Armour v. Tchaptchet
| Decision Date | 21 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17 CV 50,2:17 CV 50 |
| Parties | DONALD LEE ARMOUR, Plaintiff, v. ERIC TCHAPTCHET, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Donald Lee Armour, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a motion for default judgment against Dr. Eric Tchaptchet. (DE # 30.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default and default judgment. When a defendant fails to answer a complaint or otherwise defend himself, that party is in default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Although Dr. Tchaptchet's answer was due on January 30, 2019 (see DE # 25), he has not appeared, responded to the complaint, or otherwise defended himself in this case to date. Thus, the Clerk entered default against him. (DE # 29.)
The entry of default is only the first step in obtaining a default judgment. Applying to the court for a default judgment is the second step. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In general, once a default is entered, "the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint relating to liability are taken as true . . .." Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 253 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); but see 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed. 2019) (); Rosenbaum v. Seybold, No. 1:06- CV-352-TLS, 2013 WL 633284, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 20, 2013) (). However, In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. DiMucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988)). A default judgment may not be entered without a hearing pertaining to damages unless "the amount claimed is liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits." e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods, Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983)).1
Armour, who was housed at the Porter County Jail during the time period inquestion, was granted leave to proceed against Dr. Tchaptchet for being deliberately indifferent to his undiagnosed neuropathy from July 18, 2016, through September 22, 2016, and for being deliberately indifferent to his two ischemic attacks on August 18-19, 2016, until his transfer on October 4, 2016, both in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (DE # 17.) With regard to his neuropathy, Armour alleges that he arrived at the Porter County Jail on July 8, 2016, with preexisting issues from a neck fracture/cervical fusion in 1994. He began complaining to Dr. Tchaptchet on July 18, 2016, about "numbness, tingling, pins and needles, and aching pain" from his right shoulder to his lower right extremities. (DE # 16 at 3.) He was given an x-ray, which according to the documents attached to the complaint, was "within normal limits cervical fusion remains stable." (Id. at 14.) Dr. Tchaptchet also prescribed Flexeril, a muscle relaxer, but Armour alleges that he remained in pain and continued to complain to medical staff. Armour states that he was "finally approved for an MRI" on September 22, 2016. (Id. at 7.) However, documents attached to the complaint show that the MRI was performed on September 8, 2016, and that he was seen by an outside physician, Dr. Anton A. Thompkins, on September 22, 2016, to discuss the results of the MRI, which indicate:
[N]o evidence of any significant neural compromise as per my reading in the cervical region. There is some mild foraminal narrowing, but I do not think that is the cause of symptoms today. Standing AP and lateral cervical xrays show no evidence of any dislocations. . . . I have told him I think the best mode of treatment would be, at this point, treat him from a medical standpoint. I would try him on some Neurontin 300 mg 3 times a day to see if that helps him, but I am comfortable in saying that surgery is not indicated at this stage.
(Id. at 24.) Armour was prescribed the Neurontin, which he indicates provided "some relief." (Id. at 7.) He was transferred out of the Porter County Jail to the Kankakee County Jail on October 4, 2016, which ended his interactions with Dr. Tchaptchet.
As to Armour's transient ischemic attacks (TIA),2 he alleges that on August 18, 2016, his "blood pressure spiked to dangerous levels" due to pain from his previously untreated condition. (Id. at 4.) The nurse wanted to transport him to the emergency room, but, after conferring with Dr. Tchaptchet, the transport was cancelled. Instead, Armour was given Clonidine, a medication to lower his blood pressure, and he was subsequently placed in the medial isolation unit. The next day, he suffered another TIA. Again, although the medial staff wanted to transport him to another facility, Dr. Tchaptchet declined the transfer, prescribed more Clonidine, and told him to "try and get some rest." (Id. at 6.) Armour remained in medical isolation for a week, and he requested but did not receive CT scans and MRIs "to determine his condition as far as strokes or heart attacks." (Id.) Other than Clonidine, Armour did not receive treatment for the TIAs prior to his departure from the Porter County Jail on October 4, 2016.3Armour does not allege that he suffered any additional TIAs after his transfer, nor does he allege that he suffered a full, post-TIA stroke at any time. According to Armour, other than the CT scan and MRIs described in footnote three, he has not received any other treatment for the TIAs from the time he was transferred out of the Porter County Jail until the present day. (See DE # 30 at 3.)
The amended complaint requests $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $9,000,000 in punitive damages from Dr. Tchaptchet. (DE # 16 at 10.) His motion for default judgment requests a lump sum of $9,999,000 but does not differentiate between the two types of damages sought, which is problematic. (DE # 30 at 5.) More importantly, although the amended complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations set forth above are deemed true for purposes of default, Armour has not sufficiently tied those allegations to the requested damages. "[T]o recover damages [in a default judgment proceeding] a plaintiff must prove that the Defendants caused the damages he sustained." Tate v. Troutman, 683 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 (E.D. Wis. 2010), aff'd sub nom Tate v. Riegert, 380 Fed. Appx. 550 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, in his motion for defaultjudgment, Armour asserts that Dr. Tchaptchet "recklessly and unconcernness (sic) placed my central nervous system in permanent disfunction." (DE # 30 at 4.) Such a conclusory statement need not be taken as true. See Tate, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
Specifically, Armour claims that he is:
now forced to walk with a cane and sometimes a walker due to partial paralysis on his right side of his body, suffers muscle wasting, muscle twitching, and extreme cramp outbreaks daily, loss of control over his bladder, having to wear disposable pull-up underwear, libido dysfunction/impotence, small vessel ischemic vascular disease brain (dementia) if white matter changes continue to progress over time, and depression which is being treated with anti-depression medication (Trazodone), loss of healthy vision, and speech, possible further surgery needed, and ongoing medical treatment with rehab, and home healthcare aid/assistance with medication, cooking, washing, and hygiene support.
(Id.) However, he does not provide any medical evidence or physician opinions attributing those issues/problems to the actions of Dr. Tchaptchet or his time spent in the Porter County Jail, nor does he provide any medical evidence establishing his current medical condition.4 Armour's statement that Dr. Tchaptchet caused or permanently exacerbated his current impairments is undercut by several exhibits attached to his complaint and motion. For example, a week after his arrival at the Porter County Jail—and three days prior to when he alleges he began complaining to Dr. Tchaptchet—Armour submitted a request to medical staff stating he had (DE # 16 at 12; DE # 30-1 at 10.) He submitted another request the following day, noting that he was "a victim of a spinal injury." (Id. at 13; Id. at 11.) These documents suggest that at least some of Armour's current impairments pre-existed his interactions with Dr. Tchaptchet. Moreover, although Armour insists that the post-transfer CT scan and MRI "revealed that Armour has in fact suffered a series of (ischemic) strokes and not multiple sclerosis" and that Dr. Tchapchet "deliberately placed Armour's central nervous system in permanent disfunction" (DE # 16 at 8), the medical documents cited in support of that proposition are less than definitive. The MRI results from April of 2017 indicate only that "scattered ischemic changes" were noted, and the possibility of a multiple sclerosis diagnosis could not be ruled out without further testing. (DE # 16 at 27; DE # 30-1 at 20.) None of the documents indicate when the ischemic changes likely occurred, that the changes were because of Dr. Tchaptchet's treatment choices, or that the symptoms he is currently experiencing were the result of the undiagnosed neuropathy from July through September of 2016 or the TIAs he experienced in August of 2016. Without additional medical evidence or other such reliable and verifiable information, the court is unable to even begin to conduct an inquiry to "ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty." In...
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