Armendariz v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Writing for the Court: William P. Johnson, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Armendariz v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 331 F.Supp.3d 1245 (D. N.M. 2018)
• Decision Date: 06 August 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:17-cv-00339-WJ-LF
• Parties: Gabriel ARMENDARIZ, Eric Dion Coleman, Jacob Gomez, Tony Lovato, Matthew J. Lucero, Edward R. Manzanares, Joe Martinez, Christopher Mavis, Philip Talachy, Felipe J. Trujillo, and Joseph Vigil, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. SANTA FE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and Mark Gallegos, in his individual and official capacity, and Industrial Commercial Coatings, LLC, Defendants.

331 F.Supp.3d 1245

Gabriel ARMENDARIZ, Eric Dion Coleman, Jacob Gomez, Tony Lovato, Matthew J. Lucero, Edward R. Manzanares, Joe Martinez, Christopher Mavis, Philip Talachy, Felipe J. Trujillo, and Joseph Vigil, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs,

v.SANTA FE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and Mark Gallegos, in his individual and official capacity, and Industrial Commercial Coatings, LLC, Defendants.

Case No. 1:17-cv-00339-WJ-LF

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed August 6, 2018

Mark H. Donatelli, Paul M. Linnenburger, Rothstein Donatelli LLP, John C. Bienvenu, Bienvenu Law Office, Kristina Martinez, Egolf, Ferlic & Harwood, LLC, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiffs.

Alisa Wigley-Delara, Christa M. Hazlett, Conklin, Woodcock & Ziegler, PC, Jennifer A. Noya, Tiffany L. Roach Martin, Alex Cameron Walker, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Judd C. West, Carrie A. Snow, West Law Firm, PLLC, Albuquerque, NM, John D. Sear, Pro Hac Vice, Richard G. Morgan, Pro Hac Vice, Bowman and Brooke, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

William P. Johnson, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action (Claims Arising Under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act), filed on March 20, 2018 by Defendants Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners and Mark Gallegos ("County Defendants" or "Defendants" for purposes of this motion) (Doc. 59) . Having reviewed the parties' briefs and applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants' motion is not well-taken and, therefore, is denied. The Court finds that class action tolling principles do not apply to Plaintiffs' state law claims. However, these claims survive because the Court also finds that Defendants have waived the statute of limitations defense, are estopped from asserting the defense, and that Plaintiffs' state law claims are equitably tolled.

BACKGROUND

This case is a putative class action arising from Defendants' renovation of the shower facilities at the Santa Fe Adult Correctional Facility ("ACF") in 2014 when Plaintiffs and the class members were inmates at the ACF. Plaintiffs allege that they were exposed to dust, debris, and hazardous chemicals, which caused them injury.

This federal action is a continuation of a prior state court class action by Plaintiffs, Case No. D-101-CV-2016-00671 in the First Judicial District Court, County of Santa Fe, State of New Mexico. The state court action was filed on March 11, 2016 by two of the named Plaintiffs in this case, Joe Martinez and Christopher Mavis, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons. The state court action raised timely claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 et seq, and according to Plaintiffs, was brought within the two year limitations period set forth in NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15. See Doc. 63 at 1-5.

The federal case was initiated on March 14, 2017 when Plaintiffs Mavis and Martinez joined with additional named Plaintiffs to file a Class Action Complaint for Damages Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). The federal action brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiffs and a class of similarly situated persons based on the same underlying facts as the state court action. After Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in the federal case, parties agreed to litigate the two cases together in this case in federal court to conserve resources of both the parties and the courts. See Doc. 63 at 1-5. As part of that agreement, Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend the complaint to add Industrial Commercial Coatings, LLC ("ICC") as a Defendant and to include Plaintiffs' claims against ICC, Santa Fe County and Gallegos under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act and New Mexico common law. Following the filing of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs dismissed the state case without prejudice.

The currently filed complaint states four causes of action:

(1) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against County Defendants;

(2) Supervisory Liability under § 1983 against County Defendants;

(3) Claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, ¶ 41-4-7 and § 41- 4-12 against County Defendants; and

(4) Claims against Defendant ICC under New Mexico Common Law.

