Arciniega v. Feliciano

• Decision Date: 15 June 2018
• Docket Number: SC 20088
• Citation: 329 Conn. 293,184 A.3d 1202
• Parties: Milly ARCINIEGA et al. v. Giselle FELICIANO et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

329 Conn. 293

184 A.3d 1202

Milly ARCINIEGA et al.

v.Giselle FELICIANO et al.

SC 20088

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 3, 2018

Officially released June 15, 2018^*

Alyssa Peterson, self-represented, the appellant (intervening defendant).

John B. Kennelly, for the appellees (named plaintiff et al.).

Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.^**

McDONALD, J.

The question presented to us in this election case, brought under General Statutes § 9–329a, concerns the validity of petitions submitted to qualify a slate of candidates to run for election to the Democratic Town Committee for the sixth district of the city of Hartford. Specifically, it concerns whether election officials are required to reject such petitions if the circulator of the petitions knows or should know that the petitions contain an incorrect address for one of the candidates listed, irrespective of whether the candidate would be qualified to run for the position listed on the petitions under the correct address. We conclude that the threshold and, ultimately, dispositive issue is whether the acceptance of such a petition constitutes a "ruling of an election official," which is an essential predicate to a party's standing to proceed under § 9–329a. We conclude that it does not. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of this claim.

Before we turn to the particular facts of this case, it is helpful to set forth the legal landscape that informs the significance of those facts. In the city of Hartford, Democratic Town Committee members are elected on a district basis rather than at large. See General Statutes § 9–431 (b). A person is eligible to be a candidate for a political party's town committee if that person's name appears on the last completed enrollment list of the party in the district within which that person is to be nominated. General Statutes § 9–406. If not endorsed by the party, the candidate must file petitions with the municipality's registrar of voters containing the signatures of a specified percentage of electors, whose names also appear on the last completed enrollment list of that party in the district, in support of his or her candidacy. General Statutes §§ 9–406 and 9–410.

Any person requesting petition forms to commence this process must provide to the registrar the name, address, and office or position sought of the candidate for whom the petition is being obtained, as well as a statement signed by the candidate indicating his or her consent to be a candidate for that office or position (consent form). General Statutes § 9–409. In turn, the registrar types or prints on the petition form the name and address of each such candidate, the office sought, and the political party holding the primary. General Statutes § 9–409.

Various provisions prescribe the eligibility of persons signing the petitions, the contents of each petition page, and the eligibility of persons circulating the petitions to collect signatures (circulator). General Statutes §§ 9–409, 9–410, 9–411 and 9–431. On each petition page, the circulator must certify his or her eligibility and attest to the veracity of the information collected from the electors signing the petitions. General Statutes § 9–410 (c).

When the petitions are returned, the registrar verifies that they conform to specified mandates. The registrar must reject any petition page that fails to contain the requisite certifications by the circulator or that was circulated in violation of the specified procedures. General Statutes § 9–410 (b) and (c). The registrar also must reject any signature of any person whose name does not appear on the last completed enrollment list in the district. General Statutes § 9–412. After certifying the number of signatures on each valid petition page that conforms to the requirements, the registrar files the certified pages with the clerk of the municipality, together with the registrar's certificate as to the whole number of names on the last completed enrollment list of such party in the district. General Statutes § 9–412.

The registrar notifies the municipal clerk if a primary is required, providing the candidates' names, addresses, and the titles of the office or position for which they are candidates. General Statutes § 9–435. The clerk, in turn, causes that notice to be published and to be filed with the Secretary of the State. General Statutes § 9–435.

With regard to the aforementioned procedures, the following facts in the present case were either found by the trial court or are otherwise undisputed. At all relevant times prior to March 6, 2018, the named defendant, Giselle Feliciano, was the Democratic registrar of voters for the city of Hartford, and the defendant John V. Bazzano was the clerk of the city of Hartford. A Democratic Town Committee primary was scheduled to take place on March 6, 2018, between two slates of candidates, the Arciniega slate¹ and the Peterson slate,² after the defendants determined that each slate had timely submitted sufficient signatures to qualify to run for election. On February 9, 2018, the Arciniega slate commenced an action against the defendants under General Statutes §§ 9–329a (a) and 9–329b, seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants to reject certain allegedly fraudulent elector signatures on the Peterson slate's petitions and to declare that the Peterson slate had obtained insufficient support to qualify as candidates. The Peterson slate thereafter sought and was granted permission to intervene in the action. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

Upon intervening, the Peterson slate filed a counterclaim against the defendants and the Arciniega slate under § 9–329a, seeking a declaration that the Arciniega slate was not qualified to run. The counterclaim alleged that one of the candidates on the Arciniega slate, Jacqueline Nadal, had falsely listed 646 New Britain Avenue as her residential address on her candidate consent form, which was an address where Nadal was registered to vote but had not resided for at least eight months. The counterclaim alleged that Nadal currently resided at 370 Freeman Street, and that this fact was known, or should have been known, to the circulators of the petitions containing the New Britain Avenue address. The counterclaim further alleged that the defendants were responsible for accepting and verifying the petitions and, as such, should have rejected the Arciniega slate's petitions.

On February 21, 2018, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Arciniega slate on both the Arciniega slate's complaint and the Peterson slate's counterclaim. With regard to the complaint, the court directed the defendants to reject all elector signatures submitted in support of the Peterson slate that had been proven to be fraudulent, and to remove the Peterson slate from the ballot if there were insufficient valid signatures remaining to qualify the slate.

With regard to the counterclaim, the court concluded that the Peterson slate had not met its burden under § 9–329a to prove that there were "substantial violations of the requirements of the [election] statute ...." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport , 285 Conn. 618, 649, 941 A.2d 266 (2008). The court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Nadal had abandoned her residence at New Britain Avenue, which Nadal still owned and where she still received mail, and, thus, that the petitions contained an incorrect address. The court further found that, even if that address was incorrect, the Peterson slate had not established that this error would have an impact on the ballots or the authenticity of the primary petitions because the New Britain Avenue and Freeman Street addresses were both within the sixth district. Finally, the court concluded that there was no authority for striking the slate on this basis, a result that would disenfranchise the voters who signed petitions supporting the Arciniega slate.

One member of the Peterson slate, Alyssa Peterson, filed an appeal from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court.³ We transferred the appeal to this court and issued an order notifying the parties that the appeal would be considered on an expedited basis, and, as such, no reply briefs would be allowed. See General Statutes § 9–325 (providing that Supreme Court "may establish rules of procedure for the speedy and inexpensive hearing" of appeals and reservations stemming from contested elections and primaries).

In her appeal, Peterson challenges the trial court's judgment only insofar as the court rejected the counterclaim. She contends that the trial court applied an improper legal standard by requiring proof of abandonment or, alternatively, made a clearly erroneous finding that the Peterson slate had not met its burden of proving that Nadal had abandoned the New Britain Avenue residence. In response, the Arciniega slate defends the trial court's decision but also contends that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that either the Peterson slate lacked standing to advance its counterclaim or that the counterclaim was rendered moot by the Arciniega slate's subsequent election by default. We conclude that the Peterson slate lacked standing to advance the counterclaim. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider its merits.

It is settled law that a "court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing , 328 Conn. 376, 382, 179 A.3d 769 (2018). Standing implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. West Farms Mall, LLC v. West Hartford , 279 Conn. 1, 11 n.6, 901 A.2d 649 (2006). As such, even if a challenge has not been raised to a party's standing, the court is obliged to consider it once it has come to the court's attention.⁴ See Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. Partnership v. Norwalk , 320 Conn. 535, 548, 133 A.3d 140 ...