Arguello v. Lafavers

Decision Date24 March 2020
Docket NumberNo. 3:18-cv-00449,3:18-cv-00449
Citation448 F.Supp.3d 655
Parties Martin A. ARGUELLO, Appellant, v. Dylan LAFAVERS, Appellee.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Erin E. Jones, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Erin Elizabeth Jones, Erin E. Jones, P.C., Houston, TX, for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge.

Martin Arguello appeals the final judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, in an adversary proceeding denying the dischargeability of debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).1 For the reasons set forth below, the court affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Specifically, the court agrees that Arguello's injurious conduct was both willful and malicious, and so affirms the judgment in this respect. But the court vacates the bankruptcy court's ruling that the debt was not dischargeable. On remand, the bankruptcy court shall determine whether Arguello's actions were sufficiently justified under the circumstances such that it renders the debt dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

I. Background
A. Factual Background

The appellee, Dylan LaFavers, began living with his mother's then-boyfriend, now husband, Arguello, in mid-2014. Record on Appeal2 ("ROA") at 22; Dkt. 7 at 6.3 A series of disagreements and confrontations led to LaFavers moving from the main house to a separate guesthouse located on Arguello's property. ROA at 45. The parties dispute whether LaFavers was "banned" from entering the main house. See ROA at 106:7–106:10.

On the evening of December 9, 2015, LaFavers, who was 17 years old, was walking from the guesthouse to the main house to get a glass of water. Arguello confronted him outside and demanded that he return to the guesthouse. ROA at 87:6–87:12, 88:16–88:19, 141:21–142:3. The parties present different accounts of the altercation that ensued.

According to Arguello, he was outside around sundown, about to feed his dogs, when he saw LaFavers walking towards the main house. See ROA at 141:21–142:3. Arguello ordered LaFavers to return to the guesthouse. When LaFavers ignored him, Arguello—who had served in the United States Army Reserve4 —felt threatened and removed from his pocket a loaded 9mm Beretta. ROA at 141:21–143:24. Arguello then fired what he describes as two "warning shots" into the ground near his own feet. ROA at 142:4–148:23. LaFavers was unfazed by the first warning shot and "just kept walking ... [n]ot necessarily directly at [him] ... [but] in the same general direction." ROA at 149:19–150:6. After the second warning shot, LaFavers "rushed" at Arguello from roughly twenty feet away and "the next thing [Arguello] knew [he] was getting pummeled in the face and head." ROA at 153:19–154:10. Notably, Arguello does not contend that LaFavers knocked him to the ground at any point during their altercation. ROA at 167:2–167:6.

Arguello discharged the firearm at least twice more during their physical altercation, striking LaFavers in his forearm and bicep. Dkt. 7 at 7. Arguello is adamant, however, that he did not intend to harm LaFavers. "It was only while being beaten that [he] unintentionally discharged the firearm twice in instantaneous succession." Id.

LaFavers paints a very different picture. He claims Arguello first fired one shot in the air before quickly firing a second into the ground near LaFavers’ feet. ROA at 91:22–92:10. Arguello then approached to within "five to seven feet," "point[ed] the gun at [LaFavers’] face," and told him to "walk away." ROA at 93:12–94:9. As LaFavers attempted to retreat to the guesthouse, Arguello fired a third bullet inches from his feet. ROA at 93:2–95:2 (testifying the third gunshot propelled rocks and gravel around LaFavers’ feet into his calves and legs). "[T]errified for [his] life," LaFavers defended himself, striking Arguello twice in the face before sustaining the first of two gunshot wounds

. ROA at 95:3–96:6. LaFavers disputes Arguello's claim that the injurious gunshots were unintentional. He instead argues Arguello attempted to kill him—firing three gunshots during their physical altercation, one of which missed. LaFavers adds that Arguello would have succeeded had his gun not jammed when he tried to shoot LaFavers in the stomach. ROA at 96:4–96:24. As further evidence of Arguello's malicious intent, LaFavers says he could hear the "clicks" as Arguello attempted to fire the jammed gun as LaFavers fled toward the guesthouse. ROA at 97:16–98:4.

Whatever the true sequence of events, it is undisputed that a physical confrontation occurred on the evening of December 9, which resulted in LaFavers sustaining two gunshot wounds

.

