Argyle Independent School Dist. v. Wolf

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Terrie Livingston
• Citation: Argyle Independent School Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App. 2007)
• Decision Date: 09 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2-06-336-CV.,2-06-336-CV.
• Parties: ARGYLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, by and through its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellant/Appellee, v. Jeffrey J. and Janice WOLF, on Behalf of their Minor Children, and Allen and Vicki Zimmerman, on Behalf of their Minor Children, Appellees/Appellants.

234 S.W.3d 229

ARGYLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, by and through its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellant/Appellee, v. Jeffrey J. and Janice WOLF, on Behalf of their Minor Children, and Allen and Vicki Zimmerman, on Behalf of their Minor Children, Appellees/Appellants.

No. 2-06-336-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

August 9, 2007.

Rehearing Overruled September 20, 2007.

Abernathy, Roeder, Boyd & Joplin, P.C., Charles J. Crawford, McKinney, for Appellant.

Jackson Walker, LLP, James D. Bradbury, Fort Worth, for Appellees.

PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

OPINION

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.

Introduction

This is an appeal from the trial court's imposition of a temporary injunction against appellant and cross-appellee Argyle Independent School District (AISD). The injunction enjoins AISD from prohibiting the minor children of appellees and cross-appellants Jeffrey J. and Janice Wolf and Allen and Vicki Zimmerman (appellees) — who do not live within AISD boundaries — from attending AISD schools during the 2006-07 school year unless appellees pay tuition of $6,487.50 per child, and from retaliating against those children because of appellees' filing of the underlying suit. In three issues, AISD contends that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the temporary injunction because appellees presented no evidence of a probable right to relief on any of their causes of action; because appellees presented no evidence that they faced a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent an injunction; and because the evidence showed that appellees are not entitled to equitable relief in that they have unclean hands. In one cross-issue, appellees claim that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to enjoin the AISD Board of Trustees from interfering with appellees' appeal of a Denton Independent School District (DISD) decision declining to detach the street on which appellees live from DISD's boundaries. That appeal is pending before the Texas Commissioner of Education.¹ We reverse and remand.

Background

Appellees Jeffrey and Janice Wolf moved to the Estates at Tour 18 subdivision in Flower Mound in May 2002, and appellees Allen and Vicki Zimmerman moved there in 2003. Both families purchased homes on Firestone Drive. The Wolfs were told by their realtor and the developer of the subdivision that the entire subdivision, including their home on Firestone Drive, was included within the boundaries of AISD. One reason the Wolfs and Zimmermans moved to Firestone Drive was so that their children could attend AISD schools.

Kathy Jessen, an employee in the office of the elementary school that the children living in Tour 18 attended, told Janice that the Wolfs' house was located in AISD.² Janice then enrolled her three children in AISD schools. The Wolf children have been attending AISD schools since the 2002-03 school year. The Zimmermans were told the same thing and also enrolled their children in AISD schools.³ Their children have been attending AISD schools since the 2003-04 school year. They never registered their children as transfer students, nor were they told they needed to do so. Moreover, they were never charged tuition for their children to attend AISD schools.

In September 2005, AISD Superintendent Carolyn Pierel received a complaint that children living on Firestone Drive were allowed to attend AISD schools for free even though the houses on one side of that street were located in DISD and the residents paid taxes to DISD, not AISD.⁴ In response to the complaint, Superintendent Pierel confirmed that one side of Firestone Drive was located in DISD instead of AISD and determined which children living on Firestone Drive were attending AISD. She then contacted Miriam Pierce, another resident of Firestone Drive whose daughter had been attending AISD schools for several years. As a result of that call, Pierce circulated a petition to Firestone Drive residents asking DISD to release Firestone Drive from its boundaries and asking AISD to annex Firestone Drive.⁵ The Wolfs and Zimmermans signed the petition. On April 17, 2006, the AISD Board of Trustees voted to approve the petition to annex Firestone Drive into the district. DISD had not yet voted on the residents' request to detach the street from its boundaries.

In the spring of 2006, before the 2005-06 school year ended, appellees preregistered their children with AISD for the 2006-07 school year. On the Affidavit of Residency forms, Janice listed "Argyle" in response to the question, "School District you reside in." Vicki left the answer blank on the forms for two of her children, but she wrote in "Argyle" on the form for her third child. AISD did not demand tuition at the time, nor did it require appellees to register their children as transfer students. Superintendent Pierel admitted that AISD accepted the children's preregistration.

The next month, DISD rejected the Firestone Drive residents' transfer petition on May 16, 2006. The Wolfs and Zimmermans appealed that decision to the Texas Commissioner of Education.

On June 19, 2006, the AISD Board passed a resolution to allow children of the then-current residents of Firestone Drive to attend AISD schools as transfer students so long as they paid tuition.⁶ Although the agenda for the meeting had been posted at the administration building, the wrong agenda had been posted on AISD's website, and the Wolfs and Zimmermans did not know about the meeting until the day it was held. The Wolfs attended the meeting. On July 26, 2006, nineteen days before school was to begin on August 14, Superintendent Pierel sent appellees letters stating that tuition for the 2006-07 school year would be $6,487.50 per child, requesting payment in full before the first day of school, and enclosing a transfer application. The Wolfs were out of town at the time. Appellees did not complete the transfer paperwork or pay tuition; instead, they filed suit "seeking to prevent [AISD] from treating them as non-residents and charging them tuition." Appellees sought a declaratory judgment as well as temporary and permanent injunctive relief.

The trial court granted appellees' request for a TRO on August 10, 2006, enjoining AISD from "denying [appellees'] minor children public education by wrongfully requiring payment of tuition and/or by requiring [appellees'] minor children to be enrolled as transfer students prior to attending school commencing on August 14, 2006." After an evidentiary hearing held in August 2006, the Wolfs and the Zimmermans agreed to deposit the requested tuition into the court registry in monthly installments, and the trial court entered a temporary injunction on September 11, 2006 enjoining AISD from (1) denying public education and services to appellees' children during the 2006-07 school year and (2) retaliating against the children because of the filing of the suit.⁷

Standard of Review

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead a cause of action and show a probable right to recover on that cause of action and a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.2002); Fox v. Tropical Warehouses, Inc., 121 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). A probable right of recovery is shown by alleging a cause of action and presenting evidence tending to sustain it. Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ). An injury is irreparable if damages would not adequately compensate the injured party or if they cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Fox; 121 S.W.3d at 857; see T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd).

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1993); Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. "Status quo is defined as `the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.'" Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (quoting Transp. Co. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (1953)).

In an appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary injunction, the scope of review is restricted to the validity of the order granting or denying relief. Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58; Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 576. Whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58; Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. Accordingly, when reviewing such a decision, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor, and determine whether the order was so arbitrary that it exceeds the bounds of reasonable discretion. Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 576; CRC-Evans Pipeline Int'l, Inc. v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence and evidence in the record reasonably supports the trial court's decision. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978); Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; Myers, 927 S.W.2d at 262.

Probable Right to Relief

In its first issue, AISD contends that appellees presented no evidence of a probable right to relief on any of their claims. Appellees primarily sought (1) both a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting AISD from treating their children as transfer students, charging them tuition to attend AISD schools, and denying them admission to AISD schools unless they paid tuition and (2) a...