Armstrong v. Kline, Civ. A. No. 78-172

Citation513 F. Supp. 425
Decision Date27 October 1980
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 78-172,78-132 and 78-133.
PartiesPatricia ARMSTRONG et al. v. Caryl KLINE et al. Patricia Sue BATTLE et al. v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA et al. Natalie BERNARD et al. v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA et al.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)

Janet F. Stotland, Philadelphia, Pa., for Armstrong.

Sylvia Meek, Philadelphia, Pa., for Bernard & Battle.

Allen C. Warshaw, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NEWCOMER, District Judge.

To qualify for federal assistance under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420, a state must have in effect a policy which assures all handicapped children the right to a "free appropriate public education." § 1412. The Act also establishes procedural safeguards with respect to the implementation of that right. § 1415. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, prior to June 21, 1979, had established a policy and practice of refusing to fund the provision of education for any child, handicapped or not, in excess of 180 days per year. Five handicapped children and their parents instituted three class action suits alleging that the defendants' adherence to the 180 day limitation violated plaintiff childrens' constitutional and statutory rights. The actions were consolidated for trial on their common injunctive and declaratory issues.

On June 21, 1979, this Court found that the Commonwealth's 180 day rule violated the class's and named plaintiffs' right to a free appropriate public education under the Act. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F.Supp. 583, 605 (E.D.Pa.1979).1 Injunctive relief was granted to class members in Remedial Orders # 1 and # 2, entered August 1 and September 5, 1979, respectively, and to the named plaintiffs in Orders dated July 5 and July 17, 1979.

Defendants sought interlocutory review of the judgment, and on July 15, 1980 the Court of Appeals issued its opinion. Battle v. Commonwealth, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir., 1980). Although it essentially agreed with this Court that the 180 day limitation violated the Act, the Court of Appeals based its conclusion on different reasoning. As a result, the case was remanded for consideration of whether any of the remedial orders required modification. In the interim, such orders were to remain in effect. Defendant Scanlon has filed a motion to vacate all of this Court's remedial orders. For reasons discussed below, the Motion will be denied.

Discussion

In ruling on the validity of the 180 day rule, this Court focused on the content to be given the phrase "free appropriate public education." We found in the Act's definition of "special education," one of the components of an appropriate education, an emphasis on meeting the "unique needs" of the handicapped child. Recognizing that "needs arise in the context of achieving certain ends, and surely there are certain ends, and not others, that are the concern of this legislation," we turned our inquiry to the goals of the education that states are required to provide under the Act. Although we found no explicit guidance in the Act, we found throughout the legislative history an express intent to "provide for that education which would leave these children, upon school's completion, as independent as possible from dependency on others, including the state, within the limits of the handicapping condition." 476 F.Supp. at 604. Coupled with our factual finding that "for some SPI and SED children, including the named plaintiffs, interruptions in programming, because of regression and the length of time it takes to regain lost skills and behaviors, render it impossible or unlikely that they will attain that state of self-sufficiency that they could otherwise reasonably be expected to reach," Id. at 597, this legal conclusion led us to hold that the inflexible 180 day limitation on education violated the Act.

In its opinion the Court of Appeals disagreed with this Court's holding that the Act provides specific educational goals for handicapped children. It found instead that "states are responsible in the first instance for setting reasonable educational objectives and reasonable means for achieving these objectives." At 279. This conclusion was based on several factors: the Act's relative silence on the question of educational goals, the tradition of local autonomy in the areas of resource allocation and educational policy, and the responsibility which the Act places on state agencies in formulating individualized educational programs (IEP) and insuring compliance with the Act. Although the Court of Appeals agreed the legislative history indicated a concern with increased self-sufficiency, it found the history should merely provide guidance to the states in the formulation of educational goals rather than be determinative of the goals in and of itself. The Court also indicated the legislative history pointed only to a concern with increased self-sufficiency whereas the standard enunciated by this Court mandated maximization of self-sufficiency. Id. at 279, n.11.

Having concluded states bear the initial responsibility for formulating reasonable educational objectives and reasonable means for achieving those objectives, the Court of Appeals determined the Act placed two restrictions on the states in these areas: review and approval by the Commissioner of Education and detailed procedures for the formulation of IEPs. Id. at 279. It found the Commonwealth's 180 day rule conflicted with both of these provisions.

The Court of Appeals agreed with this Court that the Act's focus on the "unique needs" of the handicapped child mandates consideration of the individual needs of each handicapped child. It noted the statutory requirement of the formulation of an IEP for each child...

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3 cases
  • Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Independent School Dist.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas
    • 18 Enero 1982
    ...583, 601-02 (E.D.Pa.1979), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3rd Cir. 1980), on remand, 513 F.Supp. 425 (E.D.Pa.1980); Harris v. Campbell, 472 F.Supp. 51, 53-54 (E.D. Va.1979); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 112 (D.Conn.1979); New York State As......
  • Gladys J. v. Pearland Independent School Dist.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas
    • 17 Agosto 1981
    ...remanded on other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3rd Cir. 1980), on remand, 513 F.Supp. 425 (E.D.Pa.1980). For handicapped children within the contemplation of the EHCA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), the Act is a source of a federal statutory "right to a f......
  • Johnson By and Through Johnson v. Independent School Dist. No. 4 of Bixby, Tulsa County, Okl.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • 11 Diciembre 1990
    ...202, 102 S.Ct. at 3041-42, 3046, 3048, Polk, 853 F.2d at 172; Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 280 (3d Cir.), on remand, 513 F.Supp. 425 (E.D.Pa.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Scanlon v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 3123, 69 L.Ed.2d 981 (1981). While it would be easier for those invol......

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