B. Procedural History

LaFavers sued Arguello in state court for damages he suffered as a result of the December 9 altercation.5 ROA at 22. While the state-court proceedings were pending, Arguello filed a voluntary petition seeking relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.6 Dkt. 5–1. LaFavers timely filed a proof of claim and, on February 5, 2018, commenced an adversary proceeding against Arguello, objecting to the dischargeability of his claim against Arguello.7 ROA at 9–14.

Arguello stipulated to liability and damages in the amount of $2,036,728.22 but argued that his liability was not the type that is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(6). Dkt. 5–2; ROA at 20–21. So, the only narrow issue for the bankruptcy court to decide in the adversary proceeding was whether Arguello "willfully and maliciously" injured LaFavers.

On August 16, 2018, the bankruptcy court held a status conference and set October 1 as the parties’ discovery deadline. See ROA at 4. A week later, the bankruptcy court ordered another status conference for October 19. See id.

At the October 19 status conference, the court set November 19 as the trial date and issued a scheduling order with various pre-trial deadlines. ROA at 18-19. Although the scheduling order mistakenly identified the trial date as "November 19, 2019"—instead of 2018—both parties understood the actual trial was just one month away. ROA at 18. Indeed, on November 14, the parties filed a joint pre-trial statement—which they would not have done if trial were still a year away. ROA at 20–26; see ROA at 18 (requiring the parties to file a joint pre-trial statement "[n]o later than five (5) days before the date of trial") (emphasis in original). Arguello did not list any trial exhibits in the joint pre-trial statement. ROA at 25.

The next day, the bankruptcy court sua sponte reset the trial for December 3. ROA at 27 ("In [its scheduling order], the Court mistakenly set trial for November 19, 2019, instead of November 19, 2018. Due to the possibility the parties may have been confused [by] this mistake, the Court will grant a short continuance of the trial.").

On November 29—fifty-nine days after discovery closed and ten days after trial was originally scheduled to commence—Arguello filed a cursory, three-paragraph emergency motion requesting a continuance. ROA at 28-30. The main justification for the continuance was Arguello's counsel's preferential trial setting in an unrelated state-court matter that conflicted with the new trial date. See id. Without providing any further explanation, Arguello ended his motion with this sentence: "In addition, [Arguello] is attempting to obtain documents and photographs from the police files that are relevant to the case." ROA at 29. The bankruptcy court denied Arguello's request, citing ample notice of the October 1 discovery cut-off and upcoming trial. ROA at 32-33.

The trial began and ended on December 3. See ROA at 5. Arguello neither offered any exhibits into evidence nor raised any evidentiary or discovery dispute by written or oral motion. See generally ROA at 66-191 (trial transcript). Instead, Arguello relied only on his oral testimony to dispute that he had acted willfully and maliciously when he shot and injured LaFavers. See ROA at 115-172.

At the end of the trial, the bankruptcy court asked the parties to submit post-trial briefs on one particular issue:

[T]he issue basically really is in the Court's mind -- the shots that occurred after the physical altercation between the parties. Quite clearly we can say that all of the activity was reckless, all right? Recklessness, unfortunately does not get you over the hump relative to being a dischargeable debt.
However, the Court is very, very aware that the burden of proof is only by a preponderance of the evidence. And quite clearly -- before the two shots that injured [LaFavers] -- the three shots before that quite clearly were willful.
And whether that willfulness carries over to the two shots or whether [the Court] can infer that the two shots thereafter are willful -- [the Court will] have to make a determination on that.

ROA at 186:6–186:20.

On December 20, after the parties filed their post-trial briefs,8 the bankruptcy court entered judgment for LaFavers, concluding the greater weight of the evidence showed an objective substantial certainty of harm when Arguello fired his gun at LaFavers. ROA at 44-50.9 Arguello then filed this appeal.

II. Issues Presented
Issue 1: Whether LaFavers established by a preponderance of the evidence each element of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
Issue 2: Whether the bankruptcy court was required to consider Arguello's state of mind at the time he fired the gunshots that injured LaFavers to determine that he possessed the subjective intent to cause injury to LaFavers.
Issue 3: Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Arguello's emergency motion for continuance.
III. Standard of Review

District courts review bankruptcy-court rulings and decisions under the same standards employed by federal courts of appeals: a bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law, conclusions on mixed questions of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Frazier v. GPI KS-SH, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • September 11, 2020
    ...fact can be "represented by counsel of their choice" in this case on September 21, 2020. The motion is denied. See Arguello v. LaFavers, 448 F. Supp. 3d 655 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (no abuse of discretion for bankruptcy court to deny motion for continuance where motion was based primarily on couns......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT