Argueta-Fuentes v. Garland

• Decision Date: 27 May 2022
• Docket Number: 20-1287
• Parties: OSCAR BLADIMIR ARGUETA-FUENTES, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

OSCAR BLADIMIR ARGUETA-FUENTES, Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

No. 20-1287

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

May 27, 2022

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27^th day of May, two thousand twenty-two.

FOR PETITIONER: John H. Peng (Christine D. McClellan, on the brief), Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Albany, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Jonathan Ross (Brian Boynton, Assistant Attorney General, Sarah S. Wilson, Senior Litigation Counsel, Katherine S. Fischer, Trial Attorney, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Present: Richard C. Wesley, William J. Nardini, Beth Robinson, Circuit Judges.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

1

Petitioner Oscar Bladimir Argueta-Fuentes, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a March 20, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming a September 24, 2019, decision of an Immigration Judge ("IJ") denying deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). In re Oscar Bladimir Argueta-Fuentes, No. A 202 136 873 (B.I.A. Mar. 20, 2020), aff'g No. A 202 136 873 (Immigr. Ct. Napanoch Sept. 24, 2019). We assume the parties' familiarity with the record.

On appeal, Argueta-Fuentes argues that the agency erred in determining that he failed to meet his burden to obtain CAT relief, that is, to "establish that it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed." Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 168 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). We review the IJ's decision as modified by the BIA. Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Ojo, 25 F.4th at 160-61 (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo); Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S.Ct. 1683, 1692- 93 (2020) (judicial review of the denial of CAT relief is "under the deferential substantial-evidence standard").

Argueta-Fuentes first takes issue with the IJ's statement that "[a]bsent specific evidence that respondent himself will be a target . . . his claim to protection fails," Cert. Admin. R. 69, and argues that this statement suggests that the IJ held him to an incorrect and impossibly high standard to obtain CAT relief.^[1] Instead, he argues that the proper standard is whether an individual in the applicant's position-that is, an individual in similar circumstances to the applicant-would more likely than not be tortured if removed. We do not agree that the IJ applied the wrong standard in evaluating Argueta-Fuentes's claim. As an initial matter, in the sentence immediately preceding the statement that Argueta-Fuentes argues is objectionable, the IJ phrased the applicable standard as requiring that the petitioner "establish that someone in his particular alleged circumstances is more...