Armstrong v. Bates

• Decision Date: 14 November 1952
• Docket Number: No. 3595,3595
• Citation: 61 So.2d 466
• Parties: ARMSTRONG v. BATES.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 466

61 So.2d 466

ARMSTRONG v. BATES.

No. 3595.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Nov. 14, 1952.

Sanders, Miller, Downing, Rubin & Kean, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Benton & Moseley, Baton Rouge, for appellee.

ELLIS, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this suit on February 15, 1950 in which she prays to be decreed null, void and of no effect the document executed by her on June 13, 1948 which is as follows:

'State of Louisiana

Parish of East Baton Rouge

'Know all men by these presents, that I, Mrs. Maude Bates Armstrong, widow of C. W. Armstrong, have this day released, relinquished, quitclaimed, bargained, sold and delivered, for good and valuable consideration, to Mrs. Mable Jones Bates, widow of Joseph W. Bates, and his universal legatee, all of my right, title, and interest in and to the following described property, including any right of redemption from the State:

'190 acres, from 740 acre tract, bounded North by Dally, East and South by Roberts and Comite River, West by Brogden, situated in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, adjudicated to the State of Louisiana for unpaid taxes of the year 1937 in the name of Heirs of J. W. and Mrs. L. M. Bates.

'My interest in said property was acquired as one of the legal heirs of J. W. and Mrs. L. M. Bates, who were my father and mother.

'As a further consideration of this transfer, the said Mrs. Mable Jones Bates agrees to redeem the said property from the State of Louisiana, and to pay all the taxes necessary to effect such redemption.

'Thus done and signed at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this the 13th day of June, 1948.

'Witnesses:

(s) Mrs. Jos. Gregg, Jr.

(s) Mrs. Walter Blair

(s) Mrs. Maude Bates Armstrong

(Mrs Maude Bates Armstrong.)

(s) Mable J. Bates

(Mrs. Mable Jones Bates)

'State of Louisiana

Parish of East Baton Rouge

'Before me, personally came and appeared Mrs. Jos. Gregg, Jr., who deposed that she was one of the subscribing witnesses and that the foregoing quitclaim was accomplished and subscribed to in her presence.

'Thus done and signed at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this 15th day of August, 1949.

'(s) John R. Jones Notary Public

'(s) Mrs. Jos. Gregg, Jr.'

The plaintiff has attacked the instrument on the ground that it has no validity as a donation since it is not in the proper form and that it does not constitute a sale as there was no consideration. Plaintiff in the alternative further contended that in the event this document should be held to have validly transferred plaintiff's interest then it was her intention to transfer only the 1/10 interest in the described property which she had acquired as one of the ten heirs of J. W. and Mrs. L. M. Bates, her father and mother, and she prayed for such a judgment.

The defendant filed an exception of no cause or right of action which was referred to the merits but is not being urged on appeal. Defendant also filed a plea of estoppel 'for the reason that plaintiff signed said document deliberately after giving full consideration to the matter and thereby caused defendant to incur onerous obligations and expend substantial sums of money, time and effort in consequence thereof.'

Defendant's answer which constituted a general denial, in the alternative and in the event the court should find the instrument to be null and void, then prayed that there be judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff in reconvention and against the defendant in reconvention to the extent of defendant in reconvention's pro rata share of the cost of redemption of the property from the state of Louisiana, together with the pro rata share of taxes and interest paid thereon, as well as interest at the legal rate from the date of redemption on sums paid by plaintiff in reconvention.

After the trial the District Judge sustained the plea of estoppel and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, rejecting plaintiff's demands, from which judgment the plaintiff has appealed.

The facts leading up to the execution of the instrument in question are not in dispute and are substantially as follows:

The plaintiff, Mrs. Maude Bates Armstrong, was one fo ten children of Mr. J. W. and Mrs. L. M. Bates, who, at the time of their death, left an undivided interest in approximately 190 acres of land. It appears that this 190 acres was part of a 740 acre tract in which J. W. Bates originally acquired a one-half interest with a man named Blouin. Portions of the land were sold and the 190 acres is really owned in indivision by the Blouin heirs and the Bates heirs, however, the undivided interest in the property left from the 740 acres equals approximately 190 acres, and the Bates heirs were assessed with this amount of land and in 1937 they failed to pay the taxes due on their interest, being this 190 acres above mentioned, and as a consequence this acreage was adjudicated to the State of Louisiana on July 2, 1938.

