Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 92-A-101-S.,CV 92-A-101-S. |
| Citation | 812 F. Supp. 1183 |
| Parties | Pam ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff, v. FLOWERS HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
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Truman M. Hobbs, Jr., Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.
Joseph C. Espy, III, Montgomery, AL, L. Traywick Duffie, Terri L. Rosen, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.
This cause is before the court on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, filed on September 15, 1992. In its motion, defendant asserts that plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case for her claims of discrimination under Title VII, and fraudulent misrepresentation under Alabama state law, and, therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment as to those claims are, as a matter of law, due to be granted.
Plaintiff filed a response to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on October 13, 1992.
For the following reasons, the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment as it applies to both the Title VII claim and the fraudulent misrepresentation claims are due to be granted.
Plaintiff filed this suit on January 22, 1992 alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), codified as 42 U.S. § 2000e(k), as well as fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract.
Plaintiff Pam Armstrong was employed by Flowers Hospital as a nurse in the Home Care Services division of the hospital. Her employment in this position required her to visit and treat patients in their homes. Plaintiff was assigned patients in the Headland, Midland and Dothan areas, and worked during the day, Monday through Friday. When plaintiff was initially hired, she was required to attend a one-day orientation, and following that orientation, she spent the first two weeks riding with another nurse. Upon completion of that two week period, plaintiff was assigned a number of patients with varying conditions.1
On December 12, 1990, plaintiff was informed that she had been assigned a patient who was diagnosed as HIV positive.2 He was further diagnosed as having cryptococcal meningitis which is an infectious disease common among AIDS patients.3
On the same day, plaintiff informed Cheryl Wynn, her supervisor at Home Care Services, that she did not believe she should treat this patient because she was in the first trimester of her pregnancy.4 She expressed concern that if she were required to treat this patient, she might jeopardize her baby. Plaintiff stated that it was not the presence of AIDS that concerned her as much as the opportunistic infections commonly present in AIDS patients. She further stated that it was not her own health that she was concerned about, because she, as a healthy adult, would be capable of recovery from most of these opportunistic infections.
Cheryl Wynn informed plaintiff that the policy of Home Care Services was to not make exceptions and allow reassignment of patients to other nurses. Home Care's policy on the treatment of AIDS patients states that the "Universal Precautions" provided by the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") were to be followed by all nurses in treating patients with infectious diseases. This policy is in accordance with CDC's policy. Any nurse who refused to treat a patient was subject to termination. After discussing the situation with her supervisor, Wynn informed plaintiff that she would be given two days in which to reconsider her decision. If plaintiff still refused to treat the AIDS patient, she would be given the option of resigning or facing termination. On December 14, 1990, plaintiff had not changed her mind about treating the patient, and refused to resign. Therefore, she was terminated.
The defendant states that only one other nurse has refused to provide home care treatment for an AIDS patient. That nurse, who was not pregnant, decided to resign rather than be terminated. Defendants additionally stated that there have been several nurses who have become pregnant and have treated patients infected with the AIDS virus. No other pregnant nurses have refused to treat an AIDS patient under Home Care Services.
The plaintiff stated several reasons why she would be more "at risk" than nonpregnant nurses, and, therefore, should not have been required to treat this patient. Plaintiff stated that patients suffering from the AIDS virus also often suffer from one or more opportunistic infections which take advantage of the AIDS patient's weakened immune system. She feared such accompanying infections as chicken pox, cytomegalovirus ("CMV"), toxoplasmosis, and coxsackievirus. Although plaintiff was unable to articulate that pregnant persons would be more susceptible to transmission of one of these diseases than nonpregnant persons, it is clear that the implications are more grave when the health and safety of the fetus is at risk. Plaintiff did assert that she has gestational diabetes. Thus, she suffers from diabetes only when she is pregnant. However, during the term of her pregnancy, because of her diabetic condition, she has a weakened immune system and might therefore be more susceptible to transmission of infectious diseases.
At the time of plaintiff's assignment to this patient, cryptococcal meningitis was the only accompanying infection that had been diagnosed in addition to the HIV virus. Plaintiff had learned that this patient had been suffering from nausea and vomiting since leaving the hospital.5
Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she spoke with nurses at Flowers Hospital. Janie Powell, a nursing supervisor at Flowers Hospital, told her that they do not require pregnant nurses in the hospital to treat patients in "isolation." It is disputed whether this AIDS patient was an "isolation" patient. He was to be treated at home, and not in a hospital isolation area. On the other hand, all of the medical waste that was removed by treating nurses was stamped "isolation." Lydia Carnley, a nurse in the infection control area of Flowers Hospital, told the plaintiff that they try to reassign pregnant nurses so as to prevent them from being exposed to very infectious conditions such as chicken pox.
Plaintiff also consulted other persons both before and after her termination as to the policies of other hospitals with regard to treatment of AIDS and other infectious conditions by pregnant nurses. Plaintiff's sister, Christy Eike, who is a home care nurse in St. Louis, Missouri informed her that pregnant nurses in that hospital are reassigned away from AIDS patients specifically because of the accompanying opportunistic infections.
After her termination, plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC investigated the matter and returned a finding that there was no reasonable determination of a Title VII violation.
Plaintiff did not work from the date of her termination, December 14, 1990, until some time after she delivered her child on June 25, 1991. She seeks damages for loss of employment during that time, as well as damages for loss of insurance coverage. Because she was terminated from employment, she was only able to continue her health insurance pursuant to COBRA which was at a greatly increased cost. Eventually, because of the expense involved with the COBRA coverage, plaintiff was forced to terminate that insurance. She was unable to acquire insurance elsewhere which would cover her pregnancy because it was a preexisting condition. Therefore, plaintiff had to settle for her husband's insurance plan which was not a family plan, and was not as comprehensive as the health insurance provided by Flowers Hospital. Plaintiff also has to drive an additional twenty miles to work each day in her current position at Lakeview Community Hospital.
Plaintiff Pam Armstrong received her associate's degree in nursing from Wallace College, in Dothan, Alabama in June, 1989. Following her graduation, plaintiff was employed at Southeast Alabama Medical Center ("SAMC"), for one year. During her employment with SAMC, plaintiff entered into a scholarship agreement with SAMC whereby they would pay for her tuition and books, uniforms and some travel expenses, and in return she would remain in their employ for twenty-four months.
Plaintiff left SAMC after twelve months. After that, she was to either buy out her contract with SAMC to reimburse it for the scholarship agreement, or have her subsequent employer purchase the contract. Plaintiff contends that part of the stipulation for her employment with Flowers Hospital was that they would pay off her scholarship with SAMC.
Defendant's supervisor, Cheryl Wynn, testified at deposition that when plaintiff was hired, plaintiff informed her that plaintiff still had an obligation remaining with SAMC on the scholarship. Wynn testified that she spoke with her supervisor, Donna McPherson6, and they did agree that Flowers Hospital would purchase the scholarship. Armstrong testified that she believed Wynn had called her on the telephone following the interview and informed her that Flowers had accepted her application.
It is undisputed that the scholarship has not been purchased by Flowers Hospital, and is currently in a "hold" status by the personnel department at SAMC.
Donna McPherson testified at deposition that there was no agreement to purchase the scholarship. McPherson stated that no such agreement would exist until plaintiff discussed the situation with her (McPherson) and completed the "Scholarship Loan Agreement." It was, McPherson stated, in the hands of the plaintiff to follow up on the purchase of the scholarship.
There is no evidence that plaintiff ever followed up with the defendants. There is also no evidence that the defendants ever raised the issue with plaintiff after she was hired.
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