, §§ 14-9-20 through -25 1; and he was not removed from that status until November 1987, when he received a disciplinary for a minor infraction of a prison rule.

While most of Archie's allegations are fragmented and somewhat convoluted and fail to clearly put the circuit court on notice of the exact issues raised, we adhere to the view that niceties of pleading are not favored in habeas corpus proceedings, Rice v. State, 460 So.2d 254 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). With this principle in mind, we find that, when Archie's allegations are given a cohesive reading, they should have been treated on their merits. For example, Archie's petition asserts that the Department of Corrections is not applying Act No. 182 according to the legislative intent so as to correctly calculate the IGT to be subtracted from his sentence.

                Archie further states, "Petitioner [is] asking for equal protection under Johnny Powers v. State of Alabama, [546 So.2d 1000 (Ala.Cr.App.1987),] and Ex parte Powers v. State of Alabama at 546 So.2d [1004 (Ala.1988),] because not like Powers [he] has no past nor juvenile history and no bad prison record;  but only one minor disciplinary."   In Powers v. State, this court interpreted Act No. 182 to provide that for every day of service, a qualified inmate is eligible for up to two days' IGT credit, thus authorizing a three-day deduction for every day served.  In Ex parte Powers, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with this court's interpretation of Act No. 182, but reversed the judgment and remanded the case on the ground that the Department of Corrections had incorrectly calculated Powers's IGT status because of its policy based upon an attorney general's opinion stating that, under Act No. 182, the maximum deduction was two days for every day served, i.e., one day of IGT for every day served plus the day actually served.  See also Warren v. State, 598 So.2d 1058 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), also cited by Archie.  In general discussion, Archie also mentions Cox v. State, 628 So.2d 1075 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), wherein this court discussed the issue of whether the application of section (h) of Admin.Reg. 420 to deny IGT because of the inmate's criminal record is contrary to the legislature's expressed intent. 2  Archie also alleges that had he not been unconstitutionally removed from IGT status for a minor infraction, his sentence would have already been served
                

As a final note, we point out that, in response to Archie's petition, as amended, the state filed an answer and motion to dismiss wherein it asserts that Archie, in his petition, is alleging that the denial of good time is an ex post facto application; that he is being denied retroactive incentive deductions in an arbitrary manner; and that § 14-9-41 is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the ex post facto prohibition. The state addressed those allegations. It is abundantly clear that Archie's IGT is governed by Act No. 182, and thus the state's motion not only completely misses the allegations asserted in Archie's petition, but applies the wrong statutes governing Archie's eligibility to earn good time and in calculating the good time earned. Is this any indication of the reliability of the Department's calculations of an inmate's good time?

Accordingly, this cause is remanded for the circuit court to treat the merits of Archie's petition and to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. If the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, a transcript of that proceeding should be included in the return to remand along with the written statement of the court's findings. The court shall take necessary action to see that the circuit clerk makes due return to this court at the earliest possible time and within 56 days of the release of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

All Judges concur.

ON RETURN TO REMAND

PATTERSON, Judge.

On January 13, 1995, this court remanded this cause for the circuit court to consider the merits of Jimmy A. Archie, Jr.'s, petition for writ of habeas corpus and to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In his petition, Archie asserts the following: that in 1980, he was convicted of first degree robbery and rape and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of 50 years' imprisonment; that on October 6, 1981, he was placed on incentive good time (IGT) status, as provided by Act No. 182, 1975 Ala.Acts (July 29, 1976), codified as Ala.Code 1975, §§ 14-9-20 through -25 1; and that he was not removed from that status until November 1987, when he received a disciplinary for a minor infraction of a prison rule. With one exception, which we discuss below, the circuit court has complied with our order.

