Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-0134

• Decision Date: 29 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-0134
• Parties: ARLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff, v. BRIDGEPORT FITTINGS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

ARLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff, v. BRIDGEPORT FITTINGS, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-0134

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 29, 2017

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a Motion filed by Arlington Industries, Inc. ("Arlington") seeking partial reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part Arlington's Motion for an Order to Show Cause. (Doc. 389.) Arlington asks the Court to modify its Order (Doc. 388) to permit Arlington to engage in limited discovery of the online marketing materials concerning the enjoined connectors at issue. Additionally, Arlington asks the Court to clarify its Order as to whether Arlington may take discovery of Bridgeport Fittings, Inc. ("Bridgeport") itself. For the reasons that follow, Arlington's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court will permit Arlington to engage in limited discovery on its claim regarding the online marketing materials. The Court will grant in part and deny in part Arlington's discovery requests, as specified in the accompanying Order.

I. Relevant Background

Because the factual and procedural history are both well known to the parties and stated in the Court's prior Memorandum (Doc. 387), they need not be repeated here other than to note the following:

On March 19, 2013, this Court held Bridgeport in contempt of court for violating the Confession of Judgment and Injunction (Doc. 47) signed by Bridgeport and Arlington as part of a 2004 settlement agreement. Specifically, the Court found that Bridgeport's line of connectors known as the "Whipper-Snap" 380SP and 38ASP violated the 2004 injunction, and entered a new permanent injunction (the "Injunction") enjoining:

[Bridgeport], its officers, agents, attorneys, servants, employees, successors, assigns, and all those in active concert or participation with them . . . from directly or indirectly making, using, selling, offering for sale or import or causing or inducing others to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the Whipper-Snap 380SP and 38ASP model connectors during the remaining term of U.S. Patent No. 6,335,488.

On May 10, 2016, Arlington filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause why Bridgeport should not be held in contempt of Court. (Doc. 334.) Along with its Reply Brief filed on July 5, 2016 (Doc. 361), Arlington submitted a Second Declaration of Thomas Gretz, Arlington's Vice President ("Second Gretz Declaration") (Doc. 360), and a Declaration of Donald Amrbose, Arlington's National Sales Manager ("Ambrose Declaration") (Doc. 359). On July 19, 2016, Bridgeport filed a Motion for Leave to file a Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. 365) accompanied by a proposed Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. 365-1) and a Third Declaration of Paul Suzio, Bridgeport's President and Chief Operating Officer ("Third Suzio Declaration") (Doc. 365-2). The Court denied Bridgeport's Motion for Leave on July 21, 2016. (Doc. 367.) A preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 17, 2016. Prior to the hearing, counsel for Arlington noticed that only the first and last page of the Second Gretz Declaration had been filed. In order to correct this error, Arlington submitted a replacement Second Gretz Declaration on November 15, 2016 ("Replacement Second Gretz Declaration"). (See Doc. 390-2.)

At the preliminary hearing, the Court granted Bridgeport permission to respond to the Replacement Second Gretz Declaration. (T.R. 8:8-14, Doc. 385.) On December 1, 2016, Bridgeport filed a Fourth Declaration of Paul Suzio as its response ("Fourth Suzio Declaration"). (Doc. 386.) The Fourth Suzio Declaration states in relevant part:

14. After the injunction issued, Bridgeport removed all marketing materials for, and images of, the enjoined connectors from its marketing materials and prevented them from being uploaded by a distributor. Distributors, however, could have uploaded an image onto their website prior to the injunction. Bridgeport has no way of knowing if this occurred and has no control over the actions of any distributor.

15. After the injunction issued, Bridgeport sent a notice to its sales representatives asking them to return all of their samples and inventories of various marketing materials to Mansir Printing. A true and correct copy of this emaildated March 21, 2013, is attached as Exhibit B. Mansir Printing prints most of our collateral advertising materials and we commonly have obsolete materials sent to them for recycling and/or destruction.

