Armstrong v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, COA97-615.
Decision Date | 07 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. COA97-615.,COA97-615. |
Citation | 499 S.E.2d 462,129 NC App. 153 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Thomas W. ARMSTRONG, D.D.S., Petitioner-Appellee, v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Respondent-Appellant. |
Bailey & Dixon, L.L.P. by Denise Stanford Haskell and Ralph McDonald, Raleigh, for respondent-appellant.
Dozier, Miller, Pollard & Murphy by W. Joseph Dozier, Jr., and George Daly, Charlotte, for petitioner-appellee.
The issue before us is whether constitutional or common law principles prevent the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners from sanctioning a dentist who hired a dentist unlicensed in North Carolina to practice in his office, where the Board made no findings as to the hiring dentist's culpable mental state. We hold that the Board may impose sanctions in such a case.
On 29 July 1995, the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners conducted a hearing to determine whether Thomas W. Armstrong, a dentist licensed to practice in North Carolina, violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-41(a)(13), which prohibits a dentist from employing a dentist unlicensed in North Carolina. After the hearing, the Dental Board issued its Final Agency Decision, finding that:
Based on its conclusion that findings of fact three and four constituted a violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-41(a)(13), the Dental Board suspended Dr. Armstrong's license for five years. The suspension involved actual surrender of his license to practice for fourteen days, and a probationary period for the remaining four years and fifty weeks during which he could practice. The conditional return of his license required Dr. Armstrong to perform 160 hours of community service and that he take and pass a jurisprudence exam.
Dr. Armstrong appealed for review to the Stanly County Superior Court. The Superior Court reversed the Dental Board, concluding that "the substantial rights of [Dr. Armstrong] were prejudiced because (1) the action of the Dental Board was erroneous as a matter of law for failure to require that mens rea of [Dr. Armstrong] be shown; and (2) that the action of the Dental Board violated the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, Article I, § 19, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was arbitrary and capricious, because the punishment imposed on [Dr. Armstrong] was not rationally related to the statutory purpose of protecting the public from incompetent dentists." The Dental Board appealed to this Court.
Article 2 of Chapter 90 of North Carolina's General Statutes sets forth regulations concerning the practice of dentistry in North Carolina and provisions governing the activities of the Dental Board. In promulgating article 2, the general assembly specifically declared the importance of the legislation for the people of North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-22(a) (1997) states that the "practice of dentistry in the State of North Carolina is hereby declared to affect the public health, safety and welfare and to be subject to regulation and control in the public interest."
The task of protecting the public and promoting the public interest in the competent practice of dentistry has been entrusted by the legislature to the Dental Board. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-22(b) (1997) ( ). This legislative intent to entrust the Dental Board with the oversight and regulation of the practice of dentistry is evident throughout the article. In particular, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-29(a) (1997) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in the practice of dentistry in this State, or offer or attempt to do so, unless such person is the holder of a valid license or certificate of renewal of license duly issued by the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners."
In carrying out its public function, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-41 (1997) authorizes the Dental Board to take disciplinary action against licensed dentists for various actions and omissions. Specifically relevant to this case is N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-41(a)(13)(1997), which authorizes the Board to sanction a dentist who "[h]as employed a person not licensed in this State to do or perform any act or service, or has aided, abetted or assisted any such unlicensed person to do or perform any act or service which under this Article or under Article 16 of this Chapter, can lawfully be done or performed only by a dentist or a dental hygienist licensed in this State." Under the statute, the Board may impose sanctions if it "is satisfied" that such employment or assistance has occurred. Upon such a finding, it may, among other sanctions, "[r]evoke or suspend a license to practice dentistry" and "[i]nvoke such other disciplinary measures, censure, or probative terms against a licensee as it deems fit and proper." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-41(a)(1997).
When reviewing a final agency decision of the Board, the Superior Court sits as an appellate court. Little v. Board of Dental Examiners, 64 N.C.App. 67, 69, 306 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1983). This Court and the superior court employ the same standard of review. Dorsey v. UNC-Wilmington, 122 N.C.App. 58, 62-63, 468 S.E.2d 557, 560, cert. denied, 344 N.C. 629, 477 S.E.2d 37 (1996).
We first discuss our conclusion that the trial court erred by finding that "the action of the Dental Board was erroneous as a matter of law for failure to require that mens rea of [Dr. Armstrong] be shown."
An alleged error in statutory interpretation is an error of law, Best v. N.C. State Board of Dental Examiners, 108 N.C.App. 158, 161, 423 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1992), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 461, 428 S.E.2d 184 (1993), and thus our standard of review for this question is de novo. Brooks v. Ansco & Associates, 114 N.C.App. 711, 716, 443 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1994)
.
Under our canons of statutory interpretation, where the language of a statute is clear, the courts must give the statute its plain meaning. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). Section 90-41(a)(13) makes no mention of a mens rea requirement.
The Dental Board argues that we should give effect to the plain meaning of the statute and require nothing further. First, it points out that North Carolina Courts have recognized that deference is owed to an agency's interpretation of a statute, see MacPherson v. City of Asheville, 283 N.C. 299, 307, 196 S.E.2d 200, 206 (1973),
and that the Dental Board has determined that it is in the public interest that knowledge need not be shown before a dentist is disciplined under section 90-41(a)(13). Next, it argues that the legislature evidenced a purpose to not require a mens rea showing by its omission from the statute, that such a purpose is permissible under our common law principles, and that we should recognize and enforce this legislative intent. Finally, it argues that in similar situations we have held that no mens rea showing was required.
In response, Dr. Armstrong brings forth several justifications for the trial court's ruling. First, he contends that the general common law rule is that knowledge must be shown before a license may be revoked for hiring an unlicensed employee. He also argues that because of the penal nature of license revocation statutes, we should follow "[o]ur traditional rule ... that when the General Assembly does not specify whether guilty knowledge, or mens rea is required, the necessity of its existence will nonetheless be implied." State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 273, 225 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1976) (Exum, J., concurring). He further cites a decision of the Texas courts, Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Friedman, 666 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.App.1984), which held that knowledge had to be shown before a dentist could be disciplined under a Texas statute similar to the one of present concern. Finally, Dr. Armstrong cites to Watson Seafood & Poultry Co. v. George W. Thomas, Inc., 289 N.C. 7, 220 S.E.2d 536 (1975), for support of his assertion that North Carolina jurisprudence does not allow suspension of a professional license for an innocent mistake of fact which was not shown to have caused harm.
In State v. Hill, this Court quoted the following with approval:
[t]he legislature may deem certain acts, although not ordinarily criminal in themselves, harmful to public safety, health, morals, and the general welfare, and by virtue of its police power may absolutely prohibit them, either expressly or impliedly by omitting all references to such terms as `knowingly', `wilfully', `intentionally', and the like. Such statutes are in the nature of police regulations, and it is well established that the legislature may for the protection of all the people, punish their violation without regard to the question of guilty knowledge ....
1 Burdick, Law of Crime § 129j (1946)(emphasis added), quoted in State v. Hill, 31 N.C.App. 733, 735, 230 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1976), disc. review denied, 292 N.C. 267, 233 S.E.2d 394 (1977).
It is true that for criminal offenses, "[o]ur traditional rule ... is...
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