Armijo v. Pueblo of Laguna

• Decision Date: 06 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 29,893.,29,893.
• Citation: 149 N.M. 234,2011 -NMCA- 006,247 P.3d 1119
• Parties: Robert ARMIJO, Cross–Claimant Plaintiff/Appellee,v.PUEBLO OF LAGUNA, Cross–Claim Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

149 N.M. 234

247 P.3d 1119

2011 -NMCA- 006

Robert ARMIJO, Cross–Claimant Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.PUEBLO OF LAGUNA, Cross–Claim Defendant–Appellant.

No. 29,893.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Oct. 6, 2010.Certiorari Denied, Dec. 6, 2010, No. 32,687.

Tibo J. Chavez, Jr., Belen, NM, Stephen K. Bowman, Corrales, NM, for Appellee.Nordhaus Law Firm, LLP, Daniel I.S.J. Rey–Bear, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Judge.

{1} The Pueblo of Laguna (the Pueblo) appeals the order of the district court denying the Pueblo's motion to dismiss the cross-claims of Appellee Robert Armijo (Armijo) filed in a quiet title suit. Our resolution of this appeal requires us to consider the issue of tribal sovereign immunity as it relates to non-tribal land purchased by the Pueblo and whether the Pueblo is an indispensable party. We hold that the Pueblo is immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, further, that the Pueblo is an indispensable party who cannot be joined. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court and remand for dismissal of Armijo's cross-claims.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} In April 2008, the Pueblo, a federally recognized Indian Tribe organized under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1934) (as amended through 2004), purchased a ranch (the Ranch) consisting of approximately 8,300 acres from Silver Dollar Ranch, LLC. The Ranch is situated within the Cebolleta Land Grant and outside the boundaries of the Pueblo. This matter concerns 640 acres of the Ranch identified as Section 16, Township 12 North, Range 6 West (Section 16).

{3} In December 2008, the Board of Trustees of the Cebolleta Land Grant (the Board) brought an action to quiet title to Section 16. In its complaint, the Board named the Pueblo, Armijo, two other parties who have not appeared at any point during these proceedings, and all unknown claimants of interest as defendants.

{4} In March 2009, the Pueblo moved to dismiss the Board's complaint. Relying on tribal sovereign immunity, the Pueblo argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 1–012(B)(1) NMRA. The Pueblo also argued for dismissal based on indispensability under Rule 1–019(B) NMRA and failure to state a claim under Rule 1–012(B)(6).

{5} Armijo filed an answer to the Board's complaint. Therein, he asserted counterclaims against the Board for: (1) quiet title, asserting that he held title to Section 16 through a warranty deed that he obtained from the Board in September 1994; (2) adverse possession, asserting that he had “commenced actual and visible appropriation and possession of” Section 16 since 1994; and (3) breach of the warranty covenants of the 1994 warranty deed. Armijo also filed cross-claims against the Pueblo and the two nonappearing defendants asserting title to Section 16 through adverse possession.

{6} In April 2009, the Board, the Pueblo, and Armijo stipulated to dismissal of the Board's complaint. Dismissal was based on “the preclusive effect of the prior quiet title decree between the Board and the Pueblo's predecessor in title.” The stipulation further specified, however, that dismissal of the Board's complaint had no effect on Armijo's counterclaims against the Board for breach of warranty covenants, Armijo's cross-claims against the Pueblo and the nonappearing defendants for adverse possession, or the Pueblo's defenses as set forth in the motion to dismiss. Armijo's counterclaim against the Board is not at issue here.

{7} Later in April 2009, the Pueblo moved to dismiss all of Armijo's cross-claims for adverse possession based on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity and indispensability. The district court rejected the Pueblo's tribal sovereign immunity argument, concluded that the “court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over [the Pueblo] in this matter because this matter arises outside the reservation,” and denied the Pueblo's motion. The court did not address the Pueblo's argument that Armijo's cross-claims against the nonappearing defendants must also be dismissed on grounds that the Pueblo was an indispensable party to those claims and could not be joined. We accepted the Pueblo's interlocutory appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

{8} On appeal, the Pueblo asks us to reverse the district court and dismiss Armijo's adverse possession cross-claims against the Pueblo and against the nonappearing defendants. As to Armijo's cross-claim against the Pueblo, the Pueblo argues that the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim due to the Pueblo's tribal sovereign immunity. As to Armijo's cross-claims against the nonappearing parties, the Pueblo argues that, if we find the Pueblo immune from suit, dismissal of Armijo's cross-claims against the nonappearing parties is necessary pursuant to Rule 1–019.

