Areizaga v. Quern, 77 C 276.

• Citation: 442 F. Supp. 168
• Decision Date: 13 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77 C 276.,77 C 276.
• Parties: Ramona AREIZAGA, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Arthur F. QUERN, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, etc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

442 F. Supp. 168

Ramona AREIZAGA, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Arthur F. QUERN, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, etc., Defendant.

No. 77 C 276.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

August 23, 1977.

Opinion and Order December 13, 1977.

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Alan J. Barak, Robert E. Lehrer, Henry T. Zausner, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Thomas C. O'Laughlin, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DECKER, District Judge.

The instant action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenges the policy and practice of the defendant Illinois Department of Public Aid ("IDPA") of denying to claimants and recipients of public assistance seeking administrative review of adverse decisions the opportunity of reviewing their case files prior to and during the administrative hearings, except as to those items which the IDPA chooses to use at the hearing as evidence against them.

The court has granted leave for this action to proceed as class action in behalf of:

"All Illinois claimants for and recipients of public assistance benefits and/or services under Title IV-A, and/or XIX, and/or XX of the Social Security Act; and/or Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled under P.L. 93-66, § 212, as amended, who file administrative appeals with the Illinois Department of Public Aid regarding such benefits and services."

A preliminary injunction has been entered in behalf of the plaintiffs by the court.

Although the defendant argues extensively that the court lacks jurisdiction in this matter, there is no merit to this contention. Claims alleging the unconstitutional denial of due process are cognizable under § 1983 unless they are either frivolous or insubstantial. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). At most, the assertion of insubstantiality rests upon a contention that the courts have never expressly ruled upon constitutional grounds in favor of this type of claim. Even if it is conceded that this case does raise some relatively novel due process issues, it is hardly one that is frivolous or utterly without merit. Indeed, an essentially identical constitutional claim was deemed by the court in Feld v. Berger, 424 F.Supp. 1356 (S.D.N.Y.1976), to raise "fundamental questions of notice and denial of a fair opportunity to present an adequate case, which are not frivolous or insubstantial." Fn. 12 at 1360.

Furthermore, the instant action is also based upon a statutory claim, seeking the enforcement of federal regulations pursuant to the Social Security Act, which are binding upon the defendant. This provides an independent basis of federal jurisdiction for this § 1983 suit. Indeed, pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court, it is the obligation of this court to initially consider the non-constitutional claims before reaching the due process issues. Hagans v. Lavine, supra.

The few factual matters in this case are not disputed. The defendant admits in its answer that its

"continuing policy and practice is to deny to all persons bringing administrative appeals against IDPA the opportunity to examine or have their legal representative examine their own case files, with the exception only of those items which IDPA itself selects to use in evidence against those persons."

This policy is incorporated in IDPA regulation PO-235.9.

In practice this means that the IDPA, acting in essentially an adversary role, censors an appellant's access to the file containing the information relating to his or her case. It thus provides only the least favorable materials, those which it will use as evidence against the appellant's claims. The court cannot share the apparent assumption of the IDPA that the only relevant materials are those items in the file which can be used to justify denial of assistance.

In any event, it is not necessary to reach any conclusion as to the plaintiffs' due process claim,¹ since it is clear that this policy of the IDPA contravenes H.E.W. regulations. The state is obligated to comply with such regulations as a condition of receiving federal funds for public assistance programs. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968).

The regulation in question, 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(13)(i) (1976), provides that a claimant for assistance or his representative shall be granted adequate opportunity

"to examine the contents of his case file and all documents and records to be used by the agency at the hearing at a reasonable time before the date of the hearing as well as during the hearing." (Emphasis added.)

This section replaced a preceding rule which only granted "adequate opportunity . . to examine all documents and records used at the hearing." 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(10)(i) (1972), a more limited right which reflects the defendant's current practice.

This regulation plainly entitles the plaintiff class to examine the entire contents of their files prior to and during an appeals hearing. This was the express holding of the court in Feld v. Berger, supra, at 1363. Judge Weinfeld was compelled in Feld to construe the plaintiff's entitlements pursuant to the regulation; it is irrelevant that the improper restrictions imposed by the New York welfare authorities were more egregious than in the instant case.

The construction of the regulation in Feld is clearly correct. The inclusion of the words "contents of his file and" cannot be viewed as merely a clarification of "documents and records to be used by the agency at the hearing." The revised regulation grant the latter right to claimants and access to the contents of their file. Although "and" is a "kleine wortlein",² "and" can have great impact. It indicates that the records to be used by the agency at the hearing are to be supplied in addition to the materials in the file. If the words "contents of his file" were intended as a mere clarification of the old regulation, they would have been written as an appositive, or perhaps in the disjunctive, but in any event without the "and".³

Nor is this reading of the current regulations upset by the publication of inquiries regarding proposed new regulations. It may be possible that H.E.W. is considering the future limitation of public assistance appellants' access to their files. This has no bearing upon the rules presently binding upon the defendant. It is noteworthy, however, that the pre-proposed regulation, § 214.43 41 Fed.Reg. 52,498 (1976) cited by the defendant, would still require greater disclosure of an appellant's files than allowed by current IDPA practice and policy.⁴

Accordingly, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the plaintiff class is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The motion of the plaintiff class for summary judgment is hereby ordered granted.

The plaintiff class is therefore entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from:

(1) Enforcing all state regulations, particularly IDPA Categorical Assistance Manuals PO-235.9, PR-235.9, PR-235.12, which mandate, effectuate or otherwise apply its current practice of denying the plaintiff class review of their entire case files at a reasonable time prior to and during the administrative hearings;

(2) Failing to permit members of the plaintiff class and/or their designated representatives to inspect, make notes from, make photostatic copies of and otherwise examine any items in their entire IDPA case files at a reasonable time prior to and at their scheduled administrative hearings;

(3) Failing to provide members of the plaintiff class and their designated representatives with written notice (at a reasonable time prior to their administrative hearings) of their right to make notes from, make photostatic copies of, and otherwise examine their entire IDPA case files at a reasonable time prior to and at their administrative hearings.

The court hereby declares, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., that the current practice and policy of the defendant IDPA of limiting the access of the plaintiff class to their case files to those items which the IDPA selects for introduction at an adversary hearing, to be in violation of the regulation published at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(13)(i) (1976), and further declares that practice and policy deprives the plaintiff class of its rights secured by the laws of the United States.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to compel defendant, Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, to comply with certain federal regulations in his administration of the welfare system in Illinois. At issue is defendant's policy of not allowing aid claimants full access to their case files for purposes of appealing through administrative channels decisions denying them assistance or reducing the amount of assistance they receive.

On August 23, 1977, on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court found that defendant's policy violated the federal regulations set down in 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(13)(i) (1976) and ordered defendant to permit all members of the plaintiff class to "inspect, make notes from, make photostatic copies of and otherwise examine any items in their entire IDPA case files." Defendant was also ordered to give members of the plaintiff class notice of their right to such inspection. Now before the court is defendant's motion to amend the judgment.¹

At the outset, the court is met with plaintiffs' argument that all of the points raised in this motion could have been brought to the court's attention while the motion for summary judgment was under consideration, and are now untimely. Defendant responds that the only issue involved in the summary judgment motion was the...