Ardis v. Danheisser
| Decision Date | 06 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:13cv366/MCR/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | ROBERT MICHAEL ARDIS, Plaintiff, v. LAURA DANHEISSER, et al., Defendants. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief (doc. 1 at 1-45). This matter is currently before the court on Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (doc. 38).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N. D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)(C); and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Plaintiff, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary relief against one or more defendants who are immune from such relief. Therefore, dismissal of this action is warranted.
Plaintiff names twelve Defendants in this action: the Office of the State Attorney of the First Judicial Circuit of Florida ("First Circuit"); William Eddins, the State Attorney of the First Circuit; Laura Danheisser, Adrian Emerson, Susan Faris, Gregory Marcille, and Stephen Luongo, all of whom are Assistant State Attorneys; T. Michael Jones, Circuit Judge for the Circuit Court for Escambia County, Florida; Joyce Williams, County Judge for Escambia County, Florida; the Escambia CountySheriff's Office ("ECSO"); David Morgan, Sheriff of Escambia County; and Harry Kilpatrick, a deputy with the ECSO (doc. 38 at 1-6).
Plaintiff alleges during divorce proceedings between him and his now ex-wife, both he and his ex-wife petitioned for and obtained domestic violence injunctions against each other in Case Nos. 2009-DR-3645 () and 2009-DR-3588 () (doc. 38 at 8).1 Plaintiff alleges on October 25, 2010, he was arrested for violating his ex-wife's injunction (id. at 7).2 He alleges he was "held to one set of standards" regarding compliance with his ex-wife's injunction, but she was "held to a totally separate standard" (id. at 8-9). Plaintiff alleges the next day, he appeared at a bond hearing, at which Defendant County Judge Williams "punitively" set bond at $250,000.00 (id.).3 He alleges Judge Williams reduced his bond to $2,500.00 on October 29, 2010, and he posted bond that day (id. at 7-8). Plaintiff alleges he lost his job as a result of the incarceration (id. at 8).4
Plaintiff alleges over two years later, on March 27, 2013, Defendant Circuit Judge Jones issued an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be held in indirect criminalcontempt for allegedly violating his ex-wife's domestic violence injunction (doc. 38 at 9-10).5 He alleges he filed several motions to disqualify Judge Jones, but Judge Jones did not rule on them (id.).6 Plaintiff also alleges he filed a motion to dismiss the show cause order, but Judge Jones refused to rule on it (id. at 10). Plaintiff alleges Judge Jones appointed counsel for him, and his counsel filed a motion to dismiss the show cause order on statute of limitations grounds (id. ).7 He alleges his attorney also filed a motion for statement of particulars and a motion for appointment of a special prosecutor, but Defendants Eddins, Marcille, Luongo, Emerson, Danheisser, and Judge Jones ignored the motions (id. at 11). Plaintiff alleges notwithstanding the limitations issue and pending motions, Judge Jones proceeded with the indirect criminal contempt hearing on September 4, 2013 (id. at 11-12). He alleges Judge Jones sentenced him to thirty (30) days in jail, and he actually served twelve (12) days (from September 4-16) (id. at 12). Plaintiff allege Judge Jones's conduct was "personal," spiteful, and illegal (id. at 11-12).
Plaintiff claims that his arrest on October 25, 2010 for allegedly violating the domestic violence injunction, his pre-trial detention and prosecution for those charges, and his prosecution and imprisonment for indirect criminal contempt in 2013, violated his fundamental rights to equal protection and due process (doc. 38 at 8-9, 12). He seeks an injunction enjoining Defendants from "any further harassment" (id. at 13-14). He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages for interference with an advantageous business relationship, defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of liberty (id.).8
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss the case if satisfied that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). To survive § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility means "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quotation and citation omitted). And "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated succinctly:
Pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679. Finally, in civil rights cases, Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Liberally construing Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, he appears to assert claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against Deputy Kilpatrick. Plaintiff alleges Kilpatrick investigated the allegations that Plaintiff violated his ex-wife's domestic violence injunction, but Kilpatrick failed to interview him (Plaintiff) as part of the investigation. Plaintiff alleges Kilpatrick then applied for an arrest warrant, a warrant issued October 23, 2010, and Plaintiff turned himself in on October 25, 2010.
Federal law requires an arresting officer to conduct a reasonable investigation in order to determine if probable cause exists to arrest a person. See Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). However, an officer need not take "every conceivable step . . . at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person." Id. at 1436 (citations omitted). Where a law enforcement officer has sufficient facts to constitute probable cause, he does not "have a duty to investigate and decide the potential viability of a defense" before seeking an arrest warrant. See Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1995). Additionally, an officer is generally entitled to give weight to the victim's criminal complaint and identification as support for probable cause. See Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1440; L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684-85 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
A police officer submitting affidavits in an application for an arrest warrant may be held liable for damages resulting from the arrest under the authority of the warrant when no reasonable police officer could have believed that the affidavits established probable cause. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986). Further, the existence of a warrant will not shield an officer from liability where the warrant was secured based upon an affidavit that contained misstatements made either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); see also W. Point-Pepperell,Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 959 (11th Cir. 1982). A corollary of this above-stated rule is that "a warrant affidavit violates...
To continue reading
Request your trial