Armijo v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 19-00484-ACK-RT |
| Parties | JUSTIN WILLIAM ARMIJO, Plaintiff, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE WAREHOUSE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COSTCO'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT [ECF NO. 39]
Plaintiff Justin William Armijo brought this lawsuit against his employer Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation asserting claims for, inter alia, disability, sex, and race discrimination and retaliation. Costco has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1) for partial dismissal of Armijo's state-law discrimination claims and his race- and sex-related Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as for an order under Rule 12(e) requiring Armijo to file an amended complaint with a more definite statement as to his other remaining claims. For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS Costco's Motion for Partial Dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint and GRANTS Costco's Motion for More Definite Statement, ECF No. 39.
BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2017, Armijo filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that he had been subjected to disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"). Zorc Decl. Ex. B, ECF No. 39-4. He asserted that the discrimination and retaliation took place between November 2, 2016, and May 23, 2017, and he checked the box signaling a "continuing violation." Id. Armijo's EEOC charge did not check the box indicating that he wanted the claim filed with the Hawai`i Civil Rights Commission ("HCRC"), id., and no charge was ever filed. The EEOC ultimately denied the charges and issued its dismissal and right-to-sue-letter on June 7, 2019. Zorc Decl. Ex. D, ECF No. 39-6.
Armijo filed this lawsuit three months later. ECF No. 1. In light of certain deficiencies in the original complaint and then the first amended complaint, Armijo filed the operative second amended complaint on February 21, 2020. ECF No. 13 (the "2AC"). Costco filed its Motion for Partial Dismissal of Second Amended Complaint Filed February 21, 2020 [Doc 13] and Motion for More Definite Statement (the "Motion") on October 30, 2020. ECF No. 39. Armijo filed his Opposition on March 2, 2021, ECFNo. 51, and Costco filed its Reply on March 15, ECF No. 53. A telephonic hearing was held on March 29.
Armijo's suit centers around allegations that he experienced disability- and race-related discrimination and sexual harassment while working as a loss-prevention and then member-services employee at a Costco store on the Big Island of Hawai`i. As Costco points out, the 2AC is difficult to follow. Below the Court attempts to summarize the substance of Armijo's claims:
The 2AC begins by listing nineteen "separate and individual wrongful acts or infringements." 2AC at 2.1 Armijo appears to base his various claims around a 2016 incident that resulted in an on-the-job injury. 2AC at 3-4. Specifically, he asserts that he was injured when he was forced to conduct clean-up maintenance despite being under work restrictions while recovering from another injury. 2AC at 4. From the time of that injury, Armijo alleges that he experienced "bias, discrimination, harassment, and other negative management practices and management tactics." 2AC at 3 (internal quotations marks omitted).
Armijo describes what he calls a "hostile work environment" and a failure by Costco to prevent harassment, including "verbal [h]arassment based on his [d]isability." 2AC at 4. He alleges that one of his "managers/supervisors" intimidated and physically harassed him, resulting in a "long sustained pattern of severe and pervasive harassment and inappropriate conduct directed at [Armijo] beginning in 2016." 2AC at 4. Armijo details various incidents that he describes as harassing and discriminatory statements by various Costco managers. 2AC at 5-7. Many of the incidents Armijo describes do not indicate what the so-called discrimination or harassment was based on. But reading the 2AC as a whole, it appears that Armijo attributes the comments and incidents to discrimination largely on the basis of his disability, but also to race-based discrimination or sexual harassment. See 2AC at 6-7.
Based on Armijo's various factual allegations, he appears to allege eight claims about Costco's failure to train managers to understand disability accommodations and to ensure proper oversight and company management. See 2AC at 7.
STANDARDS
A defendant may challenge a court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). "A party invoking the federalcourt's jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction." See Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).
A challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction may be either "facial" or "factual." Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, "the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). By contrast, in a factual attack, "the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039). The moving party may bring a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction by submitting "affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court." Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)). The nonmoving party must then "present affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. (quoting St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201). In these circumstances, the court may look beyond the complaint without having to convert the motion into one for summaryjudgment. U.S. ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565 F.3d 1195, 1200 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121, 1128 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).
Here, the Court construes Costco's as bringing a factual challenge. Although the 2AC does not necessarily allege plausible facts that would invoke jurisdiction on their own, Costco still relies on other evidence—primarily the EEOC charge—to establish that Armijo in fact failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Under Rule 12(e) "[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Rule 8 requires a "short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." See Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Pro se pleadings and briefs are to be construed liberally. Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfullypleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). The Court should act with leniency toward pro se litigants when they technically violate a rule. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986); Motoyama v. Haw. Dep't of Transp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975 (D. Haw. 2012). That said, pro se litigants are "not excused from knowing the most basic pleading requirements." Am. Ass'n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. Motoyama, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
DISCUSSION
While not entirely clear, Armijo's 2AC alludes to claims for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Hawai`i state law.2 See 2AC at 9-11. Costco's Motionseeks partial dismissal of the 2AC for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the discrimination claims.3 Specifically, Costco argues that Armijo failed to exhaust any discrimination claims brought under state law, and that he failed to exhaust his race- and sex-related discrimination claims brought under Title VII. Costco also asks the Court to, with respect to the remaining claims, require Armijo to file an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8 and 10. The Court will first discuss whether Armijo has failed to exhaust any state-law claims and any Title VII claims based on race or sex discrimination. The Court will then address Costco's request for a more definite statement as to any claims that remain.
While he does not state as much outright in the 2AC, the Court assumes for purposes of this Motion that Armijo intends to assert a claim for unlawful employment discrimination under chapter 378 of the Hawai`i Revised Code. Costco argues that the claim is barred by Armijo's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by state law. Mot. at 9-10. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees.
Under Hawai`i law, when a remedy is available from an administrative agency, a party must exhaust that remedy before seeking judicial relief. See Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 9 Haw. App. 143, 151, 827 P.2d 1149 (1992). An individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful discriminatory practice may file a complaint with the HCRC, upon receipt of which the HCRC's executive...
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