Armiger v. S. Trail Fire Prot. & Rescue Serv. Dist.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:13-cv-825-FtM-38CM |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER ARMIGER, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH TRAIL FIRE PROTECTION & RESCUE SERVICE DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant, South Trail Fire Protection & Rescue Service District's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. #36) filed on August 7, 2014. The Plaintiff, Christopher Armiger filed his Response in Opposition (Doc. #39) on August 11, 2014. The Motion to Dismiss is now fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review.
Plaintiff Christopher Armiger ("Armiger") initiated this action by filing a two-count Complaint against Defendant South Trail Fire Protection & Rescue District ("the District") (Doc. #1) on November 25, 2013. The District is a subdivision of the State of Floridaengaged in the business of firefighting, medical rescue control, and related services. Armiger alleges he was employed by the District as a certified firefighter/paramedic EMT from 2004 until January 16, 2013.
The Court dismissed the initial Complaint on May 9, 2014, without prejudice finding that it was Armiger filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. #31) on June 5, 2014.
The Amended Complaint alleges the same two (2) Counts which were dismissed in the original Complaint: Armiger's superiors at the District included Fire Chief Bill Lombardo, Battalion Chief Brian Kirkland, Battalion Chief Payne, Deputy Chief Bengston, Assistant Chief Intartaglio, and Human Resources Administrator Don Laubheimer violated his constitutional rights to procedural due process and free speech and violated Florida's defamation law. Armiger alleges Lombardo, Kirkland, Payne, Bengston, Intartaglio, and Laubheimer were agents of the District who at all relevant times had the authority or apparent authority to hire, promote, discipline, and fire employees.
In 2011, Armiger applied for a promotion to Lieutenant and Engineer. When he applied for the Lieutenant's test, Bengston discouraged Armiger, opining that he was unqualified because he had only seven or eight years' tenure with the District. (Doc. #31, ¶16). Nonetheless, Armiger took both the Lieutenant's test and the Engineer's test. He alleges he met the objectives of both tests but did not score "in the 90s" like others with similar test responses. (Doc. #31, ¶17-19).
The Complaint alleges Lombardo, Kirkland, Payne, Bengston, and Laubheimer manipulated the District's promotion testing process, engaged in acts of dishonesty, and declined to promote Armiger. (Doc. #31, ¶14-20). The Complaint alleges Intartaglio was present during the conduct complained of and declined to take any remedial action.
On October 1, 2011, Armiger informally reported the problems and defects in both tests and states he "was subjected to reprisal for making the reports." (Doc. #31, ¶20). On October 14, 2011, he presented a formal complaint to Bengston, stating that the tests were defective. Bengston declined to accept the complaint and in front of third parties, allegedly swore at Armiger and asserted that he was incapable or incompetent. (Doc. #31, ¶24). Armiger then presented his complaint about the tests to Lombardo and Laubheimer on October 20, 2011, and Laubheimer stated he agreed with Bengston that Armiger was incompetent. (Doc. #31, ¶25-26). On January 31, 2011, the District declined to promote Armiger. (Doc. #31, ¶19).
Armiger alleges that others were treated more favorably than he in connection with both the test scores and promotions. The Complaint alleges the District improved Firefighter Timothy Alexander, Jr.'s test grade due to a supposed test error, despite Alexander's work performance being allegedly problematic and inferior to Armiger's. (Doc. #31, ¶42). Armiger also alleges Firefighter Rubin Castro was treated more favorably than Armiger despite very serious infractions including driving a fire truck while intoxicated on more than one occasion. (Doc. #31, ¶43). Armiger also alleges that other similarly situated candidates were permitted "drive time" to practice for the Engineer's exam, but that Armiger was denied the same opportunity. (Doc. #31, ¶44). Armiger sayshe was also denied permission to practice for the Engineer's exam a month earlier while working in the A shift. (Doc. #31, ¶45).
Armiger states that in July of 2012, he presented his concerns to the Fire Commission over the public safety not being served by a highly irregular testing process and the alleged reprisals he was receiving from his superiors, including Chief Payne, for complaining of the same—as Payne was preventing him from securing drive time to practice for the Engineer's exam. (Doc. #31, ¶48). Armiger states the Fire Commission took no action on his complaints. (Doc. #31, ¶48).
The Complaint further alleges that in late October 2012, Kirkland made public racist remarks and slurs concerning the Middle Eastern national origin of a Fire Marshall candidate. (Doc. #31, ¶52). Armiger vocally opposed those statements. (Doc. #31, ¶52-53). Two shifts later, on November 14, 2012, Armiger asked Kirkland to refrain from touching him and/or shouting at him during a group exercise. (Doc. #31, ¶54). Armiger was then placed on paid administrative leave for over two months, during which time he received a certified letter stating that he was being disciplined for falsely accusing Payne of discrimination four months earlier. (Doc. #31, ¶54).
Armiger reported these allegations to Lombardo on December 26, 2012. Chief Lombardo told Armiger that it was not his place to determine how drive time was determined. (Doc. #31, ¶60). Lombardo informed Armiger that he was terminated effective January 16, 2013, for reputedly challenging Lombardo's authority. (Doc. #31, ¶61). Armiger elected to resign in lieu of being fired. (Doc. #31, ¶61).
Armiger alleges that according to policy and practice, the District should provide an employee with: (1) a written warning that the employee is not performing his job dutiescompetently; (2) a period of thirty (30) days to improve; and (3) a probationary period upon demonstration of partial improvement, absent some extreme violation of company policies or misconduct. Armiger alleges he received none of these and that because Fire Commissioner Gaskill is Kirkland's father-in-law, this had a chilling effect on Armiger's ability to exercise his rights.
As a result, Armiger brings Count I for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Lombardo, Kirkland, Payne, Bengston, Laubheimer, and Intartaglio, acting in their individual capacities and under a governmental custom or policy, deprived Armiger of his constitutional rights, including his due process and free speech rights. Armiger brings Count II for defamation under Florida law, alleging the District and its agents repeated unprivileged false statements to a wide audience that portrayed Armiger unfavorably and were injurious to his professional reputation.
The District now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Bedasee v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 2:09-cv-111-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 98996 *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2010) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007)); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 153 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2002). "To survive dismissal, the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co. v. GroundDown Engineering, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544-70 (2007). The former rule—that "[a] complaint should be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief," La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)—has been retired by Twombly. James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274. Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Dismissal is warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Bedasee, 2010 WL 98996 at *1 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)); Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1992).
To satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, a complaint must simply give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, S. Ct. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002). Although the pleading standard announced in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations," it does demand more than an unadorned, "the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F. 3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Ascroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). Furthermore, unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the...
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