Arkansas Bond Company v. Harton

• Decision Date: 11 November 1935
• Docket Number: 4-4046
• Citation: 87 S.W.2d 52,191 Ark. 665
• Parties: ARKANSAS BOND COMPANY v. HARTON
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

87 S.W.2d 52

191 Ark. 665

ARKANSAS BOND COMPANY v. HARTON

4-4046

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 11, 1935

Appeal from Stone Circuit Court; S. M. Bone, Judge; reversed.

Mandamus by the Arkansas Bond Company against Francis M. Harton as county clerk to require her as such to issue certain warrants.As a taxpayer she filed an intervention, and from an adverse judgment she has appealed.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

W.K. Ruddell, for appellant.

Roy Richardson, for appellee.

OPINION

BUTLER, J.

Appellant filed a pleading in the Stone Circuit Court, styled "complaint," by which it sought to procure a writ of mandamus to require the appellee, the clerk of the county court, to issue certain warrants.During the course of the proceedings, appellee, as a taxpayer, filed an intervention praying judgment against the appellant for $ 750 theretofore paid it out of the county treasurer.She also, as clerk of the county court, interposed a demurrer to the complaint filed against her as such.The demurrer was sustained appellant's complaint dismissed, and a judgment by default rendered in favor of the county against the appellant on the taxpayer's intervention.From these orders and judgments appellant has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

We set out the substance of the complaint to the effect that appellant entered into a contract with the county judge of Stone County to refund the bonds of that county in the amount of $ 53,500, and, as a fee for his services, he was to receive a sum equal to five per cent. of the face of the bonds.Appellant is a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of Arkansas, and has fully complied with its part of the contract by having printed and delivered the said refunding bonds to the holders of the old bonds.The contract with the county judge was made exhibit A to the complaint.There was the further allegation that on the 19th day of December, 1934, the county court made an order allowing the claim of the appellant for the sum of $ 1,275, balance due it under the aforesaid contract, and directing the appellee, as county clerk, to draw certain warrants in favor of the appellant payable out of the "bond fund" and deliver the same to it.A copy of said order is attached to the complaint as exhibit C.There was also an allegation that on December 27, 1934, the county court made and entered an order of record directing the county "treasurer" to issue "her check or draft" in the sum of $ 650 to the appellant to be paid out of the "bond fund" when collected by the collector of revenues.This order was made an exhibit to the complaint, but does not appear to be involved in the proceeding against the county clerk.It was alleged that demand had been made upon the county clerk to issue the said warrant and that she had refused to do so.The prayer was for a writ of mandamus to issue directing the county clerk to comply with the orders of the court.

In testing the sufficiency of a complaint on general demurrer, the court indulges every reasonable intendment in its favor, and if the facts stated, together with every reasonable inference arising therefrom, constitute a cause of action, the demurrer should be overruled.Ellis v. First National Bank,163 Ark. 471, 260 S.W. 714;Sharp v. Drainage District,164 Ark. 306, 261 S.W. 923;Driesbach v. Beckham,178 Ark. 816, 12 S.W.2d 408.And incomplete, ambiguous, and defective averments should be reached by motion to make more definite and certain.Fitch v. Walls,169 Ark. 745, 276 S.W. 578.When tested by these rules, we think the complaint, with the exhibits, sufficiently pleaded a judgment of allowance of appellant's claim by the county court and the order based thereon to the county clerk to issue the warrants and the clerk's refusal to obey said judgment and orders.

County courts, within the sphere of the jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution, are superior courts of record and have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to the fiscal affairs of their respective counties, including claims against the said counties.Section 28, art. 7, Constitution;Pierce v. Edington,38 Ark. 150;Williams v. State,65 Ark. 159, 46 S.W. 186;Saline County v. Kinkead,84 Ark. 329, 105 S.W. 581;Leathem v. Jackson County,122 Ark. 114, 182 S.W. 570;Stumpff v. Louann Provision Co.,173 Ark. 192, 292 S.W. 106.The county court had jurisdiction to pass on the claim of the appellant, and to make the necessary orders for its payment when allowed.The question presented by the demurrer raises a collateral attack on the judgment and orders of the county court.These judgments and orders, when collaterally attacked, must be presumed to be regular and correct.Clay v. Bilby,72 Ark. 101, 78 S.W. 749;Kulbeth v. Drew County Timber Co.,125 Ark. 291, 188 S.W. 810.

As we must presume the court properly allowed the claim, the only question we can consider in this proceeding is the order directing the clerk to issue the warrants payable out of the "bond fund."The record made in the trial court and presented to us is unsatisfactory and sheds but little light upon the question to be considered.We are not advised whether refunding the bonds effected a saving to the county whether the benefit to be derived was merely an extension of maturities of the debts first funded, or whether both purposes were served.The authority of a county to refund its bonds within certain limitations was upheld in the case of Talkington v. Turnbow,190 Ark. 1138, 83 S.W.2d 71.This authority necessarily implies the power of the county court to provide and pay for the necessary expense incurred in refunding bonds.As the order allowing appellant its fee has not been appealed, for the purposes of this case the propriety of the fee as a part of the necessary expense is res...