Argyle v. Slemaker

Decision Date27 November 1984
Docket NumberNo. 14283,14283
Citation691 P.2d 1283,107 Idaho 668
PartiesDelbert K. ARGYLE and Dora B. Argyle, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. R.W. SLEMAKER, Ruth Slemaker, and the Wiser Oil Company, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

A. Bruce Larson, Soda Springs, for defendants-appellants.

Isaac McDougall, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-respondents.

BURNETT, Judge.

This case involves a dispute over the validity of a mineral deed. The owners of the subject property, Delbert Argyle and his late wife, Dora, issued the deed to R.W. and Ruth Slemaker, now deceased, who then transferred the mineral interest through a chain of successors to the Wiser Oil Company. The Argyles later filed this action to quiet title against all claims of the Slemakers or their successors. The Argyles asserted that the mineral deed was void for several reasons--those pertinent here being that Mrs. Argyle's signature had been forged and that the deed had been delivered "in blank" (without a property description).

Wiser Oil answered the complaint and obtained a summary judgment. However, the judgment was overturned by our Supreme Court in Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 (1978) (herein termed "Argyle I "). Upon remand the district court, upon the same record, entered another summary judgment, this time in favor of the Argyles. Wiser Oil appealed. For reasons set forth below, we vacate the second summary judgment.

Wiser Oil has raised two issues. The first is whether the Argyles should be estopped to attack the validity of the mineral deed in view of the fact that Wiser Oil, an innocent third party transferee, has succeeded to the interest conveyed by the deed. The second issue is whether genuine issues of material fact remain as to the validity of the deed. We turn first to the estoppel question.

On appeal from a summary judgment, this court determines whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the prevailing party below was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings. We acknowledge that federal practice may allow issues outside the pleadings to be urged on summary judgment. See 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2721 (1983). But Idaho practice is more strictly limited. No dispute of fact is deemed "material" within Rule 56(c) unless it relates to an issue disclosed by the pleadings. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 664 P.2d 281 (Ct.App.1983); Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 647 P.2d 814 (Ct.App.1982). In the present case Wiser Oil's answer to the Argyles' complaint sets forth no defense of estoppel. Such a defense must be pleaded affirmatively. I.R.C.P. 8(c). Neither does the answer specifically allege rights of an innocent transferee for value without notice. It simply asserts the validity of the mineral deed. Consequently, we decline to address the estoppel question on its merits in this appeal.

The dispositive issue, then, is whether the record shows, without a genuine dispute of material fact, that the deed is invalid. Wiser Oil contends that when the record is viewed in a light favorable to it, genuine disputes exist. However, before examining the record, we observe that no jury trial has been requested in this case. The district judge ultimately would be the trier of fact. In these circumstances the judge, when ruling on summary judgment, would be required to view conflicting evidentiary facts in favor of Wiser but not necessarily to draw inferences from uncontroverted facts in Wiser's favor. Rather, the judge could draw those inferences which he deems most probable. See Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982).

The record before us includes the depositions of Delbert and Dora Argyle. In his deposition, Mr. Argyle states that he signed the mineral deed without a description of the property attached. He further states that he later received copies of the deed and description by mail. Mrs. Argyle's deposition, though not entirely clear, contains a statement that she never signed the deed. The record contains no affidavit from the Slemakers who, like Mrs. Argyle, are now deceased. However, the record does contain the deed itself. It appears to have been duly notarized and recorded. A description of the property is attached by tape to the deed and it appears to bear the initials of the notary public who acknowledged the signatures. Unfortunately, the record contains no deposition of the notary and he, too, is deceased.

Upon this record the district judge could have inferred from the notary's certificate and the initials on the property description that the description had been attached to the deed when it was signed and delivered. Indeed, had there been no other dispute in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Gardner v. Evans
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 22, 1986
    ...has been the rule in Idaho that "issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings." Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 669, 691 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct.App.1984); see also First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 855, 664 P.2d 281, 283 (......
  • Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 23, 2003
    ...by the pleadings. Harms Memorial Hospital v. Morton, 112 Idaho 129, 730 P.2d 1049 (Ct. App.1986), citing Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App.1984). The tendered factual issues as to the reasons for Edmondson's discharge are not material to Edmondson's claims because, as......
  • Bli v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 3, 2009
    ...P.2d at 661. Conflicting evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct.App.1984). B. Tammy makes several challenges to the district court's conclusion that the policy proceeds were Mark's sep......
  • Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 19, 1987
    ...Corporation v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 111 Idaho 719, 727 P.2d 1147 (1986) (Bakes, J., dissenting). See also Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App.1984). In this case the only evidence before the district court was two affidavits in support of Consolidated's petition ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT