Archuleta v. U.S. Liens, LLC

• Decision Date: 26 April 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-0528,17-0528
• Citation: 813 S.E.2d 761
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Julian S. ARCHULETA, Defendant Below, Petitioner v. US LIENS, LLC, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

813 S.E.2d 761

Julian S. ARCHULETA, Defendant Below, Petitioner

v.US LIENS, LLC, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

No. 17-0528

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 10, 2018

Filed: April 26, 2018

Tammy M. McWilliams, Trump & Trump, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner

Christopher P. Stroech, Arnold & Bailey, Charles Town, West Virginia, Attorney for Respondent

Davis, Justice:

This is an appeal by Petitioner, Julian S. Archuleta (defendant below), from a summary judgment order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County. The circuit court's order vested title to Petitioner's home to the Respondent, US Liens, LLC (plaintiff below). In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that she was entitled to summary judgment because there was no material issue of fact in dispute regarding the Respondent's failure to comply with all of the requirements for providing her notice of the right to redeem her home. After a careful review of the briefs, the appendix record, and listening to the oral arguments of the parties, we reverse.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record indicates that the Petitioner, who is in her seventies, and her father purchased a home in Martinsburg, West Virginia, in 1994. The home was subject to a mortgage. It appears that the lender required the Petitioner and her father to make monthly payments for property taxes into an escrow account for the life of the loan. The lender was ultimately responsible for paying property taxes from the escrow account. The Petitioner's father died in 2003, after which title to the property vested in Petitioner by right of survivorship. The mortgage was satisfied in 2012. Once the loan was satisfied the lender was no longer responsible for paying property taxes.

After the termination of the tax escrow account, the Petitioner failed to pay her property taxes for the year 2012. As a result of the 2012 taxes not having been paid, the Sheriff of Berkeley County held an auction on November 19, 2013, to sell the tax lien on the Petitioner's home. The Respondent purchased the tax lien on the property at the auction. It appears that during the first few months of 2015, the Respondent, through the West Virginia State Auditor, unsuccessfully attempted to have the Petitioner notified,¹ by mail² and newspaper publications,³ of her right to redeem the property. On April 1, 2015, a deed to the property was conveyed to the Respondent by a State Auditor appointee. Thereafter, on July 23, 2015, the Respondent filed the instant proceeding in circuit court to quiet title to the property.⁴

The Petitioner filed an answer and counterclaim to the petition to quiet title.⁵ In her response, the Petitioner asserted that in January 2015 she was hospitalized in Arlington, Virginia.⁶ The hospital eventually released her to a nursing facility in Arlington. The Petitioner was not able to return to her home in Martinsburg until April 2015. The Petitioner further alleged that the Respondent failed to comply with all of the statutory requirements for providing her with notice of the right to redeem her home. Specifically, the Petitioner alleged that the Respondent failed to comply with W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(d) (2013) (Repl. Vol. 2017), by addressing a notice to redeem to "Occupant" and sending it by first class mail to her home.

Both parties eventually moved for summary judgment. By order entered May 9, 2017, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. The circuit court's order acknowledged that the Petitioner was recovering from health problems in Virginia during the period of time the Respondent attempted to provide her with notice to redeem the property. However, the order held that the Petitioner's incapacitation "does not toll the redemption deadline." The order also concluded that, although the notice to "Occupant" mailing was not complied with, the Petitioner "would not have received any additional notice had a ... first class letter been delivered to her under a pseudonym." The circuit court ultimately concluded that the Respondent substantially complied with the redemption notice requirements. This appeal followed.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

This proceeding was brought from a summary judgment order of the circuit court. We have held that "[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo ." Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy , 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). We have also held that

[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.

Syl. pt. 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc ., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995). We will apply these standards to our analysis of this appeal.

III.DISCUSSION

The Petitioner contends that the circuit court's summary judgment order should be reversed, because the evidence clearly showed that the Respondent failed to have a notice addressed to "Occupant," and mailed to her home as required by W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(d). The Respondent concedes that it failed to comply with the "Occupant" notice requirement. However, the Respondent argues that it provided the West Virginia State Auditor with the address of the property, and that it was the duty of the State Auditor to send out a notice of redemption addressed to the "Occupant" of the address given. The Respondent further argues that it should not be held responsible for the State Auditor's failure to comply with W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(d).

To start, we note that the Legislature has carved out detailed statutes that regulate every aspect of the sale of real property for delinquent taxes and the redemption of such property. See W. Va. Code § 11A-3-1 et seq . We have previously observed that "this area of the law has undergone significant change in the last several years, with each change increasing the protections afforded the delinquent land owner." Mingo Cty. Redev. Auth. v. Green , 207 W. Va. 486, 491, 534 S.E.2d 40, 45 (2000). Many of the changes in this area of the law took place after a decision by the United States Supreme Court recognized certain constitutional due process notice requirements for owners of real property subject to delinquent tax sales. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams , 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712, 77 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1983) ("Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the ... property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable."). This Court adopted the federal constitutional standard in Lilly v. Duke , 180 W. Va. 228, 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988), where we held:

There are certain constitutional due process requirements for notice of a tax sale of real property. Where a party having an interest in the property can reasonably be identified from public records or otherwise, due process requires that such party be provided notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice.

Syl. pt. 1, Lilly . Although Lilly addressed the issue of due process notice to a property owner before a delinquent tax sale occurs, we have found that those constitutional protections are equally applicable to notice of the right to redeem property after a tax sale. See Mason v. Smith , 233 W. Va. 673, 680, 760 S.E.2d 487, 494 (2014).

The issue in this case concerns the notice of the right to redeem real property that was sold for delinquent taxes. Before examining the specific statutory provision at issue in this case, W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(d), we must first review W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 (2010) (Repl. Vol. 2017), a general statute that impacts the resolution of the issue raised under W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(d).

As a prerequisite to receiving a deed to property sold for delinquent taxes, W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 requires the tax purchaser to "[p]repare a list of those to be served with notice to redeem and request the State Auditor to prepare and serve the notice as provided in sections twenty-one [§ 11A-3-21⁷ ] and twenty-two [ § 11A-3-22⁸ ] of this article." (Footnotes added). The statute also makes clear that, "[i]f the purchaser fails to meet these requirements, he or she shall lose all the benefits of his or her purchase ."⁹ (Emphasis added). Further, prior to 1994, the text of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 was contained in a former version of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-20. This Court held the following regarding the pre-1994 version of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-20 :

Noncompliance with the mandatory requirements of West Virginia Code § 11A-3-20 (1983 Replacement Vol.) is a jurisdictional defect not subject to curative measures.

Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Morgan v. Miller , 177 W. Va. 97, 350 S.E.2d 724 (1986). In light of the fact that W. Va. Code § 11A-3-20 was rewritten in 1994, and its text was placed in W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19, we take this opportunity to now hold that noncompliance with the mandatory requirements of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 is a jurisdictional defect not subject to curative measures.¹⁰

As we previously mentioned, and now hold, W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 provides that a property owner must be served notice of the right to redeem property as outlined under W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22, and that failure to provide notice in the manner required will result in the tax purchaser of the property losing all benefits of the purchase. The Petitioner contends that the Respondent failed to comply with the "Occupant" notice requirement contained in W. Va. Code § 11A-3-22(d). The relevant text of this statutory provision provides as follows:

In addition to the other notice requirements set forth in this section, if the real property subject to the tax lien was classified as Class II property at the time of the assessment, at the

...