Armour Packing Co. v. City Council of Augusta

• Decision Date: 13 August 1903
• Citation: Armour Packing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 552, 45 S.E. 424 (Ga. 1903)
• Parties: ARMOUR PACKING CO. v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

45 S.E. 424

118 Ga. 552

ARMOUR PACKING CO. v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA.

Supreme Court of Georgia

August 13, 1903

Syllabus by the Court.

1.Notes, accounts, and other choses in action in the hands of an agent of a nonresident corporation doing business in a municipal corporation of this state, and which were received in the course of the business so conducted, are taxable by such municipal corporation; it having general statutory authority to tax property of every kind situated within its limits.

Error from Superior Court, Richmond County; W. T. Gary, Judge.

Action between the Armour Packing Company and the city council of Augusta.From the judgment the packing company brings error.Affirmed.

Felder & Rountree, C. Henry Cohen, and Boykin Wright, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. H Barrett, for defendant in error.

COBB J.

The Armour Packing Company, a corporation chartered under the laws of the state of New Jersey, has a place of business in the city of Augusta, with a manager, to whom it ships meats to be sold, and the amounts realized from the sale of such meats are remitted daily to the packing company, at Kansas City, Mo.; none of the money being invested in the city of Augusta.The packing company's branch at Augusta does business on credit as well as for cash, and in January, 1900 had upon its books in Augusta notes, accounts, and choses in action received from the sale of meats and other products amounting to $6,000.The question is whether the city of Augusta has power to levy a tax upon debts due the corporation, such as these notes, accounts, and choses in action.The facts of this case are substantially the same as those in Armour Packing Company v. Savannah,115 Ga. 140, 41 S.E. 237, where it was held that the money and solvent accounts due the corporation were taxable in Savannah.A careful examination of the opinion shows that the decision was based upon the rule thought to be applicable under general principles of law, and also upon a section of the charter of Savannah which was construed to confer the power to tax.It is therefore to be seen that the exact question has been decided by this court.We have been requested to review and overrule that decision, or at least so much of it as held that the city of Savannah had authority to levy the tax under principles of general law.We are of opinion, however, that the decision is sound, and decline to overrule it.

It is to be conceded that by the decided weight of authority the general rule is that debts follow the person of the creditor and are to be taxed at his domicile.This court, however, held in an early case that, for purposes of taxation, the situs of a debt is the place where the debtor resides.Bridges v. Griffin,33 Ga. 113.In that case it was sought to tax notes owned by a resident of this state, due by persons residing without the state.Such notes and other evidences of indebtedness are now taxable by express statute.Pol. Code, § 776;Collins v. Miller,43 Ga. 336;Cary v. Edmondson,44 Ga. 651;City Council of Augusta v. Dunbar,50 Ga. 387.These cases have little bearing on the question now in hand.It is conceded, of course, that tangible personal property is taxable wherever it is situated, and that for purposes of taxation the maxim that personal property follows the owner does not apply.It is claimed, however, that it does apply in all cases to intangible personal property, such as notes, bonds, accounts, etc.We do not agree that this is a universal rule, even as applied to that class of property; and we are not, as was suggested by the able counsel for the plaintiff in error, alone in this opinion.Courts of high standing and ability have held that the situs of negotiable instruments for purposes of taxation is at the place where they are actually situated, without regard to the residence of the owner.See25 Am. & Eng. Enc.L. (2d Ed.) 147;Wilcox v. Ellis,14 Kan. 588, 603, 19 Am.Rep. 107;Fisher v. Commissioners,19 Kan. 414;People v. Gardner,51 Barb. 352, 357-359, and cases cited;People v. Trustees,48 N.Y. 397;Catlin v. Hull,21 Vt. 152;In re Jefferson,35 Minn. 215, 28 N.W. 256;People v. Home Insurance Co.,29 Cal. 533;Poppleton v. Yamhill County,18 Or. 377, 23 P. 253, 7 L.R.A. 449;Taylor v. County Court,47 Mo. 594;Redmond v. Commissioners,87 N.C. 122.The reasoning upon which these decisions is based would make them applicable to other species of intangible property than negotiable securities.They proceed upon the ground that wherever property is actually situated and receives the protection of the laws, it is subject to taxation, whether tangible or intangible.The ground upon which we rest our decision in this case is that when a nonresident goes into another state for the purpose of doing business, and employs an agent there to transact his business, receive money due him, contract debts for him, purchase property to be used in the business, and exercise a general management of such business, he cannot escape the burden of taxation which his property of every description situated in this state ought to bear by invoking the fiction that intangible property has its situs where the owner resides.It is just and fair that the state which affords his property protection should have a right to lay upon it its proportionate burden of taxation.This fiction has no application in matters of taxation, at least in such a case as is presented in this record.To all intents and purposes, these notes and accounts are a part of the business being conducted in Augusta.They were received in the course of that business, and represent part of the capital employed in the business.They are, in short, as much taxable as is the tangible personal property actually employed in the conduct of the business in that city.These views are based upon sound reasoning, good sense, as well as the principles of common justice, and are not without authority to support them; nor are they necessarily in conflict with the rule that the situs of a debt is generally at the place where the creditor resides.Mr. Desty lays down the following rule: "The situs of personal property, whether tangible or intangible, for the purposes of taxation, unless otherwise provided by statute, is at the place of residence of the owner; the only exception being where the...