In May of 1948 T. Y. Powell made application for a homestead entry and the property designated was the 190 acre tract.

It is also shown by the record that the plaintiff in addition to the 1/10th interest inherited from her father and mother acquired an additional 1/10th interest from her sister, Mrs. Bertie Bates Hurst, and inherited what amounted to a 1/7th of 3/10th interest from a sister and two brothers who died.

The defendant learned of the attempt to homestead the property from the state and took the matter up with the plaintiff and other Bates heirs in an endeavor to get each one to put up his pro rata share necessary to redeem the property. None of the heirs desired to join the defendant in the redemption of the property and the defendant then acquired the interest of most of the heirs by the same kind of instrument as that which the plaintiff executed, supra.

The defendant was pressed for time after learning of Powell's application for homestead, and the day after obtaining the instrument signed by the plaintiff herein went to the bank and borrowed the necessary amount and redeemed the property for $719.23.

It is further shown that in addition to the initial cost of $719.23 necessary to redeem the property, the interest being an undivided one, it would be necessary to obtain legal services in order to clear the title.

The record further reveals that 26 acres of this 190 acres was separately assessed to the plaintiff and she paid taxes thereon from 1917 through 1949 with the exception of the years 1932 through 1936 when the 26 acre tract so assessed was adjudicated to the State, and that in 1937 the 26 acres was redeemed by the plaintiff, Mrs. Armstrong, from the State of Louisiana. There is no accurate description in the record of this 26 acres or explanation of why it was assessed separately to the plaintiff, neither is there an accurate description of the 190 acres.

The instrument in question in this case is what is commonly referred to as a quitclaim deed, similar to the one involved in the case of Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Company, 213 La 588, 35 So.2d 225, 230 and which the Supreme Court said:

'The deed recites in substance that the party of the first part has 'remised, released, sold, conveyed, and quitclaimed, and by these presents does remise, release, sell, convey and Quit Claim * * * all the right, title interest, claim and demand which said party of the first part has in and to the following described piece of land * * *.' Obviously, the declarations do not convey the land but only the right, title and interest of the vendor. It is in the nature of an assignment of a right or an interest and as such falls squarely within the category of the common law quitclaim deed. Examination of our Civil Code discloses the absence of provisions relative to quitclaim deeds. The articles on sales of property and the obligations and rights resulting therefrom do not mention quitclaim deeds; Articles 2500 through 2504 respecting the warranty of the seller being confined to treatment of sales with warranty, express and implied, and those where warranty is specifically excluded. On the other hand, quitclaim deeds are fully recognized in the jurisprudence and have many times been considered by our courts. 26 C.J.S., verbo, Deeds, § 8, page 181, defines a quitclaim deed as follows:

"A quitclaim deed is one which purports to convey, and is understood to convey, nothing more than the interest or estate in the property described of which the grantor is seized or possessed, if any, at the time, rather than the property itself.'

'The authorities from the Federal courts and the courts of other states are that, in determining whether a deed is a quitclaim or not, reference must be made to the language used therein for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties. Williams v. Rabb, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 121. The fact that the deed is denominated a quitclaim is not conclusive (Wise v. Watts, Ariz., 239 F. 207, 152 C.C.A. 195; Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 175 S.W. 1094, 3 A.L.R. 940), nor does the fact that the words 'bargain and sell' are used necessarily imply that the grantor is absolute owner and that he is not merely quitclaiming his right, title and interest. Brown v. Harvey Coal Corporation, D.C.E.D. Ky., 49 F.2d 434; Young v. Clippinger, 14 Kan. 148. Examination must be had of all of the recitals contained therein in an effort to resolve the true intent. Here, we think, as above stated, that the recitals are clear and show merely transfer of the interest of Rectangle in two townships and do not convey any property.

'On the other hand, the title to real property may be as effectually transferred by quitclaim as by any other form of conveyance. But such a deed conveys only such title or interest that the grantor had at the time it is given 'and excludes any implication that he has any title or interest.' 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 118, page 415. Nevertheless, it is established in Louisiana that a quitclaim deed is sufficient to support the ten year acquisitive prescription provided by Article 3478 of the [LSA...