Armendariz-Mata v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1996
• Docket Number: ARMENDARIZ-MAT,No. 95-50462,P,95-50462
• Citation: 82 F.3d 679
• Parties: Carloslaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; Michael Quinn, DEA Special Agent; Robert Hernandez, DEA Special Agent, Defendants-Appellees, and Alfredo Juarez, DEA Special Agent; Guadalupe Gomez-Gamez, DEA Agent, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 679

82 F.3d 679

Carlos ARMENDARIZ-MATA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION;

Michael Quinn, DEA Special Agent; Robert

Hernandez, DEA Special Agent, Defendants-Appellees,

and

Alfredo Juarez, DEA Special Agent; Guadalupe Gomez-Gamez,

DEA Agent, Defendants.

No. 95-50462.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 15, 1996.

Carlos Armendariz-Mata, Three Rivers, TX, pro se.

Ellen A. Lockwood, Thomas P. Moore, United States Attorney's Office, San Antonio, TX, James H. DeAtley, Austin, TX, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before LAY, ^* HIGGINBOTHAM and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge:

Carlos Armendariz-Mata ("Mata"), a federal prisoner, filed suit against the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), and four individual law enforcement officers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04, complaining of wrongful seizure and forfeiture of currency and property. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Mata contends the district court erroneously determined (1) that his equitable claim concerned only the seized currency, and (2) that the notice of forfeiture was adequate. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

Facts

On May 14, 1988, DEA agents arrested Mata for the attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. ¹ On arrest, an address book and $839 were taken from his person. Agents also seized Mata's 1987 Chevrolet Suburban, $7,980 in currency, a pistol with ammunition, and allegedly, an export-import manual. ² DEA did not institute forfeiture proceedings regarding the vehicle, but rather, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.101(c), released it to the lienholder, General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The handgun and ammunition were turned over to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") and destroyed by ATF after Mata's criminal conviction. The address book was destroyed by DEA in December 1992, at the time Mata's case was closed. ³

On June 7, 1988, the government sent a notice of forfeiture of the currency to Mata's home. Mata's sister, Blanca Mata, received the notice and signed the return receipt on June 17, 1988. On the same date that it sent notice to Mata's residence, the government also sent an identical notice to Mata at his place of incarceration at the Guadalupe County jail. For unknown reasons, that notice was returned to DEA marked "Attempted RLW--5510 6/13/88" and marked "Return to Sender." Gov't Ex. 4. Thereafter, DEA made no other attempts to notify Mata of the forfeiture proceedings, except to publish notice in USA TODAY. The period for contesting forfeiture expired without a claim being filed, and on September 13, 1988, the currency was administratively forfeited.

In district court, Mata raised a due process claim, alleging defective notice of the forfeiture. Relying on the APA, Mata also sought equitable relief, namely, the return of the currency and property seized. The court determined it had jurisdiction to hear Mata's equitable claim, but that the claim extended to the $8,819 in currency only. The district court held that the applicable limitations period for Mata's equitable claim was six years pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); thus, the equitable claim implicating due process was not time barred. On the merits, the district court also determined the forfeiture notice was constitutionally adequate. Mata timely appeals.

Jurisdiction

The defendants initially challenge the district court's jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's claims. ⁴ The United States is immune from suit except as it waives its sovereign immunity. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1000, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). The terms of those waivers are set forth by Congress and courts may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against the federal government except as Congress allows. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 1976, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). Furthermore, such waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112, 118 (5th Cir.1995).

The APA, which creates a right of review regarding actions by federal agencies, provides:

[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages ... shall not be dismissed ... on the ground that it is against the United States.... Nothing herein ... affects the limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate ... ground....

5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Congress intended to broaden the avenues for judicial review of agency action by eliminating the defense of sovereign immunity in cases covered by § 702, Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 891-92, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2731, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), but when the substance of the complaint at issue is a claim for money damages, the case is not one covered by § 702, and, hence, sovereign immunity has not been waived. Drake v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 907 F.2d 532, 535 (5th Cir.1990).

Mata asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 seeking federal court review, under the APA, of DEA's seizure and forfeiture determination. He claims the district court erred in deciding the only property over which it had jurisdiction was the $8,819.00 in United States currency. Specifically, Mata contends that the relief sought for the vehicle, weapon, and address book was also equitable in nature, citing Marshall Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.1990), for the proposition that the return of forfeited property or its monetary equivalent is equitable relief.

Mata's claim is unpersuasive. He prayed for either the return of his property or its value, and $120,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Further, Mata ascribed a monetary value for his property; specifically, $8,083 for the Suburban, $100 for the address book, and $500 for the pistol and ammunition. All the property has either been destroyed or possession thereof relinquished by DEA. It was not forfeited, and cannot be returned; thus, any relief can only be in the form of monetary damages. The APA's § 702 waiver of the government's sovereign immunity does not apply to monetary damages. Marshall Leasing, 893 F.2d at 1100; see also A. & S. Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 238 (D.C.Cir.1995). Thus, the district court properly determined the only claim over which it had subject-matter jurisdiction was Mata's equitable claim for the return of $8,819 in currency.

Adequacy of Notice

In forfeiture proceedings, in addition to at least three weeks of publication of the intention to forfeit, "[w]ritten notice ... shall be sent to each party who appears to have an interest in the seized article." 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir.1994). In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court held that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. Mata argues the notice sent by DEA was inadequate. We agree.

Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983). Under most circumstances, notice sent by ordinary mail is sufficient to discharge the government's due process obligations. See Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 785, 102 L.Ed.2d...