Armstrong v. Lamy
| Decision Date | 27 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 94-11426-REK. |
| Parties | Barry ARMSTRONG and Kim Armstrong, Plaintiffs, v. Michael LAMY, Thomas Lamy in his capacity as Executor for the Estate of Cecilia Lamy, Thomas Lamy, Philip Lamy, Catherine (Lamy) Puzzo, City of Peabody, Robert Ireland, individually and in his capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Edward J. O'Connor, individually and in his capacity as Principal, J. Henry Higgins Junior High School, Nicholas Mavroules, individually and in his capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, Edward J. Dullea, Jr., individually and in his capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, David J. Hallinan, individually and in his capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, Stephen L. Delaney, individually and in his capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, Margaret E. McBreen, individually and in her capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, Antoinette T. Potter in her capacity as Executrix of the Estate of Raymond F. Potter, individually, and Potter in his capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, Walter A. Roche, individually and in his capacity as a member of the Peabody School Committee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
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Neila J. Straub, Straub & Meyers, Salem, MA, John D. Keenan, Straub & Meyers, Sacon, MA, for Barry Armstrong.
Neila J. Straub, Straub & Meyers, Salem, MA, for Kim Armstrong.
Michael J. Conley, Wakefield, MA, for Michael Lamy, Catherine Puzzo, Philip Lamy.
John J. Davis, Tory A. Weigand, Elizabeth M. Fahey, Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, Boston, MA, for City of Peabody, Robert Ireland, Edward J. O'Connor, Nicholas Mavroules, Edward J. Dullea, Jr., David J. Hallinan, Stephen L. Delaney, Margaret E. McBreen, Raymond F. Potter.
John J. Davis, Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, Boston, MA, for Walter A. Roche.
Marjory D. Robertson, Curley & Curley, Boston, MA, Michael J. Conley, Wakefield, MA, for Thomas Lamy.
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Barry Armstrong and Kim Armstrong, for civil rights violation, and under pendant jurisdiction for common-law torts and violation of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12 § 11I.
This action, filed July 14, 1994, arises out of the alleged sexual abuse of Barry Armstrong in the 1970s, when he was a teenage student at Higgins Junior High School in Peabody, Massachusetts. Defendant Michael Lamy, a music teacher at the Higgins Junior High School, allegedly had sexual contact with Barry Armstrong on school property, at Lamy's residence, and in a vehicle operated by Michael Lamy. Plaintiff Barry Armstrong and his wife Kim Armstrong have brought a complaint containing 29 counts, including Kim Armstrong's claim against each defendant for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs allege one or more counts against each of 15 defendants.
For convenience of reference, the claims are grouped as follows:
(1) The plaintiffs have brought a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA") claim under Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12 § 11I, and common-law tort claims of negligence and loss of consortium against Edward O'Connor (Principal of Higgins Junior High School), Robert Ireland (Superintendent of the Peabody School System), seven members of the Peabody School Committee, and the City of Peabody. Collectively, these defendants are referred to here as the "Municipal Defendants."
(2) The plaintiffs have also brought an MCRA claim and common-law tort claims of negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium against Michael Lamy's siblings, Thomas Lamy, Philip Lamy, and Catherine (Lamy) Puzzo, as well as against Thomas Lamy in his capacity as executor of the estate of Cecilia Lamy (Michael Lamy's mother). Collectively, these defendants are referred to here as the "Lamy Family Defendants."
(3) Finally, the plaintiffs have brought an MCRA claim and common-law tort claims of negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, and loss of consortium against defendant Michael Lamy.
Now pending before this court are motions for summary judgment for all defendants on all claims.1
For convenience, a Table of Organization of this Opinion is presented below.
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To survive the motion, the nonmoving party need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where, as here, the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, that party nevertheless must make a showing, by "pointing out to the district court," that the evidence is insufficient to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. Once this showing has been made, it is up to the nonmoving party to proffer sufficient competent evidence to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992). "Genuine" means that "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and a "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. On issues where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, he or she must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. Id. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15.
This statement of the factual background recites facts as disclosed by the record before the court, viewed, for the purposes of summary judgment, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
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