Armstrong v. State, 26S05-0606-CR-212.

Citation848 N.E.2d 1088
Decision Date15 June 2006
Docket NumberNo. 26S05-0606-CR-212.,26S05-0606-CR-212.
PartiesMichael C. ARMSTRONG, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

John D. Clouse, Ivan A. Arnaez, Clouse Law Offices, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 26A05-0401-CR-12

RUCKER, Justice.

We hold today that a driver of a vehicle who leaves the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death may be held criminally responsible even if the driver's vehicle did not strike the injured or deceased party.

Facts and Procedural History

In the early evening hours of May 31, 2003 Michael C. Armstrong was driving his Ford Expedition along County Road 400 West in Gibson County. Craig Mobley sat in the passenger seat. At some point Mobley apparently opened the passenger door and jumped from the vehicle while it was in motion. Because Mobley did not move after hitting the roadway, Armstrong believed that he was injured. However, Armstrong did not stop at the scene nor did he use his cellular telephone to call for help. Rather, according to Armstrong, he "freaked out and did not know what to do and kept on driving and later called his father to tell him [what happened]." Appellant's App. at 23. In the meantime a property owner discovered Mobley lying motionless in his yard near the roadway and called 911. About an hour later Armstrong returned to the scene with his father. Police had already arrived along with emergency personnel. Armstrong gave police a statement recounting the events as set forth above. Mobley later died as a result of his injuries.

The State charged Armstrong with failure to stop after an accident resulting in death, a Class C felony. See Ind.Code § 9-26-1-1. Armstrong filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the statute did not apply to him because Mobley had not been struck by Armstrong's vehicle. After conducting a hearing the trial court entered an order denying the motion. At Armstrong's request the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction. Arguing that an earlier Court of Appeals opinion interpreting Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1 entitled him to relief, see Honeycutt v. State, 760 N.E.2d 648 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. not sought, Armstrong contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals interpreted Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1 differently and declined to follow Honeycutt but noted, "we acknowledge that our interpretation is so markedly different as to cause concerns about retroactive application to Armstrong." Armstrong v. State, 818 N.E.2d 93, 99 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Accordingly the Court of Appeals declared that although the trial court properly interpreted the statute, "this interpretation should not be applied to Armstrong retroactively. . . ." Id. The Court of Appeals thus reversed the judgment of the trial court and granted Armstrong's motion to dismiss. We now grant transfer and adopt that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion interpreting Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1. But because we have a different view on the question of retroactivity, we now affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Discussion

At the time of Armstrong's arrest and conviction Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1 provided in pertinent part:

The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that results in the injury or death of a person shall do the following:

(1) Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the accident as possible in a manner that does not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.

(2) Immediately return to and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver does the following:

(A) Gives the driver's name and address and the registration number of the vehicle the driver was driving.

(B) Upon request, exhibits the driver's license of the driver to the following:

(i) The person struck.

(ii) The driver or occupant of or person attending each vehicle involved in the accident.

(C) Determines the need for and renders reasonable assistance to each person injured in the accident, including the removal or the making of arrangements for the removal of each injured person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment.

(Emphases added).1 A violation of this statute is a Class A misdemeanor but is elevated to a Class C felony if the accident involves the death of a person. I.C. § 9-26-1-8.

In Honeycutt, three brothers were driving home together after visiting several bars. They began to argue and at one point one of the brothers either fell or was pushed out of the moving vehicle and suffered a broken leg. The driving brother stopped the vehicle and the injured brother asked for help getting out of the street. The driving brother then pulled the injured brother out of the street and placed him in a nearby driveway. The driving brother tried to convince the injured brother to get back in the car to go home, but the injured brother refused, saying he needed an ambulance. Leaving the injured brother there, the driving brother and the third brother left the scene and went to their home, which was three blocks away. The driving brother was later charged and convicted of failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious bodily injury. On review, the Court of Appeals placed significant emphasis upon the phrase "person struck" and held that "the legislature limits the scope of this statute to incidents involving a vehicle striking something that causes injury to someone, or a vehicle striking a person and causing injury." Honeycutt, 760 N.E.2d at 651. Because there was no evidence that the injured brother was struck by a vehicle, the court reversed the defendant's conviction, declaring that Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1 did not apply.

In the case before us the Court of Appeals focused not upon the phrase "person struck" but rather upon whether Armstrong was "involved in an accident." Armstrong, 818 N.E.2d at 98-99. As the court put it:

The phrase "involved in an accident" and the word "accident" are not specifically defined in the statute. Undefined words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. "Accident" is broadly defined as "an unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance" and "an unfortunate event resulting especially from carelessness or ignorance." "Accident," is also defined as an "unexpected and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm" and as "[a]n unforeseen incident." Mobley's sudden exit from Armstrong's moving vehicle was clearly an "unexpected and undesirable event" resulting in harm, and falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term accident. . . . [N]othing inherent in the term "accident" suggests that it encompasses only incidents where someone or something is struck. Upon closer examination, we believe the term "accident" is the bellwether for all of the duties imposed by Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1. . . . We therefore hold that all of the duties imposed by the statute apply to a "driver of a vehicle involved in an accident."

Id. at 97, 99 (citations omitted). We agree. The duties the statute imposes upon a driver are triggered regardless of whether the driver's vehicle struck anyone or anything. We therefore adopt that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion interpreting Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1. In so doing we disapprove the contrary interpretation of the statute announced in Honeycutt. As indicated earlier however we have a different view than our colleagues on the question of whether to apply this correct interpretation of the statute to the defendant in this case.

Armstrong suggests that he did not know that his actions were criminal because he could not have foreseen that Honeycutt may have been incorrectly decided. According to Armstrong, applying the current interpretation of the statute to his conduct "comes dangerously similar to our ban on ex post facto laws under the Federal and State Constitutions." Br. In Opposition To Pet. To Trans. at 1.

Article I of the United States Constitution provides that neither Congress nor any state may pass any ex post facto law. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. An ex post facto law is one which applies retroactively to disadvantage an offender's substantial rights. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). Over two hundred years ago, Justice Samuel Chase explained that "[t]he Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime . . . ." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). But, as is clear from the Constitutional text, "[T]he Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) ("[T]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to judicial decisionmaking."). Nonetheless, the prohibition on ex post facto laws embodies "one of the most widely held value-judgment[s] in the entire history of human thought," that is, that there should be no punishment without a law authorizing it. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 468, 121 S.Ct. 1693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). This principle—"the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties""is fundamental to our concept of constitutional...

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