Arclar Co. v. Gates, Civ. 97-4335-JLF.

CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
Writing for the CourtForeman
CitationArclar Co. v. Gates, 17 F.Supp.2d 818 (S.D. Ill. 1998)
Decision Date21 August 1998
Docket NumberNo. Civ. 97-4335-JLF.,Civ. 97-4335-JLF.
PartiesARCLAR COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff, v. James Kenneth GATES, Defendants.

Robert C. Wilson, Wilson & Cape, Harrisburg, IL, John E. Rhine, Rhine, Ernest, Mount Carmel, IL, for Plaintiff.

James W. Morris, Barrett, Twomey, Carbondale, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FOREMAN, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc.6). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc.12). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Plaintiff, Arclar Company, has sued James Gates for specific performance (count I) and for an injunction (count II) regarding certain land in Saline County. Specifically, Arclar seeks specific performance of an option to purchase a certain surface area of Gates' land that Arclar claims is necessary for its coal mining operation. Arclar also seeks an injunction because Gates is allegedly preventing Arclar from using an easement that Arclar claims to have acquired by deed. The original action was brought in Saline County. Gates removed it to this Court based on diversity and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.

I. Background.

Once upon a time, several members of the Choisser family, (specifically, William Choisser, Kate Choisser, De Launt Choisser, and Willie Choisser), held title to 214 17/20 acres in Saline County. In 1905, in a document called "Warranty Deed to Coal," the Choissers conveyed all of the coal underneath the surface of the 214 17/20 acres to O'Gara Coal Company (Doc. 2, Exh. A). The Warranty Deed to Coal also granted O'Gara Coal Company:

... the right to mine, dig, ventilate, drain and remove the coal therefrom, and together with the right to use the passageways and entries under the said premises for the purpose of hauling, mining and removing the coal above conveyed, and all other coal not belonging to or hereafter to be acquired by the said O'GARA COAL COMPANY, its successors and assigns, and for a "Right-of-Way" over the same, or such portion thereof as may be necessary for conveying said coal to market; ...

(Doc. 2, Exh. A).

The parties refer to this bundle of rights as a "Conveyor Easement." Finally, the Choissers also granted O'Gara Coal Company, (and its heirs, successors, and assigns), the right at any time to purchase for $100 per acre the portion of the land's surface necessary to mine and remove the said coal. Specifically, the Choissers agreed that:

The said grantors for themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, as a covenant running with the land and the property conveyed, further agree to sell to the O'GARA COAL COMPANY, its successors or assigns, at any time hereafter, such portion of the surface of the premises hereinabove described as may be necessary for the erection of tipple, buildings, powerhouses, railroad tracks, switches and other improvements necessary for the mining and removing said coal at the price of One hundred ($100.00) Dollars per acre, and to convey the title of said surface to said O'GARA COAL COMPANY, its successors and assigns, by good and sufficient Warranty Deed...

(Doc. 2, Exh. A).

By mesne conveyances, Arclar acquired the interests that O'Gara Coal Company had acquired by the Warranty Deed. In other words, Arclar has acquired: 1) the coal; 2) the Conveyor Easement; and 3) the right to purchase the surface necessary to mine the coal.

Arclar claims that it is necessary to construct a conveyor over and across the Conveyor Easement to convey the coal to market. Although Arclar has the Conveyor Easement, it also claims that it needs 3.442 acres of the surface to construct a high voltage power line and water line to service the conveyor. Gates owns 33 acres, including the 3.442 acres allegedly needed by Arclar. Gates acquired these 3.442 acres with notice of O'Gara's right to buy the surface. Specifically, the deed stated that Gates' 3.442 acres was:

Subject to the rights of O'Gara Coal Company its successors and assigns, relating to purchase of the surface and ownership of a right to explore for coal attached as Exhibit A and subject to all rights which are appurtenant to ownership of coal, expressed and implied.

(Doc. 2, p. 3).

