Argo v. State
| Decision Date | 11 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 561 |
| Citation | 213 So.2d 244,282 Ala. 509 |
| Parties | Jesse ARGO v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Robt. C. Barnett, Birmingham, for appellant.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and John A. Lockett, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant (defendant), Jesse Argo, was convicted on the 29th day of March, 1967, in the Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, for robbery and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in the penitentiary. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial on the 11th day of April 1967 and this motion was overruled on the 19th day of December 1967. The appellant filed his notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama on the 19th day of December, 1967.
The appellant was charged with taking the sum of Nine Hundred Dollars ($900) from one Howard Tribble on the 25th day of October, 1961. The appellant, having represented himself to be a pauper, was assigned counsel. On his arraignment, the plea was not guilty, with a reservation to file additional pleas prior to the trial. The case was set for trial on the 11th day of February, 1963.
The appellant's defense was an alibi in that he was living and working in Houston, Texas, at the time of the alleged crime. The appellant found it necessary to file interrogatories to witnesses in Houston, Texas, and moved that the State provide expense money so as to allow the expense for what he termed material witnesses to be paid to come to Alabama. He made an amended motion and asked for funds to be furnished his attorney to enable him to travel to Texas to locate and interview witnesses. Both of these motions were denied. Thereafter, the appellant propounded interrogatories to several out of State witnesses as provided by law in Title 15, §§ 297, 298, Code of Alabama, 1940, as amended.
The appellant relies on five propositions of law as a basis for the reversal of this case. The first is that the defendant did not get a 'speedy and public trial' and therefore in denying such a 'speedy trial' it violated the constitutional rights of appellant.
We do not take issue with the appellant as to the law on the subject of 'speedy trial,' but find nothing in the record that substantiates appellant's contention that he was denied a 'speedy and public trial.' Some of the postponements and continuances of the trial were made at the request of appellant, and the other continuances set out in the record were non-conclusive as being adverse to the rights of appellant. We deem this ground without merit.
Next, the appellant claimed he was denied 'equal protection under the law' in that he was denied a fund to secure witnesses to testify on his behalf pointing out that the District Attorney had such a fund.
The law of Alabama makes no provisions for such a fund for any indigent defendant, or any other defendant. It is the law in this jurisdiction that a defendant, under the circumstances of this case, may secure the testimony of out of State witnesses by taking depositions of such out of State witnesses as provided by Title 15, §§ 297, 298 Code of Alabama 1940, as amended, supra, and Argo v. State, 42 Ala.App. 454, 168 So.2d 19, cert. den. 277 Ala. 177, 168 So.2d 23.
We are not convinced by the authorities cited by appellant, nor by an independent research of the law, that appellant was denied equal protection due to the fact that this State did not provide appellant with money to seek witnesses in Texas as complained of. Here, the appellant availed himself of the means provided by Alabama law and did present witnesses by interrogatories.
The next basis for error assigned is that the District Attorney in referring to defendant in the closing argument called him a 'professional robber.'
We find nothing in the record disclosing that the District Attorney referred to appellant as a 'professional robber.' We do find in the record, the following quotation:
'There is no evidence whatsoever that this man is a professional.
'THE COURT: I sustain the objection and instruct the jury not to consider the statement just made by counsel.'
We have no way of knowing whether the District Attorney used the words 'professional robber,' or professional whatnot. As stated in the case of Daniel Construction Company v. Pierce, 270 Ala. 522, 120 So.2d 381, decided by this Court in 1960:
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...and arrest discussion." Cross v. State, 68 Ala. 476, 484 (1881) (citations omitted, emphasis added). See also Argo v. State, 282 Ala. 509, 213 So.2d 244 (1968); Clark v. State, 462 So.2d 743 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). In the context of this case, we do not find the comments improper, for they do no......
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...130 So.2d 373.' See also Phillips v. State, 32 Ala.App. 238, 24 So.2d 226; Clark v. State, 280 Ala. 493, 195 So.2d 786; Argo v. State, 282 Ala. 509, 213 So.2d 244." II We have again considered the other issues asserted, which were fully covered in our original opinion, and are of the view t......
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Gholston v. State
...argued as contained in defendant's counsel's objections are insufficient for us to hold that the argument was improper. Argo v. State, 282 Ala. 509, 213 So.2d 244; Canady v. State, 55 Ala.App. 473, 316 So.2d 720; Cassady v. State, 51 Ala.App. 544, 287 So.2d We have considered all questions ......
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