Armstrong Toler
Decision Date | 26 March 1826 |
Citation | 6 L.Ed. 468,24 U.S. 258,11 Wheat. 258 |
Parties | ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff in Error, against TOLER, Defendant in Error |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
money paid by Toler, on account of goods, the property of Armstrong and others, consigned to Toler, which had been seized and libelled in the District Court of Maine in the year 1814, as having been imported contrary to law. The goods were shipped during the late war with Great Britain, at St. Johns, in the province of New-Brunswick, for Armstrong and other citizens and residents of the United States, and consigned to Toler, also a domiciled citizen of the United States. The goods were delivered to the agent of the claimants on stipulation to abide the event of the suit, Toler becoming liable for the appraised value; and Armstrong's part of the goods were afterwards delivered to him, on his promise to pay Toler his proportion of any sum for which Toler might be liable, should the goods be condemned. The goods having been condemned, Toler paid their appraised value, and brought this action to recover back from Armstrong his proportion of the amount. At the trial of the cause, the defendant below resisted the demand, on the principle that the contract was void, as having been made on an illegal consideration. When the testimony on the part of the plaintiff below was concluded, the counsel for the defendant insisted, on his behalf, to the Court, that the several matters propounded and given in evidence on the part of the plaintiff were not sufficient, and ought not to be allowed, as decisive evidence to entitle the plaintiff to maintain the issue, and to recover against the defendant. The judge thereupon delivered the following charge to the jury, which is spread at large upon the record.
And the jurors having submitted to the Court an inquiry, in the words following, viz. The Court gave their opinion upon the same as follows:
This charge was excepted to by the defendant and a verdict having been found for the plaintiff, on which a judgment was rendered in his favour, the cause was brought, by writ of error, to this Court.
Feb. 24th.
Mr. Webster and Mr. Wheaton, for the plaintiff in error, stated, that this case arose out of an illegal importation of goods from the enemy's country during the late war, upon the false and fraudulent pretext of a capture jure belli, which was finally pronounced by this Court to be collusive, and the property condemned to the government.a They argued, that although the abstract principles, laid down in the charge of the Court below, might be considered as correct in point of law, no one of the hypothetical cases put by the learned Judge, fully stated the facts as proved in the cause. The whole case being submitted, and the Court being asked to give a general instruction, the charge ought to have been applicable to the case in evidence, which, it was contended, it was not. Admitting, therefore, the opinions in the charge to be correct, it was still liable to exception, because there was a material part of the case which it did not embrace. The charge did not state what the law would be, if Toler knew, previous to the consignment, that Armstrong was engaged in this unlawful trade. The general principle, that no action could be maintained upon a contract growing out of an immoral or illegal transaction, was insisted on as applicable to this case, where the transaction was not subsequent or collateral, but directly connected with the unlawful act.b The authorities cited would show, that this principle has been constantly recognised in the Courts of justice both in England and this country, and it might, indeed, be said to form a rule of universal law which had been incorporated into the civil code of every nation.c Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, contra, insisted, that the law on this subject was accurately laid down in the Judge's charge, and although there was some apparent discrepancy in the cases, they would...
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