A. Sovereign Immunity

{9} We begin with the issue of the Pueblo's sovereign immunity. “In reviewing an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the determination of whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002–NMSC–012, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668; see also Martinez v. Cities of Gold Casino, 2009–NMCA–087, ¶ 22, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.3d 44 (“We review de novo the legal question of whether an Indian tribe ... possesses sovereign immunity.”), cert. denied, 2009–NMCERT–007, 147 N.M. 361, 223 P.3d 358.

{10} “Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. Indeed, Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Gallegos, 2002–NMSC–012, ¶ 7, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]ribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the states.” Id. Tribal immunity from suit is limited in two respects. First, “Article I, Section 8 of the U[nited] S [tates] Constitution provides Congress with the ultimate authority over Indian affairs, and, thus, Congress can expressly authorize suits against Indian tribes through legislation.” Id. Alternatively, “[a] tribe can also waive its own immunity by unequivocally expressing such a waiver.” Id.

{11} There is no federal statute expressly authorizing the present suit against the Pueblo, nor has the Pueblo expressly waived its sovereign immunity. Yet, the district court concluded that the Pueblo was not immune from suit. The basis for this decision was the district court's observation that “this matter arises outside the reservation.” The court explained its reasoning in greater depth as follows at the hearing on the Pueblo's motion to dismiss.

I just can't see how the Pueblo can engage in purchasing property outside the reservation and if there is a dispute as far as title is concerned, I can't see how the Pueblo can just claim sovereign immunity and then everything is stalled. And just the basic fairness would keep me from granting this motion to dismiss. So it is denied.

The law governing tribal sovereign immunity does not support this conclusion.

{12} The locus of the Pueblo's activity does not determine the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity. The United States Supreme Court has “sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal activities occurred.” Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998); see also Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149, 157 (2d.Cir.2010) (“[A] tribe's immunity from suit is independent of its lands.”). Armijo argues that we should not rely on the above quoted language from Kiowa because Kiowa is a contract case and the discussion therein is limited to contract issues. We reject this contention. See Antonio v. Inn of the Mountain Gods Resort & Casino, 2010–NMCA–077, ¶ 11, 148 N.M. 858, 242 P.3d 425 (“To the extent that [the appellant] argues that [ Kiowa's ] holding is limited to suits on contract, we disagree.”), cert. denied, 2010–NMCERT–007, 148 N.M. 610, 241 P.3d 611 (2010).

{13} The district court also premised its decision on “basic fairness.” We understand the court's concern with the equities of the case. However, “sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation.... Rather [,] it presents a pure jurisdictional question.” Ameriloan v.Super. Ct., 169 Cal.App.4th 81, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 572, 582 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ute Distrib. Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, 149 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir.1998) (“In the absence of a clearly expressed waiver by either the tribe or Congress, the Supreme Court has refused to find a waiver of tribal immunity based on policy concerns, perceived inequities arising from the assertion of immunity, or the unique context of a case.”).

{14} The suit against the Pueblo was not authorized by federal statute nor did the Pueblo waive its immunity. Furthermore, the Pueblo has not affirmatively asserted claims in the suit and thereby consented to jurisdiction. Contra Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244–46 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that by filing suit, the tribe consented to jurisdiction and “assumed the risk of the court determining that the [t]ribe did not have title to the disputed tracts”). We conclude that the district court erred in denying the Pueblo's motion to dismiss Armijo's cross-claim against the Pueblo.

{15} Armijo makes varying arguments in support of affirmance. First, he argues that we should affirm the district court's decision on equitable grounds and submits that he will be without a ranch and without a remedy if we reverse and dismiss the matter. As stated above, equity is not a consideration in determining whether the Pueblo is immune from suit. Ameriloan, 86...