Arion v. State

Decision Date22 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. 08A02–1508–CR–1278.,08A02–1508–CR–1278.
Citation56 N.E.3d 71
Parties Ricky E. ARION, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Steven Knecht, Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C., Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

BAKER

, Judge.

[1] Ricky Arion appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge. Arion was serving a prison sentence for unrelated convictions when he was served with a warrant informing him of the present charges. He requested a speedy trial on multiple occasions, but the State made no attempt to try him for well over a year. The State now contends that because one of its officers failed to return the warrant to the trial court after serving it upon Arion, it was absolved of its responsibility to bring Arion to trial in a timely fashion in accordance with Indiana Criminal Rule 4

. The State's position is contrary to both the text and the purpose of the rule, which places an “imperative duty upon the state and its officers, the trial courts and prosecuting attorneys.” Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 183–84, 102 N.E.2d 203, 207 (1951). Because we find that the delay in bringing Arion to trial was unjustifiable and that it exceeded the length of time allowable under Indiana Criminal Rules 4(B) and 4(C), we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the charges.

Facts 1

[2] On September 5, 2013, the State filed charges of burglary, sexual battery, and criminal confinement against Arion in the Carroll Circuit Court. The next day, the court issued a warrant instructing the Sheriff of Carroll County to arrest Arion on those charges. Arion was incarcerated in Miami County for prior convictions at the time, and the warrant listed the Miami Correctional Facility as his address. On September 10, 2013, a law enforcement officer at the Miami Correctional Facility served the warrant on Arion and gave him a copy. For unknown reasons, no law enforcement officer returned the served warrant to the trial court.2

[3] A few days later, on September 13, 2013, Arion filed a pro se motion for speedy trial under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)

in the trial court. He did not serve a copy of this motion on the State, but wrote on the bottom of the motion “please forward a copy to the prosecutor's office of said motion.” Appellant's App. p. 18. On December 16, 2013, after ninety-four days had passed with no trial date set, Arion filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that he had not been brought to trial within seventy days of his filing of a Rule 4(B) motion. The trial court denied the motion, holding that because the arrest warrant had not been returned as served, Arion was “not being held on the above entitled cause” and, therefore, Rule 4 does not apply.” Id. at 23.

[4] On January 27, 2014, Arion filed a pro se motion to reconsider, arguing that he had been served with the warrant and it was not his duty to ensure that the warrant was returned as served to the trial court. This time, he made sure to serve the State with a copy. He also attached to the motion a copy of the warrant that had been served on him. The trial court summarily denied the motion later that day.

[5] Following this, over a year passed in which the State made no attempt to try Arion. On March 26, 2015, Arion sent a letter to the Carrol County Sheriff's Department with a copy of his arrest warrant in an effort to prove that it had been served on him. The Sheriff's Department forwarded this letter to the trial court the same day. On April 7, 2015, the trial court issued an order to transport Arion to the trial court for an initial hearing to be held on May 22, 2015.

[6] At the hearing, counsel was appointed and trial was set for October 5, 2015. Arion objected to the trial date, citing Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C)

. The trial court noted the objection. It then issued an order on the initial hearing, acknowledging that Arion's March 26, 2015, letter showed that the warrant had been served on Arion on September 10, 2013, but noting that it had still not received a return of the warrant.

[7] On July 10, 2015, Arion, this time by counsel, filed a motion for discharge under Rule 4(B), 4(C)

, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion on August 17, 2015. The trial court found that Arion “likely became aware of his arrest, in this cause of action, on September 10, 2013.” Id. at 98. However, the trial court also found that it was not aware of the arrest until March 26, 2015, and that it had not seen the copy of the warrant that was attached to Arion's earlier motion. It held:

From this Court's perspective, temporal restrictions imposed on the Court by Indiana Criminal Rule 4

and the U.S. Constitution begin when Defendant is arrested. In circumstances where Defendant is arrested and the Court is never made aware of the arrest, arrest occurs when the Court has actual knowledge that Defendant has been arrested on this Court's warrant.

Id. at 99–100. The trial court went on to hold that, even though the trial was still scheduled seventy days after March 26, 2015, at the initial hearing, Arion had objected under Rule 4(C)

rather than 4(B). It also held that Arion had not been prejudiced by the delay. The trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and this Court accepted jurisdiction under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B).

Discussion and Decision

[8] Arion argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that this case should have been discharged under Indiana Criminal Rules 4(B), 4(C)

, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As we believe that Rule 4 provides a sufficient basis for disposing of this case, we need not address Arion's constitutional arguments. However, because [t]he broad goal of Indiana's Criminal Rule 4 is to provide functionality to a criminal defendant's fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial,” we begin our discussion with a few words about that right. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind.2013).

[9] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution begins: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial....” The United States Supreme Court has recognized this right as “one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)

. Speedy trials serve not only to benefit criminal defendants; “society [also] has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Because “society's representatives are the ones who should protect that interest,” the Sixth Amendment places an affirmative duty on the State to act. Id. at 527, 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ([a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial”; “the primary burden [is] on the courts and the prosecutors”). The State must act diligently and in good faith when performing this duty. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) ; see also

Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 219, 87 S.Ct. 988 (Sixth Amendment protects “against an unjustified postponement of trial”).

[10] Given the nature of Arion's case, it is important to note that the fact that he was incarcerated for a separate conviction at the time he was charged with the present offenses is not important. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that defendants incarcerated for unrelated reasons still retain an interest in being tried promptly on new charges. Smith, 393 U.S. at 377–78, 89 S.Ct. 575

; Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439–40, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973). “The fact is that delay in bringing such a person to trial on a pending charge may ultimately result in as much oppression as is suffered by one who is jailed without bail upon an untried charge.” Smith, 393 U.S. at 378, 89 S.Ct. 575.3

[11] Indiana Criminal Rule 4

seeks to ensure that the State provides defendants with a speedy trial as mandated by the Constitution. The Rule is divided into several parts, two of which are relevant here. Rule 4(B) provides that

If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion....

Rule 4(C)

, which applies regardless of whether the defendant has moved for a speedy trial, provides that

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later....

Thus, a defendant must be tried within one year of arrest, unless the defendant specifically moves for a speedy trial, in which case he must be tried within seventy days of the motion. The rule provides an exception for when a continuance is made on the defendant's motion or where there was not sufficient time to try the defendant because of congestion of the court calendar, but neither exception is applicable in this case. Crim. R. 4

.

[12] On September 13, 2013, after having been read the charges, Arion moved for a speedy trial under Rule 4(B)

. Both the State and the trial court seem to acknowledge that Arion's arrest on these charges occurred when he was read the warrant. See Appellant's App. p. 98 (trial court noting that Arion “likely became aware of his arrest, in this cause of action, on September 10, 2013); Appellee's Br. p. 16 (State referring to the reading of the warrant as a “fact [ ] indicating that Arion's present charges were subject to Rule 4(B)). In any event, the State does not argue that Arion was never being held on these charges; rather, it contends that the Rule 4

clock did not start ticking until the trial...

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2 cases
  • Harrison v. Knight
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 27 d4 Junho d4 2019
    ...A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; rather, the primary burden is on the courts and prosecutors. Arion v. State , 56 N.E.3d 71, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ). " Indiana Criminal Rule 4 seeks to ensu......
  • Myers v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 4 d5 Novembro d5 2016
    ...the issue of the appropriate standard of review in Criminal Rule 4 cases.3 We acknowledge the very recent decision in Arion v. State, 56 N.E.3d 71, 72 (Ind.Ct.App.2016), in which another panel of this Court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for discharge where the ......

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