Armstead v. Nat'l Freight, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 November 2020
• Docket Number: Appeal Nos. 3-17-0777,3-18-0009
• Citation: 174 N.E.3d 119,447 Ill.Dec. 428,2020 IL App (3d) 170777
• Parties: Clifton ARMSTEAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL FREIGHT, INC., d/b/a NFI Industries, Inc., and Derrick Roberts, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (3d) 170777
174 N.E.3d 119
447 Ill.Dec. 428

Clifton ARMSTEAD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL FREIGHT, INC., d/b/a NFI Industries, Inc., and Derrick Roberts, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal Nos. 3-17-0777
3-18-0009

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Opinion filed November 20, 2020

Michael W. Rathsack and Adam J. Zayed, both of Chicago, for appellant.

Robert M. Burke and Garrett L. Boehm Jr., of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees.

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Clifton Armstead, appeals the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants, National Freight, Inc., d/b/a NFI Industries, Inc. (National Freight), and Derrick Roberts. Plaintiff argues the circuit court improperly characterized his statement from a separate but related action as a judicial admission. Originally, we reversed the judgment of the circuit court. After our initial disposition, defendants filed a petition for rehearing. Upon rehearing, we now affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The record on appeal indicates that on March 6, 2015, defendant Roberts,

174 N.E.3d 122

while driving defendant National Freight's semi-truck, struck plaintiff's semi-truck in Grundy County. Plaintiff filed a tort complaint against defendants, alleging Roberts negligently operated the vehicle at an excessive speed in the course of his employment as National Freight's agent. Plaintiff complained of and sought damages for back, shoulder, and knee injuries that occurred as a result of the accident. He maintained the accident caused injuries to his back, shoulder, and knee in interrogatories.

¶ 4 At the time of the accident, plaintiff drove the semi-truck for his employer, Manfredi Mushroom Company (Manfredi), a Pennsylvania corporation. On or around March 31, 2015, plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim against Manfredi in Pennsylvania for the injuries he sustained in the course of his employment. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. During the workers' compensation proceedings, an independent medical examiner opined that plaintiff suffered an injury to the right knee as a result of the March 6, 2015, accident. The independent medical examiner also opined: "[r]elative to [plaintiff's] lower back condition, the information available to me today does not indicate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty any injury to have been sustained by [plaintiff] relative to the lower back on or around March 6, 2015."

¶ 5 On November 9, 2016, plaintiff signed a "Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation" (Agreement) settling the Pennsylvania workers' compensation claim. The Agreement contained language pertinent to this appeal. Under the "Conclusions of Law" section, the signed Agreement states it is "appropriately approved as binding only on the signing Parties, and limited to their respective rights and obligations under the [Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act]." The Agreement also states it "is not to alter rights or obligations of any third party not a signatory to the Agreement." In the body of the Agreement, under "[s]tate the precise nature of the injury," the description indicates "[r]ight knee strain. The parties agree that Claimant did not sustain any other injury or medical condition as a result of his 3/06/2015 work injury." Plaintiff certified the complete Agreement by signature.

¶ 6 Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's tort claim, arguing the claim was barred under the doctrines of (1) collateral estoppel, (2) res judicata , and (3) judicial admission. Under their judicial admission argument, defendants maintained plaintiff could not present evidence of injuries other than to his knee based on the signed Agreement. The circuit court granted defendants' motion, finding the above statement concerning the scope of plaintiff's injuries to be a judicial admission disclaiming other injuries. The circuit court's partial grant of summary judgment limited plaintiff's tort claim injuries to knee issues. The circuit court, however, rejected summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. Plaintiff dismissed the underlying complaint as a result.

¶ 7 On January 17, 2019, this court issued a Rule 23 order (see Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (eff. Apr. 1, 2018)) reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff moved to publish the order as an opinion. On February 5, 2019, we granted plaintiff's motion and published the opinion the same day. Two days later, defendants filed a petition for rehearing, which we granted. Plaintiff filed a response; defendants filed a reply. We now consider defendants' arguments anew.

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¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 In the initial briefing, defendants urged this court to reject several of plaintiff's arguments for failure to raise them in the response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. When reading plaintiff's response, we observed all the arguments included on appeal. Defendants initially moved for summary judgment on three bases: (1) collateral estoppel, (2) res judicata , and (3) judicial admission. Plaintiff addressed the same issues in his response to defendants' motion as on appeal but not exclusively under the heading "Judicial Admission." Plaintiff's arguments are therefore properly before this court. See Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc. , 295 Ill. App. 3d 963, 978, 230 Ill.Dec. 317, 693 N.E.2d 446 (1998) (explaining it is longstanding law to require a legal theory be raised in an initial response).

¶ 10 Plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because the response to "[s]tate the precise nature of your injuries" is not a judicial admission. Plaintiff points out language in the Agreement limiting its application as to plaintiff and his former employer. Additionally, plaintiff submits that the statement was not made under oath. Plaintiff points out that the statement is contradicted by his answers to interrogatories in this matter. While the statement may properly be considered an evidentiary admission, plaintiff contends the circuit court erred in finding it was a judicial admission.

¶ 11 A. Initial Disposition

¶ 12 In our initial disposition, we agreed with plaintiff that his statement in the Agreement did not constitute a judicial admission. Therefore, we found that the circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment on this issue. We adhere to this determination on rehearing.

¶ 13 Section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). We review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc. , 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 309 Ill.Dec. 361, 864 N.E.2d 227 (2007). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo . Id.

¶ 14 There are two types of admissions: judicial and evidentiary. Judicial admissions are formal admissions in the pleadings that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact. Konstant Products, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 401 Ill. App. 3d 83, 86, 341 Ill.Dec. 121, 929 N.E.2d 1200 (2010). For a statement to constitute a judicial admission, it must be clear, unequivocal, and uniquely within the party's personal knowledge. Serrano v. Rotman , 406 Ill. App. 3d 900, 907, 348 Ill.Dec. 269, 943 N.E.2d 1179 (2011). The statement must also be an intentional statement that relates to concrete facts and not an inference or unclear summary. Id. Judicial admissions "do not include admissions made during the course of other court proceedings." Green v. Jackson , 289 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1008, 224 Ill.Dec. 848, 682 N.E.2d 409 (1997). "Rather, such statements constitute evidentiary admissions." Id.

¶ 15 Evidentiary admissions may be explained by the party. Brummet v. Farel , 217 Ill. App. 3d 264, 267, 160 Ill.Dec. 278, 576 N.E.2d 1232 (1991). "Evidentiary admissions may be made in, among other things, pleadings in a case other than the one being tried ***." Id. Whether plaintiff's signed response in the Agreement

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is a judicial admission is a question of law we review de novo . Hansen v. Ruby Construction Co. , 155 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480, 108 Ill.Dec. 140, 508 N.E.2d 301 (1987).

¶ 16 Each case defendants cite on the issue of judicial admissions is distinguishable. In Hansen , the plaintiff, during a deposition, said he fell as a result of rubber bumpers on the edge of a loading dock. Id. at 477-78, 108 Ill.Dec. 140, 508 N.E.2d 301. He later attempted to change his answer to cite a different cause for his fall. Id. at 478, 108 Ill.Dec. 140, 508 N.E.2d 301. The court properly treated his deposition testimony as a judicial admission because the plaintiff made the statement in the course of the same proceeding. Id. at 482, 108 Ill.Dec. 140, 508...