Doc. 20. The Court recently allowed Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to add what the Court considered to be minor changes, leaving intact the above description of the four causes of action. Doc. 128.

DISCUSSION

This motion concerns only the claims in the Third Cause of Action brought under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-7 and § 41-4-12 ("Tort Claims Act") against the County Defendants, with these defendants seeking dismissal of those claims because they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Defendants argue:

• Plaintiffs' state law claims under the Tort Claims Act) against the County Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations;

• The two-year statute of limitations was not tolled by the prior state court action filed by Plaintiffs Mavis and Martinez; and

• Even if a principle of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling applied, it would apply only to subsequent "individual" lawsuits by putative class members and not to successive class actions.

Plaintiffs contend that class action tolling principles apply to their state law claims and if not, the Court should find that Defendants have either waived the limitations defense or that they should be estopped from asserting it.

Plaintiffs' alleged injuries occurred in the spring of 2014, and so to be timely under the Tort Claims Act, the complaint should have been filed before the end of spring 2016, within the two-year limitations period of the Tort Claims Act. See NMSA § 41-4-15(A). Instead, the complaint was filed on March 14, 2017, almost three years after the date of the alleged incidents resulting in harm and one year too late. Plaintiffs do not dispute the chronology or the fact that the Tort Claims Act limitations period has run on these claims, but they maintain that the filing of the state court case suspended the tolling of the statutory clock. Thus, the Court's inquiries here will be twofold:

• whether class action tolling principles apply; and if not,

• whether Defendants should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense and allow Plaintiffs' claims to be equitably tolled.

I. Class Action Tolling Principles

A. Relevant Law

The Supreme Court first addressed the interplay of class actions and statutes of limitations more than four decades ago. In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah , 414 U.S. 538, 544, 552-53, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that a timely-filed complaint seeking relief on behalf of a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suspends the running of the statute of limitations for potential class members, and that, upon the denial of class certification, members of the unsuccessful class may intervene in the original case without erosion of their claims to the statute of limitations. 414 U.S. 538, 544, 552-53, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). The Court's stated purpose was to promote "efficiency and economy of litigation" which is a "principle purpose" of Rule 23. Id. at 553, 94 S.Ct. 756. In a case decided nine years later, the Court concluded that so-called American Pipe tolling applies not only when members of the pleaded class intervene in the original suit, but also when they file their own individual cases. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker , 462 U.S. 345, 350, 353-54, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). There remained an open question in the wake of both these cases: did these tolling principles also apply to subsequent class actions?

The Supreme Court answered this question very recently in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh , holding that the equitable tolling rule does not apply to subsequently filed class action claims.¹ ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1800, 201 L.Ed.2d 123 (2018). Thus, while American Pipe allows a putative class member to file an individual claim upon denial of class certification even if the statute of limitations would have by that time otherwise run out, China Agritech does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court explained that "[e]ndless tolling of a statute of limitations is not a result envisioned by American Pipe . " 138 S.Ct. at 1809.

B. Tolling Argument

It is undisputed that this federal action was filed in March 2017, three years after the alleged injuries occurred and one year past the two-year limitations period under the Tort Claims Act. The question is whether the initial state court action tolled the running of the clock under the American Pipe rule.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have no basis for any claimed tolling because the federal tolling rule in American Pipe does not provide that a state law class action filed in state court tolls the limitations period of a later cause of action filed outside that state's judicial system, that is, in another state or in the federal courts. Defendants point out that because Plaintiffs' Tort Claims Act claims arise under New Mexico law, this Court must apply New Mexico law and cannot allow Plaintiffs to assert claims in federal court that would be barred in a New Mexico court under the state's statute of limitations. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) ; see also Leavens v. Foster , 132 F.3d 43 (10th Cir. 1997) (courts cannot give a cause of action a "longer life" in federal court than it would have had in the state court" (relying on application of Erie to diversity cases). The Court agrees that American Pipe itself does not provide a tolling mechanism for Plaintiffs' state law...