Armster v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California
| Decision Date | 22 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 86-7354,86-7362,s. 86-7354 |
| Citation | 806 F.2d 1347 |
| Parties | Maurice ARMSTER, Josefina Cabrales, Clarence Carnes, William Clark, Nina Gorio, Patricia McCoy, Michael Romberg, Maverick Veasey, Joseph Walters, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent, and City of Riverside, City of Los Angeles, City of Rialto, Terry Ford, Sheman Block, Sheriff of Los Angeles, Jeff Launi, Daryl Gates, Police Chief of City of Los Angeles, Robert Evans, Real Parties in Interest Celine ROLERSON, Dr. Mark Rolerson, M.D., individually, Dr. Mark Rolerson, M.D., as the natural father of Elizabeth Rolerson, a minor, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR the DISTRICT OF ALASKA, and the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Respondents, Volkswagenwerk A.G., a/k/a Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, a foreign corporation and Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Real Parties in Interest. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Stephen Yagman, Marion R. Yagman, Yagman & Yagman, P.C., Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners in No. 86-7354.
Brian A. Putra, Peterson, Bracelin, Young, Putra, Fletcher & Zeder, Judith E. Bendich, Bendich, Stobaugh & Strong, Seattle, Wash., for petitioners in No. 86-7362.
Douglas Letter, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Before KOELSCH, FERGUSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
MOTION TO VACATE FOR MOOTNESS
Respondent United States District Court for the Central District of California, by its counsel the Department of Justice, has moved to vacate our decision filed on June 26, 1986 in these consolidated mandamus proceedings on the ground that the proceedings are now moot. We deny Respondent's motion. Respondent's counsel misunderstands the nature of the proceedings in this Court, the basis of our supervisory authority over district courts, the grounds of petitioners' prayers for the writs of mandamus, and the law governing mootness.
In our prior decision in these proceedings, reported at 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1986), we denied petitioners' requests that writs of mandamus be issued against the District Court for the Central District of California and the District Court for the District of Alaska. The petitioners sought to prevent those courts from suspending their civil jury trials, all of which were to be heard between June 16, 1986 and October 1, 1986.
Following respondents' receipt of a memorandum sent to all United States District Judges by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts dated June 12, 1986, respondents advised counsel for petitioners that civil jury trials were being suspended. According to the Justice Department which represented the District Courts in the proceedings before us, the memorandum from the Administrative Office did not mandate that district courts suspend civil jury trials. Rather, it informed district judges throughout this nation that if they continued to empanel civil juries they would be in violation of their duties under the Anti-Deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. Sec. 1341(a)(1) (1982)). That Act prohibits federal officers or employees from incurring financial obligations in excess of appropriated funds. The memorandum was based on an action by the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference. 1 (See Memorandum of June 12, attached as Appendix 1).
According to the Administrative Office, a $3.8 million deficit in the civil jury trials portion of the Judiciary's budget was likely to occur if a supplemental appropriation was not enacted by the Congress. In light of the perceived potential lack of sufficient funding and the alleged correlative duty under the Anti-Deficiency Act, the "only feasible short-term solution," according to the memorandum from the Administrative Office, was for the district courts to suspend jury trials from June 16 through the end of the fiscal year, September 30. The Administrative Office anticipated a budget shortfall because of Congress' earlier decision to appropriate only $43.4 million of the $46.2 million requested for annual expenses associated with, inter alia, the compensation of civil jurors. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub.L. No. 99-180, 99 Stat. 1136, 1154 (1985); Armster I, 792 F.2d at 1425 n. 3.
The petitioners in Armster I had each made timely jury demands in the appropriate district court. Their cases were all scheduled for trial prior to the end of the fiscal year. Joseph Walters' case, for example, was trailing; it was to be the next one tried before the district judge to whom it had been assigned. On Friday, June 13, Walters' counsel was suddenly informed by the judge's clerk that the judge would not start any new jury trials until after the beginning of the next fiscal year. The clerk advised counsel that the other judges of the Central District of California would also not conduct civil jury trials until after that time. Counsel was informed that this action was necessary because insufficient funds had been appropriated to compensate jurors during the 1986 fiscal year. The clerk then asked counsel if he would be willing to waive a jury. Counsel replied that he would not. Celine Rolerson also had a jury trial scheduled. Her case was to commence on June 23 in the District of Alaska. On June 13 the district judge announced at a hearing that if the moratorium on civil jury trials were not lifted by June 18, he would strike the scheduled trial date.
In Armster I, the petitioners sought writs of mandamus to require commencement of their trials as scheduled, subject to "normal" delays. Although we recognized that the district courts had wide discretion in scheduling and rescheduling civil jury trials, we agreed with the petitioners that the suspension of the right of jury trial because of a shortfall in the national budget violated the Seventh Amendment. We should note at this point that "the right to grant mandamus to require jury trial where it has been improperly denied is settled." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511, 79 S.Ct. 948, 957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, in Armster I, we concluded that it was "not necessary for us to issue a writ." 792 F.2d at 1431. In declining to order the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, we observed:
We are confident ... that the [district] judges ... who are presiding over the cases that are the subject of this petition will now act in light of the principles set forth in this opinion, that they will follow their normal procedures and exercise their customary and reasonable judicial discretion in scheduling and holding civil jury trials, and that they will do so without regard to the availabilty or unavailability of appropriated funds for the payment of juror fees.
Id. We then denied the petitions without prejudice.
Although the Justice Department previously denied that the moratorium announced in the June 12 memorandum from the Administrative Office was mandatory, it now urges us to vacate our decision as moot because of the subsequent actions of that Office. Petitioners object most strongly. 2 The Justice Department's motion to vacate our decision states:
4. On June 26, 1986, Congress approved the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, H.R. 4515, which provides $3.8 million in supplemental funding for fees and allowances for jurors. On June 27, 1986, the Administrative Office ... rescinded its advice to suspend civil juries and informed district court judges that civil jury trials could be resumed effective immediately. On July 2, 1986, the President signed H.R. 4515.
5. As a result of the Administrative Office's action of June 27, the proceedings before this Court, which concern the constitutionality of a suspension of civil jury trials for a lack of funds, have become moot.
Respondent's Motion to Vacate for Mootness, No. 86-7354, (July 7, 1986) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Memorandum of June 27, 1986 from the Administrative Office is reproduced in Appendix 2. 3
As a matter of fact, the anticipated budget shortfall appears always to have been far more a theoretical concern than a practical reality. The funds necessary to ensure that no shortfall would occur during the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986 had already been appropriated in separate bills by the House and Senate, and the measure was in conference committee when the Administrative Office issued its initial memorandum. "Nonetheless," that Office reported in its June 12 memorandum, "it does not appear likely that consideration by a Conference Committee, acceptance of the conference report by both houses, and presidential signature can be attained prior to June 16." (The Administrative Office offered no explanation of the importance it attached to the June 16 date). The view expressed in the Administrative Office memorandum, put in its simplest terms, was that the potential risks to the public fisc took precedence over the historic institution of the civil jury. The memorandum called for the suspension of civil jury trials nationwide. Following issuance of the memorandum, no new civil jury trials were commenced before 19 of the 20 active district judges in the Central District of California, (although the record does not indicate precisely how many jury trials had been scheduled in the Central District or how many individual judges had such trials scheduled before them), and the one active district judge in the District of Alaska whose actions were brought to our attention announced that he would strike Rolerson's scheduled jury trial. Based on these facts we issued our decision holding the suspensions unlawful.
Now the Justice Department seeks to have us withdraw our opinion. It tells us that this proceeding has become moot because the...
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