Armstrong v. Weiland

Citation267 S.C. 12,225 S.E.2d 851
Decision Date08 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 20233,20233
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesMyrtle H. ARMSTRONG, Executrix of the Estate of T. O. Armstrong, Appellant, v. Andrew J. WEILAND, M.D., Respondent.

E. Graydon Shuford, Decatur, Ga., for appellant.

Douglas McKay, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

In March 1972, T. O. Armstrong brought this malpractice action, alleging injuries proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, a medical doctor, in treating him at the emergency room of the Columbia Hospital in January 1972. Mr. Armstrong died in March 1975, before the case was tried, and his widow, as executrix (plaintiff), has been substituted as party plaintiff.

Upon the trial of the case, the judge granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit, ruling that plaintiff's evidence, although creating a jury issue as to negligence, failed to establish that such proximately caused the injuries alleged.

Plaintiff has appealed the order granting the nonsuit. We affirm.

She has also alleged error and raised other questions pertaining to the court's ruling relative to hypothetical questions which her counsel attempted to ask her expert witness, a medical doctor from Charleston. The exceptions relating to this asserted error are too vague and fail to point out specific errors of law, as required by Supreme Court Rule 4 § 6, and therefore need not be considered. However, a review of the evidentiary rulings indicates no prejudice to the plaintiff.

The complaint alleges that Mr. Armstrong went to the emergency room of the Columbia Hospital and was treated by the defendant for pneumonia; that defendant prescribed certain drugs for his treatment which interacted with medicine which he was already taking for a heart condition, and that as a result of the interaction of the two medicines Mr. Armstrong suffered 'numerous heart attacks as well as extensive, prolonged and severe internal bleeding;' that such was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, all of which should have been foreseen.

The defendant interposed a general denial. He alleged that the medicine, erythromycin, given Mr. Armstrong by the defendant to treat his pneumonia, is not expected to interact adversely with coumadin, a blood-thinning drug which he was already taking; that the medication prescribed was proper emergency treatment for pneumonia, and that there was no negligence on his part proximately causing injury.

Plaintiff's evidence consisted primarily of her own testimony and that of a Charleston physician, who had never treated the patient. In addition, there was introduced into evidence the printed inserts packaged with the medicine taken by Mr. Armstrong.

Plaintiff, in testimony, explained that she had taken her husband to the hospital for treatment of a cold; that the defendant diagnosed the ailment as pneumonia and prescribed erythromycin, an antibiotic. She said that the defendant was told that Mr. Armstrong was taking coumadin, an anticoagulant, for his heart condition, but he gave no indication of any possible adverse effects from taking the two drugs. Defendant gave the patient a prescription for ten days supply of erythromycin and permitted him to return home. About three days thereafter, Mr. Armstrong developed a knot in his stomach, which gradually enlarged, and the skin around it became black in color. Ten days later, he went to his physician, who admitted him to the hospital for tests. He returned home and the black discoloration and knot disappeared after about six months. From the time Mr. Armstrong was treated by the defendant at the emergency room in January 1972 until his death in March 1975, he was hospitalized five times; all, except the first time, were for heart trouble.

On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that her husband had been in a serious accident in 1968, which caused him to contract phlebitis and required surgery; that he had undergone surgery for diverticulitis, and that he suffered a severe...

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27 cases
  • Benjamin v. Shaw
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • July 28, 2017
    ...the accident proximately caused it . . . ." Roscoe v. Grubb, 237 S.C. 590, 596, 118 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1961); see Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C. 12, 16, 225 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1976) ("When the testimony of an expert witness is not relied upon to establish proximate cause, it is sufficient for p......
  • Baughman v. American Tel. and Tel. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • December 14, 1990
    ...between plaintiff's injuries and the acts of the defendant, the testimony must satisfy the "most probably" rule. Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C. 12, 225 S.E.2d 851 (1976); Martin v. Mobley, 253 S.C. 103, 169 S.E.2d 278 (1969); Gambrell v. Burleson, 252 S.C. 98, 165 S.E.2d 622 (1969). The rul......
  • Payton v. Kearse
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • March 9, 1995
    ...meet the "most probably" standard required when expert testimony is used to establish proximate cause. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C. 12, 225 S.E.2d 851 (1976). Kearse contends that Richards was qualified to testify as to the side effects of the drugs Payton was taking, and becau......
  • Pearson v. Bridges, 3070.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • November 8, 1999
    ...required to admit evidence of future damages is the same as that required to prove causation. We disagree. See Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C. 12, 16, 225 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1976) ("When the testimony of an expert witness is not relied upon to establish proximate cause, it is sufficient for pl......
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