Ardoin v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

• Decision Date: 24 January 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 9226.
• Citation: 226 F. Supp. 192
• Parties: Vernel ARDOIN v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

226 F. Supp. 192

Vernel ARDOIN v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA.

Civ. A. No. 9226.

United States District Court W. D. Louisiana, Opelousas Division.

January 24, 1964.

Dubuisson & Dubuisson, Edward Dubuisson, Opelousas, La., for plaintiff.

Hammett, Leake & Hammett, Robert E. Leake, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendant.

Mouton & Roy, Harmon F. Roy, Lafayette, La., for intervenor.

Faris, Ellis, Cutrone, Gilmore & Lautenschlaeger, J. Y. Gilmore, Jr., New Orleans, La., and Lewis & Lewis, Opelousas, La., for third party defendant.

PUTNAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ardoin filed this suit on the law side of the Court to recover against Union Oil Company of California for personal injuries sustained by him on navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of Louisiana. The owner of the motor vessel on which he was riding at the time, D & B Boat Rentals, Inc., and its insurer, Transit Casualty Company, are not named in the original complaint as defendants.

The pleadings reflect that the parties stand in relation to each other as follows: Union contracted with Richey Drilling Company to drill a well on one of its offshore locations, and also contracted with D & B to furnish transportation to and from the well site for Richey's drilling crews, of which Ardoin was a member. The complaint does not state whether the accident occurred beyond the continental shelf or within the seaward boundaries of Louisiana as delineated in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301, 1331 et seq., nor does it allege whether the drilling operations being conducted were carried out on a submersible drilling barge of the type that may be classified as a vessel, or on a fixed platform.

It is alleged that the weather was rough, that a representative of Union on the platform instructed the skipper to come out to the location in spite of the rough weather prevailing and the danger incident to this undertaking, that the skipper in carrying out their instructions negligently proceeded in the light vessel at a high rate of speed and upon the vessel being struck by a series of large waves plaintiff was thrown from a bunk on which he was lying, whereupon he was injured.

Union has filed a third party petition seeking to bring D & B and its insurer, Transit Casualty Company, into the suit as defendants, on the theory (1) that if it is liable to Ardoin its liability is vicarious and secondary to that of D & B, with a right of indemnity against D & B on the theory of active vs. passive negligence (2) that it has a right to indemnity under the "implied warranties of fitness and good workmanship legally implicit in D & B's performance of its contractual obligations to Union, which are governed by Louisiana Law," and (3) in the alternative, that Union is entitled to contribution from D & B and Transit as between joint tort feasors for one-half of all sums for which it might be cast.

D & B and Transit now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim and alternatively for summary judgment or to strike such portions of the third party complaint which fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This motion we now consider.

Movants rely upon Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952), which held that there was no right of contribution in the maritime law for actions against joint tort feasors for negligence in non-collision cases, and Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) holding that actions for injuries occurring on navigable waters are governed by the federal maritime law as to matters of substantive right as well as procedure. To this we add the comment that the contract between D & B and Union is a maritime contract for the transportation of persons over navigable waters, and is itself subject to interpretation by maritime standards insofar as they apply. Benedict on Admiralty, 6 ed., Vol. 1, § 66 p. 136, note 47 and cases there cited.

Union relies upon D. M. Picton & Co., Inc. v. Eastes et al, 160 F.2d 189 (5 Cir. 1947); Pinion v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 156 F.Supp. 652 (E.D.La.1957); and Hill v. George Engine Co., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.La.1961).

In Picton there was clearly an active breach of an express contract provision in the failure to remove a piling from an oil well location in the Gulf under contract with Superior Oil Company. Superior was allowed indemnity from its contractor for damages paid by it to the owner of a motorboat damaged by the remaining piling, there being a negligent failure to perform an express obligation and such damages being contemplative and foreseeable under the contract.

In Pinion, the court allowed indemnity for damages paid by a shipowner for injuries to a ship's repairman from the ship's repairer with whom the owner contracted to do the work in question, this relationship being likened to the stevedore vs. owner vs. stevedore-contractor relationship found in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956).

In Hill as in Picton, there was a negligent breach of an express engagement to properly install an engine in plaintiff's tug, causing damage to the Harvey lock gates. For breach of this contractual warranty, indemnity was allowed.

More recently the Fifth Circuit in Grace Lines, Inc. v. Port Everglades Terminal Company, 324 F.2d 699, reviewed the Ryan case, supra, and its progeny...