Ard v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 72-2346

Decision Date15 October 1973
Docket Number72-2347.,No. 72-2346,72-2346
PartiesEmanuel H. ARD, as Administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth R. Ard, Deceased, Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee. James H. MOORE, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of Loretta B. Moore, Deceased, Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

John A. Martin, Winnsboro, S. C. (Ted H. Bradberry, Winnsboro, S. C., on brief), for appellants.

H. Simmons Tate, Jr., Columbia, S. C. (John H. Lumpkin, Jr., Boyd, Knowlton, Tate & Finlay, Columbia, S. C., on brief), for appellee.

Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

A train of the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad struck, in the early afternoon of March 25, 1971 near Columbia, South Carolina, a station wagon as it was crossing the track at Brickyard Road, killing the four occupants. Two of these were 11-year old Elizabeth R. Ard and Loretta B. Moore, daughter and sister, respectively, of the driver. Their personal representatives sued in these two actions1 to recover damages, actual and punitive, for their deaths, laying the blame on the negligence of the Railroad.2 A verdict was directed for the defendant. The judgment thereon, upon the plaintiff's appeal, will be reversed and a new trial directed.

The trial judge, at the conclusion of all the evidence, appraised the proof as insufficient to allow the jury to find the Railroad negligent. However, when the testimony is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as is required on the motion for direction of a verdict, Webb v. Robinson, 241 F.2d 99, 101 (4 Cir. 1957), we think a jury could have found for the plaintiff. As District Judge Chapman pithily phrased it, "The only thing the plaintiff has to prove is one act of negligence that operated as a proximate cause, not the proximate cause, a concurring cause". (Accent in original). Conversely, the inquiry is whether the automobile driver's negligence, if any, was the sole proximate cause of the accident.3

The plaintiff chiefly ascribes negligence to the defendant's failure to maintain a flagman, flashing lights or other warning precautions at the crossing, and to the operation of trains at a dangerous speed, knowing the crossing was hazardous and heavily travelled.

Plaintiff's proof permitted the jury to deduce these facts. The railroad line, a single track, runs north and south; the train was proceeding northward; and Brickyard Road crosses east and west at grade. The station wagon was proceeding west to east, having just picked up the decedent child at a school on the west side of the track about a city block away. Both snow and sleet had been falling in the morning causing ice to form on Brickyard Road, but only the snow continued through the day. Because of the weather the school had closed early. The station wagon was headed for U. S. highway #1, paralleling the track on the east side thereof.

The distance from the west or nearest edge of highway #1 to the easternmost rail was less than the length of a bus, so that a bus stopping to enter the highway could not completely clear the track. Apparently, just before the catastrophe, the station wagon was standing behind an automobile which was awaiting an opportunity to turn onto highway #1. At that moment the rear of the station wagon was hit by the train.

Approaching the track from the west on Brickyard Road, the station wagon passed a State railroad warning sign about 450 feet away from the crossing. Next, approximately 335 feet from the crossing, there was a Highway Department "Stop Ahead" sign. Then, written on the surface of the road 138 feet from the track, was a railroad sign "RXR". Further on is a railroad crossing sign and a red "stop" sign, both about 15 feet from the track. Also, there were crossbuck stop signs at the track, indicating the crossing.

To the right of the driver there were four 50-foot boxcars standing on a siding just west of the main track and 325 feet from the crossing. Additionally, to the south of Brickyard Road, some 125 feet from the center of the main track on the west side, was an industrial building. The employees of the industry parked automobiles to the east of this building at right angles to the west side of the track. From the red "stop" sign, visibility was unobstructed for a distance of 2000 to 2500 feet in the direction from which the train was coming.

Closely following the station wagon was an automobile driven by a father with his two children whom he had also just taken from the school. He testified that the station wagon stopped about three feet in front of him before reaching the track. No train, he says, was then in sight. In the next split second he heard a locomotive whistle. By that time the rear end of the station wagon had already progressed onto the track; in front of the station wagon were one or more cars waiting to turn onto highway #1. The train's speed was 60-65 mph. A passenger in a car driving southward on...

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3 cases
  • Bostick Oil Co., Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., Commercial Div.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 14 March 1983
    ...nonmoving party, in the light most favorable to it, drawing all reasonable inferences in Bostick's favor, Ard v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 487 F.2d 456, 457 (4 Cir.1973), without weighing the credibility of witnesses. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp. v. Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 3......
  • Rice v. Military Sales & Service Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 1 May 1980
    ...his presentation and to view all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom favorably to the plaintiff. Ard v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, (4th Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 456, 457; Boleski v. American Export Lines, Inc., (4th Cir. 1967) 385 F.2d 69, 74. That evidence, as included by agreeme......
  • United States v. DeBerry
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 7 November 1973
    ... ... for codefendant Padilla followed the same line as to his defendant, with the same result. No one ... ...

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