Argenti v. Buller (In re Interest of Buller)
| Decision Date | 17 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20200168,20200168 |
| Citation | 952 N.W.2d 106 |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF David BULLER Anna A. Argenti, Assistant State's Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee v. David Buller, Respondent and Appellant |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Karlei K. Neufeld, Assistant State's Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for petitioner and appellee; submitted on brief.
Kent M. Morrow, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellant; submitted on brief.
[¶1] David Buller appeals from a district court order granting a petition for commitment of a sexually dangerous individual. Buller argues the proceedings in this case were barred by res judicata and the order for commitment was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.
[¶2] On January 23, 2020, the State filed a petition for civil commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. On January 28, 2020, following a preliminary hearing, the district court entered an order of dismissal of the petition after finding the State failed to establish Buller had a condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction. On January 30, 2020, sua sponte and without notice to the parties, the court issued an order vacating the prior order dismissing the petition and finding probable cause was established to commit Buller.
[¶3] On February 19, 2020, Buller filed a petition for writ of mandamus to this Court. This Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court's January 30, 2020 order after considering the procedural irregularity of the second order issued sua sponte and without notice to the parties. In vacating the January 30, 2020 order, we noted the following: "the Court takes this action without prejudice to the district court's or the State's ability to conduct further proceedings in this case, or to the State filing a new petition based on existing or new facts." No further proceedings were taken in the initial commitment proceedings.
[¶4] On March 6, 2020, the State filed a new petition and started a new proceeding seeking commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. Buller requested dismissal of the new petition asserting res judicata precluded a second petition because the January 28, 2020 order dismissing the petition following the preliminary hearing was not vacated in the first proceeding. Following the preliminary hearing in the new proceeding, the district court ordered Buller to submit to an evaluation as a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶5] After completion of the evaluation, a treatment hearing was held where the State presented evidence and testimony by Peter Byrne, Ph.D. (Dr. Byrne), a North Dakota Licensed Psychologist. Dr. Byrne had conducted a record review and in-person interview and assessment of Buller. Buller presented evidence and testimony by Jessica Mugge, Ph.D., L.P., (Dr. Mugge), a Licensed Clinical Psychologist. Dr. Mugge conducted a record review and in-person interview and assessment of Buller. Both doctors reached the opinion Buller met the criteria of a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶6] During the treatment hearing, Buller again moved to dismiss the State's petition based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Buller later filed a formal motion to dismiss the petition. The motion was denied.
[¶7] On May 29, 2020, the district court issued an order granting the petition seeking commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual after finding Buller met the statutory criteria as a sexually dangerous individual who is in continued need of treatment and rehabilitation. The court based its decision on the reports and testimony of Dr. Byrne and Dr. Mugge, with a specific finding that Dr. Byrne's testimony was persuasive at the hearing. The court noted Dr. Mugge's testimony was not as detailed as Dr. Byrne's testimony, but still found her testimony convincing and supported the commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶8] Buller appeals from the district court order granting the petition to commit him as a sexually dangerous individual. On appeal, Buller argues the second petition was barred by res judicata and he challenges the finding that the State had proved he is a sexually dangerous individual who is in continued need of treatment and rehabilitation.
[¶9] Buller argues the district court order for civil commitment in this proceeding was barred by res judicata because the court's order of dismissal, entered on January 28, 2020 in the prior proceeding, was the final order on the merits after this Court vacated the district court's January 30 order. The doctrine of res judicata forecloses parties from litigating claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions between the same parties. Ungar v. N.D. State Univ. , 2006 ND 185, ¶ 11, 721 N.W.2d 16. "Whether res judicata applies is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal."
Fredericks v. Vogel Law Firm , 2020 ND 171, ¶ 10, 946 N.W.2d 507.
[¶10] In order for a claim to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, there must be a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Reed v. Univ. of N.D. , 1999 ND 25, ¶ 10, 589 N.W.2d 880. A final judgment, or its equivalent under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b), can be appealed to this Court. Indus. Comm'n of N.D. v. Kuntz , 486 N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D. 1992). Interlocutory orders are not final and appealable unless "it can be affirmatively established the underlying order was meant to be, in all aspects, final." White v. Altru Health Sys. , 2008 ND 48, ¶ 4, 746 N.W.2d 173 (internal quotation omitted); see also William Clairmont, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc. , 229 N.W.2d 77, 80 (N.D. 1975) (). In Trautman v. Keystone Dev. Corp. , 156 N.W.2d 817, 818-819 (N.D. 1968), this Court held an order vacating a judgment was not final and appealable when the order was not decisive on the question involved and did not prejudice the parties’ right to raise issues at a subsequent stage of the proceedings.
[¶11] In determining whether an order is final, we consider whether the underlying proceedings were vacated or dismissed with or without prejudice. "Dismissal of a claim or action without prejudice has no res judicata effect because there has been no decision on the merits and no right or remedy of the parties is affected." Hager v. City of Devils Lake , 2009 ND 180, ¶ 11, 773 N.W.2d 420 ; see also Sellie v. N.D. Ins. Guar. Ass'n , 494 N.W.2d 151, 159 (N.D. 1992). "The words ‘without prejudice’, as used in judgment, ordinarily import the contemplation of further proceedings, and, when they appear in an order or decree, it shows that the judicial act is not intended to be res judicata of the merits of the controversy." Hager , at ¶ 11 (quoting In re C.M. , 532 N.W.2d 381, 382-83 (N.D. 1995) ); see also Black's Law Dictionary , 1740 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "without prejudice" as "[w]ithout loss of any rights; in a way that does not harm or cancel the legal rights or privileges of a party").
[¶12] This Court's order granting Buller's petition for writ of mandamus addressed Buller's assertion the district court's second order, vacating the court's prior order to dismiss the proceedings, was improperly entered sua sponte by the court and without notice to Buller. Addressing the procedural irregularities we ordered as follows:
[¶13] No further action was taken in the prior case following this Court's order. The State subsequently filed a new petition for civil commitment of Buller. Our prior order unambiguously vacated the district court's January 30, 2020 court order and preserved the State's right to proceed with further action seeking the commitment of Buller, including "filing a new petition based on existing or new facts." We conclude, under these circumstances, the current action is not barred by res judicata.
[¶14] Buller challenges the district court's finding that the State had demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Buller is a sexually dangerous individual who is in continued need of treatment and rehabilitation. Under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, the State has the burden of proving a person is a sexually dangerous individual by clear and convincing evidence. A person may not be committed as a "sexually dangerous individual" unless the State proves the following elements as provided in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) :
(1) the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct, (2) the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction, and (3) the individual's condition makes them likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others.
In re Johnson , 2016 ND 29, ¶ 3, 876 N.W.2d 25 (quoting Interest of Johnson , 2015 ND 71, ¶ 5, 861 N.W.2d 484 ). Moreover, this Court has recognized substantive due process requires additional proof beyond the three statutory elements:
In addition to the three statutory requirements, to satisfy substantive due process, the State must also prove the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior.... We construe the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to mean that proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness encompasses proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in...
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