Arizona v. Youngblood, No. 86-1904

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtREHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS
Citation109 S.Ct. 333,102 L.Ed.2d 281,488 U.S. 51
Decision Date29 November 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-1904
PartiesARIZONA, Petitioner, v. Larry YOUNGBLOOD

488 U.S. 51
109 S.Ct. 333
102 L.Ed.2d 281
ARIZONA, Petitioner,

v.

Larry YOUNGBLOOD.

No. 86-1904.
Argued Oct. 11, 1988.
Decided Nov. 29, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1989.

See 488 U.S. 1051, 109 S.Ct. 885.

Syllabus

The victim, a 10-year-old boy, was molested and sodomized by a middle-aged man for 11/2 hours. After the assault, the boy was taken to a hospital where a physician used a swab from a "sexual assault kit" to collect semen samples from the boy's rectum. The police also collected the boy's clothing, which they failed to refrigerate. A police criminologist later performed some tests on the rectal swab and the boy's clothing, but he was unable to obtain information about the identity of the boy's assailant. At trial, expert witnesses testified that respondent might have been completely exonerated by timely performance of tests on properly preserved semen samples. Respondent was convicted of child molestation, sexual assault, and kidnapping in an Arizona state court. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the State had breached a constitutional duty to preserve the semen samples from the victim's body and clothing.

Held: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the State to preserve the semen samples even though the samples might have been useful to respondent. Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Here, the police's failure to refrigerate the victim's clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as negligent. None of this information was concealed from respondent at trial, and the evidence—such as it was—was made available to respondent's expert, who declined to perform any tests on the samples. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted in its opinion—and this Court agrees—that there was no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police. Moreover, the Due Process Clause was not violated because the State failed to perform a newer test on the semen samples. The police do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests. Pp. 55-59.

153 Ariz. 50, 734 P.2d 592, reversed.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 59. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 61.

Page 52

John R. Gustafson, Tucson, Ariz., for petitioner.

Daniel F. Davis, Tucson, Ariz., for respondent.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Larry Youngblood was convicted by a Pima County, Arizona, jury of child molestation, sexual assault, and kidnaping. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the State had failed to preserve semen samples from the victim's body and clothing. 153 Ariz. 50, 734 P.2d 592 (1986). We granted certiorari to consider the extent to which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to preserve evidentiary material that might be useful to a criminal defendant.

On October 29, 1983, David L., a 10-year-old boy, attended a church service with his mother. After he left the service at about 9:30 p.m., the boy went to a carnival behind the church, where he was abducted by a middle-aged man of medium height and weight. The assailant drove the boy to a secluded area near a ravine and molested him. He then took the boy to an unidentified, sparsely furnished house where he sodomized the boy four times. Afterwards, the assailant tied the boy up while he went outside to start his car. Once the assailant started the car, albeit with some difficulty, he returned to the house and again sodomized the boy. The assailant then sent the boy to the bathroom to wash up before he returned him to the carnival. He threatened to kill the boy if he told anyone about the attack. The entire ordeal lasted about 11/2 hours.

After the boy made his way home, his mother took him to Kino Hospital. At the hospital, a physician treated the boy for rectal injuries. The physician also used a "sexual assault kit" to collect evidence of the attack. The Tucson Police De-

Page 53

partment provided such kits to all hospitals in Pima County for use in sexual assault cases. Under standard procedure, the victim of a sexual assault was taken to a hospital, where a physician used the kit to collect evidence. The kit included paper to collect saliva samples, a tube for obtaining a blood sample, microscopic slides for making smears, a set of Q-Tip-like swabs, and a medical examination report. Here, the physician used the swab to collect samples from the boy's rectum and mouth. He then made a microscopic slide of the samples. The doctor also obtained samples of the boy's saliva, blood, and hair. The physician did not examine the samples at any time. The police placed the kit in a secure refrigerator at the police station. At the hospital, the police also collected the boy's underwear and T-shirt. This clothing was not refrigerated or frozen.

Nine days after the attack, on November 7, 1983, the police asked the boy to pick out his assailant from a photographic lineup. The boy identified respondent as the assailant. Respondent was not located by the police until four weeks later; he was arrested on December 9, 1983.

On November 8, 1983, Edward Heller, a police criminologist, examined the sexual assault kit. He testified that he followed standard department procedure, which was to examine the slides and determine whether sexual contact had occurred. After he determined that such contact had occurred, the criminologist did not perform any other tests, although he placed the assault kit back in the refrigerator. He testified that tests to identify blood group substances were not routinely conducted during the initial examination of an assault kit and in only about half of all cases in any event. He did not test the clothing at this time.

Respondent was indicted on charges of child molestation, sexual assault, and kidnaping. The State moved to compel respondent to provide blood and saliva samples for comparison with the material gathered through the use of the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion on the

Page 54

ground that the State had not obtained a sufficiently large semen sample to make a valid comparison. The prosecutor then asked the State's criminologist to perform an ABO blood group test on the rectal swab sample in an attempt to ascertain the blood type of the boy's assailant. This test failed to detect any blood group substances in the sample.

