Arellano-Velazquez v. Davis

• Decision Date: 12 March 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-4448
• Parties: JUAN JOSE ARELLANO-VELAZQUEZ, (TDCJ-CID #02091454) Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

JUAN JOSE ARELLANO-VELAZQUEZ, (TDCJ-CID #02091454) Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-4448

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

March 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

Petitioner Juan Jose Arellano-Velazquez ("Arellano") seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, from a conviction entered against him in the 208th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 7), and copies of the state court record. Arellano has filed his response. (Docket Entry No. 9).

I. Background

A jury found Arellano guilty of the felony offense of possessing, with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely cocaine, weighing at least 400 grams. (Cause Number 147933301010). On September 22, 2016, the jury sentenced Arellano to sixty years' imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals for the State of Texas affirmed Arellano's conviction in an unpublished opinion. See Arellano-Velazquez v. State, No. 01-16-789-CR, 2018 WL 454796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 18, 2018, pet. ref'd). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Arellano's petition for discretionary review on June 6, 2018. Arellano filed an application for state habeas corpus relief on March 25, 2019, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily denied without written order on October 16, 2019. (Docket Entry No. 8-20, Ex parte Arellano-Velazquez, Writ No. 90,328-01, p. 1).

On November 7, 2019, this Court received Arellano's federal petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Arellano contends that his conviction is void for the following reasons:

1. He was denied meaningful review of his state court habeas petition because:

(a) the trial court "refused to answer" and denied his motion seeking a 90-day loan of his trial transcripts for use in his state habeas proceeding;

(b) the First Court of Appeals denied his petition for mandamus which sought to compel the trial court to grant his motion for a loan of his trial transcripts for use in his state habeas proceeding;

(c) neither the trial court nor the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals obtained an affidavit from his trial counsel in response to his state habeas petition; and

(d) neither the trial court nor the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the claims raised in his state court habeas petition.

2. Trial counsel, Robert Valles, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to a biased prospective juror who was subsequently empaneled;

3. The State "committed prosecutorial misconduct" by failing to disclose that two accomplice-witnesses received reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony; and

4. Trial counsel, Robert Valles, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly object to evidence of "unadjudicated extraneous acts" that was inadmissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b);

5. His conviction is invalid because there was "no corroboration of the evidence" from the accomplice-witnesses.

(Docket Entry No. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 6-7). The respondent argues that grounds 1(a), (b), (c), and (d) are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition and that grounds 2, 3, 4, and 5 lack merit.

II. The Applicable Legal Standards

This Court reviews Arellano's petition for writ of habeas corpus under the federal habeas statutes, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2002); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997)).

Sections 2254(d)(1) and (2) of AEDPA set out the standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law that result in an adjudication on the merits. An adjudication on the merits "is a term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case is substantive, as opposed to procedural." Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court's determination of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact receives deference unless it "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if: (1) the state court's conclusion is "opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or (2) the "state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" and arrives at an opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if it identifies the correct legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular case or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent toa new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407. Factual findings made by the state court are "presumed to be correct . . . and [receive] deference . . . unless [a finding] 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Hill, 210 F.3d at 485 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

Under section 2254(e)(1), a state court's factual findings are entitled to deference and are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with "clear and convincing evidence." Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 2005)). This deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but also to any implicit findings of the state court. Garcia, 454 F.3d at 444-45 (citing Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 876 (5th Cir. 2005), and Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004)).

This deferential AEDPA standard of review is not altered when state habeas relief is denied without a written opinion because a federal habeas court reviews only the reasonableness of the state court's ultimate decision. See Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("It seems clear to us that a federal habeas court is authorized by [§] 2254(d) to review only a state court's 'decision,' and not the written opinion explaining that decision."); Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2001). In the absence of a written state court opinion, this court (1) assumes the state court applied the proper "clearly established Federal law"; and (2) determines whether the state court's decision was "contrary to" or "an objectively unreasonable application of that law. Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 303 (5th Cir. 2003) (assuming the state court was aware of relevant Supreme Court decisions even though they were not cited in its opinion). In conducting its review when "there is no reasonedstate-court decision on the merits, the federal court 'must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible [that] fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.'" Sexton v. Beaudreaux, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2558 (2018) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). "If such disagreement is possible, then the petitioner's claim must be denied." Id. Thus, the habeas petitioner must still meet his or her burden to show that "there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.

Arellano is proceeding pro se. A pro se habeas petition is construed liberally and not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings filed by lawyers. See Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2011); Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988). This Court broadly interprets Arellano's state and federal habeas petitions. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999).

III. Statement of Facts

When affirming Arellano's conviction on direct appeal, the First Court of Appeals summarized the evidence at trial as follows:

The police surveil Arellano, observe him pick up narcotics, and arrest him and his accomplices

One morning, Officer M. Zamora of the Houston Police Department was surveilling a Honda parked in front of a house in east Houston. The house was the residence of Juan Arellano-Velasquez, whom Zamora had been investigating for suspected drug trafficking. Zamora had received a tip from a confidential informant that the Honda would soon be leaving town with an undetermined amount of narcotics. He observed that the Honda had a broken window and then left the scene in his unmarked vehicle.

When Officer Zamora returned to the residence later in the day, he observed that the window had been repaired, leading him to suspect some movement was about to occur. He then observed Arellano exit his house, get into the Honda, and drive away. He called Officers G. Haselberger and K. Venables to provide rolling surveillance.

Communicating through a back-channel police radio, the officers followed the Honda to a shopping center, where they observed Arellano pick up a man, later identified as Omar Hernandez. The officers continued to follow the Honda as it left the shopping center and drove to a washateria.

Surveilling the washateria from across the street, Zamora observed the Honda park next to a Toyota, which was driven by a man later identified as Edgar Henriquez. He then observed an Infiniti pull up and park beside the Honda. Zamora continued to watch as Hernandez got out of the Honda, retrieved a backpack from a passenger in the Infiniti, put the backpack in

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