As noted, Arclar seeks specific performance of the option to buy and an injunction preventing Gates from interfering with Arclar's use of the Conveyor Easement. Gates has filed a motion to dismiss based on various grounds discussed below.

II. Standard of Review.

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit. Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 129, 112 L.Ed.2d 97 (1990). A plaintiff is required only to provide a short and plain statement of the claim "that will give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted)). The Court must accept pleaded conclusions as true. Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.1992). The sole issue when reviewing a motion to dismiss is whether relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

III. Motion to Dismiss.

Mr. Gates' Motion to Dismiss is based on six (6) grounds which are addressed below.

1) Arclar's Claims are Not Barred by Illinois' 75-year Statute of Limitation.

Gates argues that Arclar's claims are barred by Illinois' 75-year statute of limitation, 735 ILCS 5/13-114. This statute provides that:

§ 13-114 Seventy-five year limitation. No deed, will, estate, .... relating to or affecting the title to real estate in the State of Illinois, which happened, was administered, or was executed, dated delivered, recorded or entered into more than 75 years prior to July 1, 1872, or such subsequent date as the same is offered, presented, urged, claimed, asserted, or appears against any person hereafter becoming interested in the title to any real estate, or to any agent or attorney thereof, shall adversely to the party or parties hereafter coming into possession of such real estate under claim or color of title or persons claiming under him, her or them, constitute notice, either actual or constructive of any right, title, interest or claim in and to such real estate, or any part thereof, or be, or be considered to be evidence or admissible in evidence or be held or urged to make any title unmarketable in part or in whole, or be required or allowed to be alleged or proved as a basis for any action, or any statutory proceeding affecting directly or indirectly the title to such real estate.

735 ILCS 5/13-114.

Gates argues that this statute bars any use or enforcement of a deed older than 75 years. Thus, according to Gates, Arclar's claimed easement and right to buy a portion of the surface to use that easement are barred because they originate from a deed dated 1905.

Gates' argument must fail for several reasons. First, the statute is inapplicable. The purpose of the statute is to prevent clouds on title from lingering for more than 75 years. It applies to competing chains of title, adverse interests, and the like where the title to the land is at issue or could be affected. Specifically, the statute decrees that "No deed ... offered ... against any person ... becoming interested in the title ... shall adversely to the party hereafter coming into possession of such real estate under claim or color of title ... constitute notice, either actual or constructive, of any right, title, interest ... in ... or be considered to be evidence or admissible in evidence ..." 735 ILCS 5/13-114. By its own terms, the statute applies when one of the parties asserting an interest in the land does so by "claim or color of title." Id.

Claim or "color of title" means:

The appearance, [or] semblance ... of title. Also termed "apparent title." Any fact, extraneous to the act or mere will of the claimant, which has the appearance, on its face of supporting his claim of a present title to land, but which, for some defect, in reality falls short of establishing it.

Black's Law Dictionary 241 (5th ed.1979) (citations omitted); see also Anoweurth v. Burlingin, 1 F.Cas. 1036, 1037 (C.C.D.Ill. 1848) ("The court defined the `claim and color of title made in good faith' under this law, to be such a title as in law would pass the estate prima facie, if a better title be not shown").

This is not a case involving "claim or color of title." Neither Arclar or Mr. Gates is seeking to assert, by claim or color of title, the same interest in the same property. Mr. Gates simply took title to his acreage subject to the Conveyor Easement and the option to purchase the surface necessary to mine the coal. By the same token, Arclar holds title to the coal, the Conveyor Easement and the option to purchase, and is simply seeking to exercise that option. Neither party is asserting by claim or color of title the same interest in the same property. Accordingly, by its own terms, the 75-year statute of limitation is inapplicable.

Secondly, even if the statute did apply to the facts at bar, the statute also provides an exception. This exception states that:

The provisions of this Section shall not apply to or operate against ... any person who during the entire period herein permitted for reassertion of title, or prior thereto, has not had the right to sue for and protect his or her claim, interest or title.

735 ILCS 5/13-114.

O'Gara Coal Company acquired the coal, the easement, and the option to purchase...

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