Armstrong v. State
| Decision Date | 27 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 1184S450,1184S450 |
| Citation | 499 N.E.2d 189 |
| Parties | Tony ARMSTRONG, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Atley C. Price, Michigan City, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-appellant, Tony Armstrong, appeals his conviction of murder. He argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion to exclude evidence that was based upon the State's alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
Defendant was charged with murder after shooting a convenience store clerk during a robbery. The trial court ordered discovery. Defendant alleges the State violated the following portions of the discovery order:
The State shall disclose to the defense the following material and information within its possession or control on or before the 6th day of January, 1984.
a. The names and last known addresses of persons whom the State may call as witnesses, together with their relavant [sic] written or recorded statements, memoranda containing substantial verbatim reports of their oral statements and a list of memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements.
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d. Any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons.
e. Any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible objects which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belong to the accused.
f. Any record of prior criminal convictions which may be used for impeachment of the persons whom the State intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.
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The State may perform these obligations in any manner mutually agreeable to itself and defense counsel or by notifying defense counsel that material and information, described in general terms, may be inspected, obtained, tested, copied, or photographed, at specified reasonable times and places.
Defendant claims that he did not receive a complete list of witnesses, their addresses and summaries of their statements until the beginning at trial. He complains that he did not receive a copy of the autopsy report until one week prior to trial and also argues that he was unable to examine various physical evidence, including photographs and defendant's clothing, until trial.
A trial judge has the responsibility to direct the trial in a manner which facilitates the ascertainment of truth, insures fairness, and obtains economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of both society and the criminal defendant. Allen v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 615, 618; State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County (1974), 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E.2d 433; Reid v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 555, 565, 372 N.E.2d 1149; Bernard v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 688, 230 N.E.2d 536. Where there has been a failure to comply with discovery procedures, the trial judge is usually in the best position to determine the dictates of fundamental fairness and whether any resulting harm can be eliminated or satisfactorily alleviated. Reid, supra. Where remedial measures are warranted, a continuance is usually the proper remedy, but exclusion of evidence may be appropriate where the discovery non-compliance has been flagrant and deliberate, or so misleading or in such bad faith as to impair the right of fair trial. Wagner v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 476; Crenshaw v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 620. The trial court must be given wide discretionary latitude in discovery matters since it has the duty to promote the discovery of truth and to guide and control the proceedings, and will be granted deference in assessing what constitutes substantial compliance with discovery orders. Allen, supra; Harris v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 112. Absent clear error and resulting prejudice, the trial court's determinations as to violations and sanctions should not be overturned. Wagner, supra; Murray v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1012.
On May 14, 1984, after voir dire, defense counsel challenged the prosecution's compliance with the discovery order and requested exclusion of any evidence that had not been disclosed. The trial court did not exclude the evidence. During the hearing on the motion to exclude evidence, defense counsel made repeated broad allegations of non-compliance, but failed to specifically identify which...
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Kindred v. State
...the dictates of fundamental fairness and whether any resulting harm can be eliminated or satisfactorily alleviated. Armstrong v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 189. Sanctions for failure to comply with discovery are within the trial court's discretion; however, the primary factors of consid......
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Duffitt v. State
...a manner which facilitates the ascertainment of truth, insures fairness, and maintains economy of time and effort. See Armstrong v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 189; Mahla v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d It appears from the record that the reason for hanging the posters and pictures was......
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...and obtains economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of both society and the criminal defendant. Armstrong v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 189, 191. A judge may intervene in the fact-finding process to promote clarity or dispel obscurity so long as he does not improperly in......
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Koger v. State
...of a trial court's ruling on discovery violations, we will not reverse absent clear error and resulting prejudice. Armstrong v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 189, 191. Our supreme court recently "A continuance is the normal remedy when the State has violated an order for discovery, althoug......