In January 1985, the police criminologist examined the boy's clothing for the first time. He found one semen stain on the boy's underwear and another on the rear of his T-shirt. The criminologist tried to obtain blood group substances from both stains using the ABO technique, but was unsuccessful. He also performed a P-30 protein molecule test on the stains, which indicated that only a small quantity of semen was present on the clothing; it was inconclusive as to the assailant's identity. The Tucson Police Department had just begun using this test, which was then used in slightly more than half of the crime laboratories in the country.

Respondent's principal defense at trial was that the boy had erred in identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime. In this connection, both a criminologist for the State and an expert witness for respondent testified as to what might have been shown by tests performed on the samples shortly after they were gathered, or by later tests performed on the samples from the boy's clothing had the clothing been properly refrigerated. The court instructed the jury that if they found the State had destroyed or lost evidence, they might "infer that the true fact is against the State's interest." 10 Tr. 90.

The jury found respondent guilty as charged, but the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. It stated that " 'when identity is an issue at trial and the police permit the destruction of evidence that could eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due process.' " 153 Ariz., at 54, 734 P.2d, at 596, quoting State v. Escalante, 153 Ariz. 55, 61, 734 P.2d 597, 603 (App.1986). The Court of Ap-

Page 55

peals concluded on the basis of the expert testimony at trial that timely performance of tests with properly preserved semen samples could have produced results that might have completely exonerated respondent. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion even though it did "not imply any bad faith on the part of the State." 153 Ariz., at 54, 734 P.2d, at 596. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the State's petition for review, and we granted certiorari. 485 U.S. 903, 108 S.Ct. 1072, 99 L.Ed.2d 232 (1988). We now reverse.

Decision of this case requires us to again consider "what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), we held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id., at 87, 83 S.Ct., at 1196. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), we held that the prosecution had a duty to disclose some evidence of this description even though no requests were made for it, but at the same time we rejected the notion that a "prosecutor has a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to...

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3671 practice notes
  • U.S. v. Rastelli, Nos. 1-4
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • March 16, 1989
    ...preserve potentially Page 834 useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Arizona v. Youngblood, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Accord Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2533 ("In failing to preserve [evidence], the officers here we......
  • US v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc., No. 88-CR-93.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • January 18, 1989
    ...the Magistrate found no Fifth Amendment due process violation. Relying on the standards put forth in Arizona v. Youngblood, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), and two Seventh Circuit cases constr......
  • Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, No. 08–6.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 18, 2009
    ...to decide if there is a constitutional obligation to preserve forensic evidence that might later be tested. Cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56–58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). If so, for how long? Would it be different for different types of evidence? Would the State also ......
  • U.S. v. Sullivan, Nos. 89-7005 and 89-7008
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • November 16, 1990
    ...that the missing evidence had any exculpatory value or that it was destroyed in bad faith, id. at 25-26, citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 In Youngblood, the Court held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, fa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3647 cases
  • U.S. v. Rastelli, Nos. 1-4
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • March 16, 1989
    ...preserve potentially Page 834 useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Arizona v. Youngblood, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Accord Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2533 ("In failing to preserve [evidence], the officers here we......
  • US v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc., No. 88-CR-93.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • January 18, 1989
    ...the Magistrate found no Fifth Amendment due process violation. Relying on the standards put forth in Arizona v. Youngblood, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), and two Seventh Circuit cases constr......
  • Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, No. 08–6.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 18, 2009
    ...to decide if there is a constitutional obligation to preserve forensic evidence that might later be tested. Cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56–58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). If so, for how long? Would it be different for different types of evidence? Would the State also ......
  • U.S. v. Sullivan, Nos. 89-7005 and 89-7008
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • November 16, 1990
    ...that the missing evidence had any exculpatory value or that it was destroyed in bad faith, id. at 25-26, citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 In Youngblood, the Court held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, fa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • The Innocence Checklist
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Nbr. 58-1, January 2021
    • January 1, 2021
    ...291. E.g., CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(d). 292. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 293. Id. at 694–95. 294. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680–83. 295. 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 296. See id. at 58. 297. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 298. See id. at 269. 299. See e.g., United States v. Clarke, 442 F. App’x 540, 543–44 (11th ......
  • Social Capital and Protecting the Rights of the Accused in the American States
    • United States
    • Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Nbr. 18-2, May 2002
    • May 1, 2002
    ...878 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1994);Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987)Preservation/destruction of evidence 9Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P.2d1326 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales,102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) 232 Conn. 707, 657 A.2d 585......
  • Rethinking Police Expertise.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 2, November 2021
    • November 1, 2021
    ...1050-52(1987). (348.) Lvovsky, supra note 2, at 2013-14. (349.) Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009). (350.) Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring); Laurin, supra note 60, at (351.) Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 & n.12 (1977). 332. Ventri......

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