Armstrong v. Charlotte County Bd. of County Com'Rs

Decision Date10 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 2:02-CV-73-FTM-29DIVF.,2:02-CV-73-FTM-29DIVF.
Citation273 F.Supp.2d 1312
PartiesElizabeth ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff, v. CHARLOTTE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Amy L. Sergent, Lancaster & Eure, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiff.

Brendan Bradley, Charlotte County Attorney's Office, Port Charlotte, FL, for Defendant.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND FRONT PAY [Doc. # 68]

EGINTON, Senior District Judge.

Following a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Elizabeth Armstrong, on her claims of hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 760.01-760.11, as well as on her claim of retaliation under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 440.01-440.60. The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $55,000 for lost wages and benefits to the date of trial, and $275,000 for emotional pain and mental anguish. Because front pay and prejudgment interest are equitable remedies within the province and discretion of the trial judge, see United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 618-19 (11th Cir.2000), this Court reserved decision on these matters until after trial. Plaintiff has now moved for an award of front pay pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.11, and for an award of prejudgment interest. Plaintiff's motion will be granted to the extent set forth below.

Discussion
I. Front Pay

The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[i]n addition to back pay, prevailing Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to either reinstatement or front pay." Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1528 (11th Cir.1991) (superseded by statute on other grounds); see also W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d at 619. "[F]ront pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement." Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001). Although reinstatement is the preferred remedy in a wrongful discharge case, when extenuating circumstances warrant the court may award a plaintiff front pay in lieu of reinstatement. Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir.1999). In making the determination whether to award front pay, the courts have looked to whether discord and antagonism between the parties would render reinstatement ineffective as a make-whole remedy, whether there had been intimidation or threats by defendant's management toward the plaintiff, or whether the termination had harmed the plaintiff's emotional well-being. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d at 619 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In this case, defendant does not contend that plaintiff should be awarded reinstatement rather than front pay. This case involved not only wrongful termination, but also harassment and retaliation. The acrimony between plaintiff and her supervisor and the discord within the department during plaintiff's employment were prevalent themes throughout the trial. Moreover, defendant indicated its unwillingness to rehire plaintiff by virtue of its rejection of her applications for some thirty other positions, following her workers' compensation injury. Additionally, this is a case involving significant emotional distress, as evidenced by the jury's award of substantial damages for plaintiff's emotional pain and mental anguish caused by defendant's discrimination. Thus, the Court finds that reinstatement is not a viable remedy and that front pay should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. See Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846, 121 S.Ct. 1946. The only issue is the amount of front pay.

Plaintiff has sought front pay through February 6, 2009, "at which time she anticipates that she will have completed her schooling in her new chosen field of computer electronics, and she will by that time be making an amount which is commensurate with the wages and benefits she would have received from the defendant." (Pl.'s Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff calculates her claim for front pay based upon her former annual salary of $26,500, plus semi-annual cost-of-living increases, plus overtime of $300 per week for 20 weeks each year. Additionally, she seeks an unspecified amount of compensation for her lost benefits, including health insurance, long-term and short-term disability insurance, cancer coverage, accident insurance, dental insurance, life insurance, and a retirement plan.

Defendant has objected to plaintiff's request for front pay on the grounds (1) that the information she has provided as to her wages, overtime, and benefits is too speculative to support a front-pay award, and (2) that plaintiff cannot recover for lost benefits unless she replaced those benefits, of which there has been no proof.

Inherent in any award of prospective relief, such as front pay, is "some risk of uncertainty." Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir.2000). That uncertainty does not in and of itself preclude a front-pay award. Plaintiff testified that at the time she was terminated, she was earning $12.50 per hour, or $26,500 per year. (R. 131.) With semi-annual cost-of-living raises, at the time of trial, she would have been earning $13.50 per hour, or $28,080 per year. (R. 133.) Although defendant has challenged plaintiff's figures as speculative, defendant has failed to demonstrate how her figures are inaccurate or excessive. See Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1364 (11th Cir.1994). Defendant certainly had the ability and resources to refute her testimony at trial, but failed to do so. Plaintiff's testimony concerning her rate of pay and cost-of-living increases while employed by defendant is uncontradicted and is sufficiently definite to allow the Court to calculate a front-pay award based upon this evidence.

Plaintiff also testified that she earned overtime wages of approximately $300 per week, although most of her overtime was during the first six months of her employment when she was a probationary employee, trying to make a good impression on management. (R.12.) There was no evidence concerning the amount of overtime plaintiff worked after the first six months of her employment or the amount of overtime that is generally worked by employees in plaintiff's position. The Court finds that the overtime compensation requested by plaintiff as part of a front-pay award for the next six years is too speculative to support such an award and denies plaintiff's claim to that extent.

As for plaintiff's request for compensation for future lost benefits, defendant asserts that plaintiff is only entitled to damages for these benefits to the extent she incurred costs in replacing them. Plaintiff states that she could not afford to replace them because the cost was prohibitive. The monthly cost for COBRA health benefits alone would have been $400 per month. (R. 132.) No other evidence was introduced concerning the value or cost of these benefits.

In order to effectuate the "make-whole" purpose of the remedies provided by the federal and state employment discrimination statutes, this Court finds that an award for lost benefits is appropriate regardless of whether plaintiff has actually incurred costs in replacing those benefits. See Weaver, 922 F.2d at 1529. Front-pay awards should replicate the effects of reinstatement, which benefits would have included these benefits and which plaintiff lost by virtue of defendant's illegal discrimination. Plaintiff should not be penalized by virtue of the fact that she cannot afford to replace these lost benefits. These lost benefits were elements of her claim for back pay and are also appropriate elements of a front-pay award, regardless of whether she actually purchased these benefits elsewhere.

The burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove her damages. The only evidence plaintiff introduced concerning the cost of these lost benefits was her testimony that her health insurance under COBRA would have cost $400 per month.1 (R. 132.) Accordingly, the Court will allow the plaintiff to recover for lost benefits in the amount of $400 per month for the period that front pay is awarded.

The only remaining question is the length of time for which front pay should be awarded. As indicated, plaintiff seeks front pay for a period of six years, which is premised on her opinion that it will take her that long to find a job in which she can equal her former earnings. (R. 134.)

A plaintiff "must mitigate her damages by seeking employment `substantially equivalent' to the position [from which] she was [terminated]." EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1378 (S.D.Fla.1998)(citing Weaver, 922 F.2d at 1526). While a plaintiff has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages, the burden is on the defendant to prove a plaintiff's failure to discharge her duty. Joe's Stone Crab, 15 F.Supp.2d at 1378. However, even where the defendant fails to rebut plaintiff's evidence, this Court, in the exercise of its duty to render an equitable award of damages for front pay, must also consider what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. "[A] Title VII damage award should make the claimant whole, not confer a windfall." Joe's Stone Crab, 15 F.Supp.2d at 1378.

Plaintiff testified that, had she not been terminated, she would have stayed with defendant until the age of retirement. (R. 133.) She also testified that she applied for approximately thirty jobs with defendant and about twenty jobs elsewhere. (R. 129.) She applied for waitressing jobs, "anything [she] thought [she] was qualified for." (R. 130.) She believes that she was diligent in...

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