Armes v. Noble County Sheriff Dept.
| Decision Date | 06 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:01-CV-445.,1:01-CV-445. |
| Citation | 215 F.Supp.2d 1008 |
| Parties | Harry Dewayne ARMES, Plaintiff, v. NOBLE COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, Noble County Jail Medical Staff, and Officer L.H. Xeister, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
The pro se Plaintiff, Harry Armes ("Plaintiff") brings this suit against the defendants, the Noble County Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department"), the Noble County Jail Medical Staff ("Medical Staff"), and officer L.H. Keister ("Keister")1 (collectively, the "Defendants") alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983") and a state law negligence claim.
In short, the Plaintiff claims he sustained serious back and neck injuries while being transported from a Virginia county jail to the Noble County, Indiana jail, when Keister negligently drove the squad car into another vehicle, and that the Defendants then violated his civil rights when they subsequently failed to provide medical treatment for his injuries.
Currently before the Court2 are the Defendants' May 29, 2002, motion for summary judgment,3 and the Plaintiff's June 6, 2002, cross-motion for summary judgment.
On June 19, 2002, the Defendants filed a response brief to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and on June 21, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a response brief to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The time to file reply briefs for both motions has passed.
The record consists of various affidavits and documents, and jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331; 1332.4
For the reasons hereinafter provided, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.
On October 24, 2001, Keister and another officer William Tipton ("Tipton") were transporting the Plaintiff from a Virginia county jail to the Noble County jail. (Keister Aff. ¶ 3; Tipton Aff. ¶ 3.) However, while driving along a three lane interstate highway, Keister attempted to pass another vehicle by moving into the lefthand lane, where another vehicle was already traveling. (Keister Aff. ¶ 4; Tipton Aff. ¶ 4.) The front left of the squad car "brushed against" the rear right of the other vehicle, but apparently the accident was not very serious since both vehicles stopped safely, and neither sustained any real damage. (Id.) At that time, Keister inquired whether anyone was injured, and both the Plaintiff and Tipton responded they were fine. (Id.) Keister then drove the Plaintiff to the Noble County jail.
Two days later, the Plaintiff completed a medical Inmate Request Form, indicating that he needed X-rays of his neck and lower back, which he claimed hurt "very bad," and which he claimed were injured in the accident. However, when the jail offered to have the jail doctor examine the Plaintiff, he refused, stating (See Weber Aff., Ex. B.) This was merely the first episode of the Plaintiff's resistance to the efforts of the Medical Staff during his two and a half month incarceration. Indeed, during that time he refused to take his medication, including anti-psychotic and osteoarthritis medications, 69 times. (Weber Aff., Ex. C at 4.)
On November 30, 2001, the Plaintiff sued the Sheriff's Department and a "Sergeant Butch" (apparently Keister) in the Noble County Superior Court, Small Claims Division seeking $3,000.00. (Defs.' Ex. 3.) In a statement attached to his Small Claims Complaint, the Plaintiff explained he was seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the auto accident and for their refusal to provide him with medical treatment for those injuries. (Id. at 2.)
On December 10, 2001, the Plaintiff initiated this case by seeking leave of this Court to proceed in forma pauperis and by submitting his proposed complaint (see Docket No. 1), which the Court eventually ordered filed on March 15, 2002.
However, on February 1, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a letter with the Noble County Superior Court, asking Judge Kramer to "dismiss the lawsuited (sic) altogether" because "I'm tired of trying to get something done for my back & neck." (Defs.' Ex. 4.) Apparently in response, the Plaintiff was provided with a standard small claim form eliciting a dismissal "for the reason that the same is now wholly satisfied and paid in full." (Defs.Ex.5.) The Plaintiff signed and submitted the form, and Judge Kramer then used the same form to show the case dismissed "with prejudice."5 (Id.)
Liberally construed, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, the Plaintiff alleges that Keister (and the Sheriff's Department through the principle of respondent superior) negligently caused his back and neck injuries as a result of the auto accident. The Plaintiff also alleges a § 1983 claim against Keister, the Medical Staff, and the Sheriff's Department for being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to provide medical care once he arrived at the jail.
The Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment as to both claims because the Plaintiff's state court case was dismissed with prejudice by Judge Kramer, and thus he is now precluded, through the legal principle of res judicata, from pursuing these claims here. The Defendants also argue that even if the § 1983 claim is not barred, the Plaintiff has no evidence they were in any way deliberately indifferent to any of his medical needs.
The Plaintiff appears to argue that the Defendants were in fact deliberately indifferent to his negligently caused injuries, but while the Plaintiff has filed various documents, none are in the form of an affidavit or an unsworn declaration under the pains and penalties of perjury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746.6
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 2512; North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Pinkerton Sec. Sys., Inc., 89 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir.1996); In re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).
Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence nor the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2511; North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 89 F.3d at 455. However, "[i]t is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).
Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the...
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