Ardoin v. Saul
| Decision Date | 03 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 4:19-cv-02022 |
| Parties | ADOLPHUS ARDOIN, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Plaintiff Adolphus Ardoin filed this action under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), for review of the Commissioner's final decision denying his request for disability insurance benefits. Ardoin and the Commissioner moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 14, 16. Having considered the filings, the record, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Ardoin's Motion (Dkt. 14), GRANTS the Commissioner's Motion (Dkt. 16), and AFFIRMS the Commissioner's final decision.1
Ardoin filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on May 3, 2016, alleging a disability onset date of October 9, 2015. Tr. 19. Ardoin alleged disabilities of two finger amputations, asthma/bronchitis, right shoulder pain, heart arrythmias, low back pain, and cervical pain. Tr. 21. The agency denied his claim on initial review on October 12, 2016 and on reconsideration on March 16, 2017. Tr. 78-80, 88-90. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on March1, 2018 at which Ardoin and a Vocational Expert ("VE") testified. Tr. 35-60. The ALJ denied Ardoin's application for benefits on April 16, 2018. Tr. 19-26. The Appeals Council granted review on January 30, 2019, but ultimately adopted the ALJ's decision that Ardoin was not under a disability at any time through the date of the ALJ's decision. Tr. 4-7.
Federal court review of the Commissioner's final decision to deny Social Security benefits is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standard; and (2) whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018). When reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court does not reweigh the evidence, try the questions de novo, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. Id.
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
At the first step, the ALJ decides whether the claimant is currently working or "engaged in substantial gainful activity." Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. At the second step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant's impairment does not have a de minimis impact on her ability to work, she is not disabled. Salmond v. Berryhill, 892F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018). The third step of the sequential analysis requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant's severe impairment meets or medically equals one of the listings in the regulation known as Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § pt. 404, subpt. p, app. 1 [hereinafter "App. 1"]. If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ must determine the claimant's "residual functional capacity" (RFC), which is the claimant's ability to do physical and mental tasks on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments. Giles v. Astrue, 433 Fed. App'x 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545). At step four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant's RFC permits her to perform her past relevant work. If the answer is no, the ALJ determines at step five whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987). The claimant bears the burden to prove disability at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d at 452-53.
Based on these principles, as well as his review of the evidence presented at the hearing, the ALJ determined the following: Ardoin met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2021; although Ardoin had engaged in substantial gainful activity for seven to eight months during 2016, there was a continuous 12-month period during which Ardoin did not engage in substantial activity; and Ardoin suffers from the severe impairments of two finger amputations on his left hand and asthma/bronchitis. Tr. 21. The ALJ also concluded Ardoin suffers from the following non-severe impairments: heart arrythmias, right shoulder pain, low back pain, and cervical pain. Id. The ALJ found Ardoin did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one ofthe listed impairments in Appendix. Tr. 22. The ALJ determined Ardoin has the RFC for medium work with additional limitations:
Specifically, [Ardoin] can stand/walk up to 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; sit up to 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; can occasionally climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; is right hand dominant but can occasionally handle with the outer two fingers but never finger or feel with those fingers; and occasional exposure to temperature extremes, damp/dry conditions, gases/fumes, dust/smoke, and chemicals.
Id.2 Relying on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that, although Ardoin was unable to perform any past relevant work, he had acquired skills that were transferable to other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 24-25. For that reason, the ALJ concluded Ardoin has not been under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and denied his application for benefits. Tr. 25.
Ardoin challenges the ALJ's finding, arguing three points of error. Dkt. 14 at 5. First, Ardoin argues the ALJ applied an improper severity standard in determining which of Ardoin's impairments are severe. Id. Second, Ardoin argues the ALJ's RFC finding fails to accommodate for all of his impairments. Id. Third, Ardoin argues the ALJ erred in relying on the VE's testimony to find Ardoin retained the ability to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
Ardoin argues the ALJ utilized an improper severity standard at step two to find that his right shoulder pain, heart arrythmias, low back pain, and cervical pain impairments were not severe. Dkt. 14 at 5-9. In Stone v. Heckler, the Fifth Circuit held that an "impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality [having] such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (quotations omitted). The Stone court also held an ALJ is presumed to have applied an incorrect standard "unless the correct standard is set forth by reference to [the Stone] opinion or another of the same effect[.]" Id. at 1106. In this case, the ALJ did not cite the Stone standard or "another of the same effect" in his analysis.3 Instead, the ALJ found that Ardoin's right shoulder pain, heart arrythmias, low back pain, and cervical pain impairments did not "significantly limit" his ability to work. Tr. 21. Thus, the ALJ held Ardoin to a higher standard than the one set forth in Stone and since reaffirmed by the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Loza v. Apfel, 219 F. 3d 378, 391 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d at 817; see also Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d at 705 ().
The ALJ's use of an improper standard at step two is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Murphy v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-01260-M-BH, 2018 WL 4568808, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2018) (citations omitted) ("Stone error does not mandate automatic reversal and remand,however; application of harmless error analysis is appropriate in cases where the ALJ proceeds past step two in the sequential evaluation process."). "[T]he major policy underlying the harmless error rule is to preserve judgments and avoid waste of time[,]" and a decision of the Commissioner "is not to be vacated unless a substantial right of the claimant has been adversely affected." Jones v. Astrue, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1015 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (citing Audler v. Astrue, 501 F. 3d 446 (5th Cir. 2007). Ardoin bears the burden of proving the error was not harmless by showing he was prejudiced by it. Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2012).
A step two error is harmless if the ALJ proceeds beyond step two and gives proper consideration to both the severe and non-severe impairments in the remaining steps. See Goodman v. Comm's of Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1321-G(BH), 2012 WL 4473136, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 10, 2012) (); see also Bornette v. Barnhart, 466 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (). The ALJ's written decision demonstrates he considered both severe and non-severe...
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