On return to remand, Archie argues that he has not been given credit for his time actually served between the date he started earning IGT and the date he was removed from IGT status. He is under the impression that to arrive at the correct release date, the time he actually served between those dates should be subtracted from the Department of Corrections release date. The Department calculated Archie's release date, after giving Archie credit for his pretrial detention and statutory good time, as January 13, 2005. The Department reduced that time by the amount of IGT earned--6 years and 27 days--to arrive at a release date of December 16, 1999, from which the 3 months' earned good time was deducted for the disciplinary, to arrive at a release date of March 16, 1999. 2 Archie is under the impression that the time he actually served during the specified period (i.e., 6 years and 27 days) should be subtracted from March 16, 1999, giving him a release date of 1993. However, the Department's release date already takes into account his time served--by taking the good time off the top, Archie has to serve the actual time until March 16, 1999. We find that Archie has been properly credited with the actual time that he served while on IGT-earning status.

Archie also asserts that his IGT should have accumulated at the rate of three days for every day served (two days IGT plus the day actually served) rather than two. He relies on Ex parte Powers, 546 So.2d 1004 (Ala.1988), rev'g Powers v. State, 546 So.2d 1000 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). In Powers v. State, 546 So.2d at 1003, this court held that "Act 182 authorizes but does not require the Department of Corrections to grant a qualified inmate up to two days good time for every day he serves." "This interpretation results in a total daily deduction in sentence of three days: two days good time plus the one day actually served." Id. In Ex parte Powers, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with this court's interpretation of Act No. 182, but reversed the judgment and remanded the case on the ground that the Department of Corrections, in exercising its discretion in calculating Powers's IGT, followed an erroneous attorney general's opinion that stated that, under Act No. 182, the maximum deduction is two days for every day served, i.e., one day of IGT for every day served plus the day actually served. In remanding, the Court directed, "If the discretion exercised by the Board of Corrections was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, then the Board should exercise its discretion based upon a correct interpretation of the statute." 546 So.2d at 1005.

Contrary to Archie's impression, neither of the Powers opinions requires the Department to give two days of IGT for each day served. The Supreme Court in Ex parte Powers remanded simply for the Department to exercise its discretion, disregarding to the erroneous attorney general's opinion. The evidence does not show that, in awarding Archie only one day of IGT for each day served, the Department relied on the erroneous opinion. Thus, we uphold the circuit court's finding that the Department was within its discretion in awarding Archie one day IGT credit for each day served.

We must, however, remand this case again because the circuit court failed to address Archie's allegation that the Department of Corrections is not applying Act No. 182 in the manner the Legislature intended so as to correctly calculate the IGT that is to be subtracted from his sentence. He specifically points to the arguable conflict between §§ 14-9-20 through -25 and Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation No. 420, which the Department promulgated to set forth the basis for determining an inmate's eligibility for IGT. Section 14-9-20 states, "In order to encourage prison discipline, commutation of time shall be used as a reward for good behavior at the discretion of the board of corrections." (Emphasis added.) Section 14-9-22 states, "It is the intent of this article that the custody classification provided for in section 14-9-21 be used by the board only in exceptional cases of good behavior and industriousness in order that inmates be given a meaningful incentive for good behavior." (Emphasis added.) See also Powers v. State, 546 So.2d at 1003 ("The purpose of the act, as expressed in the title is '[t]o provide for commutation of time for certain prisoners for good behavior.' "). Admin.Reg. No. 420 specifically...

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2 cases
  • Strong v. ALA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • November 30, 2001
    ...the dismissive treatment of pro se filings. Boros v. Baxley, 621 So.2d 240, 243-44 (Ala.1993). See, e.g., Archie v. State, 711 So.2d 477, 478 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996) ("While most of Archie's allegations are fragmented and somewhat convoluted and fail to clearly put the circuit court on notice ......
  • Carlile v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • December 2, 2003
    ...that Carlile's IGT may have been properly applied at a rate of one day of IGT for every one day served. See Archie v. State, 711 So.2d 477, 480 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)(opinion on return to remand) ("[N]either of the Powers opinions requires the Department to give two days of IGT for each day se......

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