Arkansas State Hospital for Nervous Diseases v. Kestle

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McFADDIN
• Citation: Arkansas State Hospital for Nervous Diseases v. Kestle, 364 S.W.2d 804, 236 Ark. 5 (Ark. 1963)
• Decision Date: 28 January 1963
• Docket Number: No. 5-2822,5-2822
• Parties: ARKANSAS STATE HOSPITAL FOR NERVOUS DISEASES, Appellant, v. J. E. KESTLE, Appellee.

Page 804

364 S.W.2d 804

236 Ark. 5

ARKANSAS STATE HOSPITAL FOR NERVOUS DISEASES, Appellant, v. J. E. KESTLE, Appellee.

No. 5-2822.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 28, 1963.

Rehearing Denied March 11, 1963.

Pope, Pratt & Shamburger, by: M. Jack Sims, Little Rock, for appellant.

Virgil R. Moncrief and John W. Moncrief, Stuttgart, for appellee.

McFADDIN, Justice.

Appellant, Arkansas State Hospital for Nervous Diseases, filed this action against appellee, J. E. Kestle, to recover $1710.00 for room, board, lodging, and treatment furnished Mrs. J. E. Kestle (wife of appellee) between the dates of March 1, 1959, and October 1, 1960. The Trial Court rendered judgment for Appellee Kestle and this appeal ensued, in which appellant urges three points:

'I. A husband is liable for the cost of maintaining his wife in the State Hospital under the provisions of Arkansas Statutes (1947), Section 59-230; and under the common law he is liable for the furnishing of necessaries to his wife.

'II. A husband is not liable for the 'observation' period for his wife's maintenance in the State Hospital under the provisions of Arkansas Statutes (1947), Section 43-1301, but his liability for a later commitment for medical treatment is not thereby altered.

'III. Court erred in construing Anna Kestle's commitment as detention of a criminal or convict rather than the maintenance, care and medical treatment of a mentally ill person.'

We find it unnecessary to consider appellant's second and third points, because our determination of the first point is fatal to appellant's case. In the Trial Court a jury was waived and the cause was submitted to the Court upon stipulated facts, as contained in the Circuit Court judgment; and here are all of such stipulated facts:

'That at the time the said Anna Kestle was committed to the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases by Order of this Court, she was under charge of the crime of murder in the first degree; that it was to the best interests of the State of Arkansas and to the best interest of the said Anna Kestle that she be committed to the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases for treatment.

'That Anna Kestle was a patient in the State Hospital during the dates as pleaded in the complaint of the plaintiff, and received maintenance, medical care, and treatment while therein; that the said Anna Kestle is the lawful wife of the defendant, J. E. Kestle; that charges in the amount of One Thousand Seven Hundred Ten Dollars ($1,710.00) were assessed for the maintenance medical care, and treatment of the said Anna Kestle by the plaintiff, the Arkansas State Hospital for Nervous Diseases; that the defendant, J. E. Kestle, had no connection with the hospitalization of his wife, Anna Kestle, but that the said Anna Kestle was committed by Order of the Court of Arkansas County on October 4, 1958, under the provisions of Act III of 1936, as amended (Arkansas Statutes (1947) Section 43-1301). That on November 1, 1958, this Court further ordered that the said Anna Kestle be committed to the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases for treatment; that this was subsequent to and by virtue of the official report of the physicians at the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases declaring the wife of the defendant to be mentally ill at the time of her examination to the degree of legal irresponsibility.'

We emphasize that the foregoing are all of the facts shown in the record before us; and we rest our affirmance on the conclusion that these stipulated facts are not sufficient to support a reversal of the Circuit Court judgment. Mrs. Kestle was charged with murder and committed to the State Hospital for observation on October 4, 1958, under the provisions of § 43-1301 Ark.Stats. On November 1, 1958, the State Hospital authorities reported to the Circuit Court that Mrs. Kestle was mentally ill; and the Circuit Court ordered that Mrs. Kestle be retained in the State Hospital for treatment. This order of the Circuit Court was apparently ¹ under the authority of Act No. 413 of 1957 and also Act No. 241 of 1943. ² Under the said order of the Circuit Court, Mrs. Kestle remained in the State Hospital for treatment until October 1, 1960; ³ and the State Hospital filed this action against Mr. Kestle on September 24, 1960, alleging that Mr. Kestle, as the lawful husband of Mrs. Kestle, was liable to the appellant, and that the $1710.00 covered items of necessary services and maintenance rendered to Mr. Kestle's wife. Under the first point in appellant's brief, recovery against Mr. Kestle is based on § 59-230 Ark.Stats. and also on the claimed common law duty of a husband to furnish maintenance and necessaries for this wife. We consider these points separately.

I. The Duty Under The Statute. The germane portion of § 59-230 Ark.Stats. reads:

'Pay for maintenance of patients--If any patient admitted to the State Hospital be found, upon examination, to possess an estate, over and above all indebtedness, more than sufficient for the support of his or her dependents, his or her natural or legally appointed guardian shall pay out of such estate into the office of the business manager of the State Hospital, in advance, an amount equal to one month's maintenance, at a rate to be fixed by the Board of Control [State Hospital Board] from time to time on the basis of maintenance costs, and in addition, shall supply the patient with sufficient and suitable clothing, and shall remove said patient when so required and notified by the Superintendent. If the patient remains in the State Hospital more than one month, such payments shall be made, monthly in advance, for the whole period during which the patient remains in the State Hospital. If the patient has no such estate of his own, then his obligation shall exist against any person who is legally bound to support such patient. Inability to pay shall not, however, cause any person to be refused admission to or discharged from the State Hospital.'

Thus, the statute places the primary duty of support on the 'natural or legally appointed guardian.' Further along, the statute says, 'If the patient has no such estate of his own, then his obligation shall exist against any person who is legally bound to support such patient.' Under the wording of this statute, the primary obligation is on the estate of the patient; and it is only after there has been a showing that the patient has no estate that the claim can be made against 'any person who is legally bound to support such patient.' In other words, the fact, that the statute first allowed recovery against the guardian and then later provided for recovery against others 'if the patient has no estate,' convinces us that the burden was on the appellant in the case at bar to establish that Mrs. Kestle had no estate; and the establishment of that fact was a condition precedent to recovery against Mr. Kestle. If the Legislature had intended the husband to be liable under the statute, irrespective of the estate of his wife (the patient), then the statute would have imposed liability on the guardian of the patient 'or any other person legally liable for the maintenance of the patient.'

Since the stipulated facts do not mention the presence or absence of any estate of Mrs. Kestle, and do not mention any prior effort to recover from her guardian, we are compelled to the conclusion that the appellant has failed in its burden of proof in seeking to recover from Mr. Kestle under the statute. What defenses the guardian might offer to an action is a matter not now before us, so we need not speculate on appellant's second and third points.

II. The Common Law Liability Of The Husband To Support The Wife. The appellant argues that Mr. Kestle is liable for the amount claimed, regardless of § 59-230, because he is the husband of Mrs. Kestle; that the husband is liable at common law for necessaries furnished the wife; and that the amount claimed by the State Hospital is for the maintenance of Mrs. Kestle and is a necessary. But, even if the statute (§ 59-230) does not supersede...