16. Promptly after issuance of the injunction, and at least by March 20, 2013, Bridgeport also electronically notified both Trade Service and IDW that the Enjoined Products were now obsolete and so images and materials relating to the Enjoined Products were no longer available from those sources for download.

On December 7, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part Arlington's Motion for an Order to Show Cause. (Doc. 388.) The Court found that Arlington was permitted to pursue its allegations of contempt against Bridgeport only with respect to the "Demo Kits" containing an enjoined connector and the online marketing materials. The Court further held that Arlington was entitled to discovery on the Demo Kits allegations only.

On December 21, 2016, Arlington filed the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration. (Doc. 389.) Bridgeport filed its Brief in Opposition on January 9, 2017 (Doc. 393), and Arlington submitted its Reply Brief on January 23, 2017 (Doc. 398). The matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). A motion for reconsideration may be granted if the movant establishes: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court decided the motion; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Café, by Lou-Ann, Inc., v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. Discussion

In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Arlington argues primarily that the Court erred in finding that Arlington satisfied the standard for obtaining a contempt hearing on its claim regarding the online marketing materials but failed to meet the standard for obtaining postjudgment discovery on that same claim. (See Doc. 391, at 13-14.) Much ofArlington's Brief is dedicated to the issue of whether the Fourth Suzio Declaration went beyond the scope of what the parties agreed to at the hearing¹ and the degree to which the Declaration is reliable. (See id. at 1-2, 4 n.2, 8-12.) But, at bottom, the question presented in Arlington's Motion is: In meeting the standard for obtaining a contempt hearing on its allegations regarding the online marketing materials, did Arlington also satisfy the standard for obtaining postjudgment discovery on that claim? Upon reconsideration, the Court answers that question in the affirmative, and concludes that it erred in finding otherwise.

A. The Court Will Permit Arlington to Engage in Limited Discovery with Respect to the Online Marketing Materials and Will Clarify the Scope of Discovery

In order to obtain a contempt hearing on a particular claim, the moving party's show cause motion must allege conduct on the part of the defendant which would violate the Court's prior order. Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Sawyer, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1278 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 1999) (quoting Mercer v. Mitchell, 908 F.2d 763, 768 (11th Cir.1990)). These allegations must be "sufficiently definite, specific, non-conjectural and detailed enough [for the district court] to conclude that a substantial claim is presented and that there are disputed issues of material fact which will affect the outcome of the motion." Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 252 F.R.D. 407, 414 (N.D. III. 2008). The moving party also must go beyond mere allegations and present some facts that "implicate defendants in violation of the court's order." Id. at 413.

In order "[t]o obtain discovery based on allegations of civil contempt, [the moving party] must make a prima facie showing that a court order has been disobeyed." Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 229 (D. Del. 2003); see N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 349 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (D. Del. 1972) (Thus before the Court will permit the discovery . . . [plaintiff] must at least present a prima facie case raising a likelihood that the outstanding injunction is being violated."). A moving party may fail to meet its burden for obtaining postjudgment discovery if the nonmoving party produces sufficient evidence of compliance with the court's order. Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Ret. Plan, 79 F. Supp. 3d 93, 101 (D.D.C. 2015).

Upon reconsideration, the Court agrees that its prior opinion erred with respect to the issue of discovery. In satisfying its burden for obtaining a contempt hearing on its claim regarding the online marketing materials, Arlington met the threshold for obtaining postjudgment discovery on the alleged violation. Compare Sommerfield, 252 F.R.D. at 414, with Wesley Jessen Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d at 229. In its December 7, 2016 Opinion, the Court concluded that, despite Bridgeport's proffered evidence of compliance with the Injunction, Arlington was permitted to advance its claim regarding the online marketing materials at a contempt hearing. (Doc. 387, at 7.) In so holding, the Court concluded that Arlington had presented some facts in support of its allegations which implicate Bridgeport in violation of the Injunction. (Id. at 6.) The Court further concluded that Bridgeport's evidence of compliance was insufficient to conclusivelyabsolve Bridgeport from contempt liability on this claim.² (See id. at 7.) And, upon reconsideration, the Court concludes that limited discovery on this claim is...