Armstead v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 133,133
• Citation: 673 A.2d 221,342 Md. 38
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2691 Michael Devon ARMSTEAD v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 38

342 Md. 38

673 A.2d 221, 64 USLW 2691

Michael Devon ARMSTEAD v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 133, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 20, 1996.

John L. Kopolow, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Diane E. Keller, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, both on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

In this case we consider the statutory and constitutional limitations on the admissibility of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence. Specifically, we must determine the effect of Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1995 Cum.Supp.) § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ¹ on the admissibility of both the basic evidence of a DNA "match" and the descriptive statistics that are typically offered in support of a match. We shall hold that the statute renders both components of DNA evidence admissible. We shall also hold that the admission of DNA evidence in this case did not violate the Petitioner's due process rights.

I.

On January 29, 1991, the victim, a Howard County woman, was at home alone when an assailant broke into the home, demanded her money and valuables, and then raped her and forced her to perform fellatio. The State presented evidence that pointed to the Petitioner, Michael Devon Armstead, as the perpetrator of these offenses. First, following the attack, the victim provided the police with a description matching Armstead. The victim also selected Armstead's photograph from a photo array and identified him in court as the perpetrator. A neighbor who observed someone fleeing from the scene also identified Armstead as the perpetrator. In addition, when Armstead was arrested on the evening of the incident, he was wearing a leather jacket matching the victim's description of the jacket worn by her attacker. The police also found a pair of pantyhose and a roll of duct tape in shrubbery near Armstead, which were both items that the perpetrator had used in the attack.

Physical evidence from the rape also linked Armstead to the crime. Semen was collected from the victim and analyzed using standard blood group testing. The blood group analysis indicated that Petitioner was within the 4.7% of the population that could have been the source of the semen. Finally, DNA analysis was performed using the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) testing method, revealing a "match" between the defendant's blood and the semen sample taken from the victim.

Armstead was indicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County on twenty-five counts, ² including charges of first and second degree rape, first and second degree sexual offense perverted practices, assault, battery, burglary, robbery, and theft.

Prior to trial, Armstead filed a motion in limine to exclude the DNA evidence on both statutory and constitutional grounds. His statutory argument was that § 10-915 permits what he described as an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing." He argued that, although the Legislature may have found RFLP testing reliable when it enacted § 10-915, this does not imply that the General Assembly intended the statute to preclude all future inquiry into the technique's reliability. In light of recent scientific developments, Petitioner argued, the State should have been required to prove current general acceptance as a prerequisite to admission of the DNA evidence.

Petitioner also asserted several constitutional arguments. First, he contended that § 10-915 was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it did not provide any standards for DNA testing. Second, he argued that the use of DNA evidence violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because "an individual [must] not suffer punitive action as a result of an inaccurate scientific procedure." Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F.Supp. 226, 230 (W.D.Ky.1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 793 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir.1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.1989). Third, Armstead argued that the statute denied him his right to confrontation under both the federal and state constitutions. Finally, he argued that the statute violated separation of powers because the Legislature had invaded the province of the judiciary by enacting an evidentiary rule.

The trial court rejected Petitioner's statutory argument on the grounds that the statute precluded the trial court from holding a hearing on the reliability of DNA evidence. The court held a five-day evidentiary hearing, however, to address his constitutional challenges. ³ At the hearing, much of Petitioner's argument focused on his due process claim. He specifically challenged the method used to calculate the odds of a random or coincidental match between his DNA and the DNA taken from the victim. Petitioner contended that the DNA evidence should be excluded because this probability calculation was based on a purportedly outmoded method known as the "product rule" rather than the newer "ceiling principle" method, rendering the data so unreliable as to deny him due process.

The trial court denied the motion in limine, ruling that the evidence was admissible by statute, that the statutory conditions for admissibility had been satisfied, and that Petitioner's constitutional arguments lacked merit. First, the court rejected Armstead's "void for vagueness" argument, holding that the vagueness doctrine did not apply to an evidentiary statute such as § 10-915. Second, the court rejected the Petitioner's due process argument because, after hearing extensive expert testimony, the court concluded that the testing procedures used by the laboratories in this case did not render the results so unreliable as to violate Armstead's due process rights. Third, the court rejected Armstead's confrontation argument, finding that Armstead exercised his right to cross- examine the State's witnesses at the hearing, and that he would be afforded another opportunity to do so at trial. Finally, the court rejected the separation of powers argument, concluding that the Legislature possesses the authority to change the rules of evidence. The court therefore held that the DNA evidence would be admissible at trial.

Armstead was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County. At trial, the State called several expert witnesses who presented both the product rule and ceiling principle calculations to the jury, explaining the rationale for each method. The witnesses explained that the product rule calculation yielded odds of a random match between Armstead's DNA and the DNA recovered from the victim of one in 480 million, while the ceiling principle calculation yielded odds of a random match of one in 800,000. The jury was also informed of the laboratory error rates. Petitioner did not call any expert witnesses at trial to challenge the State's DNA evidence; he did, however, cross-examine the State's experts and elicited testimony regarding the controversy over the proper method of calculating match probabilities.

On December 9, 1992, the jury convicted Armstead of first degree rape, first degree sexual offense, perverted practices, assault, burglary, and attempted robbery. He was sentenced to two consecutive life terms plus twenty years. He noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

Armstead raised five issues before the Court of Special Appeals, but only one related to the admission of DNA evidence. He argued the trial court should not have admitted the DNA for two reasons. First, he claimed the trial court erred by not conducting a preliminary hearing, his proposed "inverse Frye-Reed hearing," to determine whether the evidence was reliable. Second, he argued the use of outmoded methods of analysis rendered the DNA evidence so unreliable as to violate due process.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions in an unreported opinion. The intermediate appellate court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to conduct a preliminary hearing on the RFLP technique, stating that while "[t]he reliability of the RFLP testing procedure is always open to attack ... the DNA profile's admissibility is incontestable." The Court of Special Appeals also held that the trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the DNA profile based on the statistical methods used because the evidence was admissible by statute. Finally, the intermediate appellate court held that Armstead's due process rights were not violated. We granted certiorari to consider the important questions presented.

II.

Petitioner raises five issues before this Court. At the outset, we note that the Petitioner does not question the reliability of the general principles underlying DNA profiling. Petitioner first argues that, despite the enactment of § 10-915, trial judges retain discretion to exclude DNA evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect; he therefore contends that the trial court erred by refusing to engage in such balancing. Second, Petitioner asserts that § 10-915 does not preclude the possibility of a preliminary hearing to challenge the reliability of DNA evidence, and that such an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing" should be held if new evidence comes to light that calls the reliability of a previously accepted scientific technique into question. Third, Armstead argues that population genetics statistics must meet the "general acceptance" standard articulated in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978), ⁴ and that § 10-915 only established the admissibility of "raw" evidence of a DNA match. He concludes that if the Frye-Reed test had been applied to the statistical techniques used in ...