Armstrong v. Ypsilanti Charter Twp

• Decision Date: 25 February 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 222924.
• Citation: 640 N.W.2d 321,248 Mich. App. 573
• Parties: Duke Leon ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. YPSILANTI CHARTER TOWNSHIP, Ruth Ann Jamnick, Brenda Stumbo, Darcus Sizemore, Karen Lovejoy-Roe, and William Gagnon, Defendant-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

640 N.W.2d 321

248 Mich. App. 573

Duke Leon ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. YPSILANTI CHARTER TOWNSHIP, Ruth Ann Jamnick, Brenda Stumbo, Darcus Sizemore, Karen Lovejoy-Roe, and William Gagnon, Defendant-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Docket No. 222924.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 6, 2001, at Lansing.

Decided December 7, 2001, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication February 25, 2002.

Jeffrey A. McKeever, P.L.C. (by Jeffrey A. McKeever), Livonia, for the plaintiff.

Garan Lucow Miller, P.C. (by Rosalind Rochkind and Thomas F. Myers), Detroit, for the defendants.

Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham), Kalamazoo, for amicus curiae the Michigan Townships Association.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and WHITBECK and METER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Duke Armstrong appeals the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendants Ypsilanti Charter Township, Ruth Jamnick, Brenda Stumbo, Darcus Sizemore, Karen Lovejoy-Roe, and William Gagnon. Armstrong also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge and the later order of the chief judge affirming that denial. Jamnick, Stumbo, Sizemore, Lovejoy-Roe, and Gagnon cross appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to quash Armstrong's first amended complaint. We affirm.

I. Basic Facts And Procedural History

A. Overview

Ypsilanti Township is a charter township, organized under the Charter Township Act.¹ Jamnick, Stumbo, Sizemore, Lovejoy-Roe, and Gagnon are all members of the township board. A sixth member of the township board, although not a defendant here, Wesley Prater, was the elected township supervisor. Armstrong had served as Prater's administrative assistant since 1991, but on May 30, 1996, the township board, with only Prater voting against the motion, eliminated the line-item funding for Armstrong's administrative assistant position, thereby effectively eliminating his job. It is undisputed that the elimination of the line-item funding was not part of the normal budgetary cycle; rather it occurred during, instead of before or at the commencement of, the township's fiscal year.

B. Armstrong's Complaint

Armstrong's first amended complaint contained thirteen counts. Count I asserted a claim based on defamation against the board members. Count II asserted a claim based on violation of the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act.² Armstrong claimed that he had been diagnosed with "stress reaction," which required a temporary medical leave. Count III asserted a violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act.³ Armstrong claimed that his age was at least one factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Count IV asserted a violation of the National Labor Relations Act.⁴ Armstrong claimed that his involvement in the attempted organization of his fellow employees in a labor union was at least one factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Count V was a claim of breach of an implied employment contract. Armstrong claimed that the township's management made statements to him and other employees that it was the township's policy not to discharge employees as long as the employees performed their jobs. Count VI asserted wrongful discharge contrary to public policy. Armstrong claimed that during his employment, the township established policies and procedures that created a legitimate expectation that his employment could be terminated only for just cause. Count VII asserted interference with a business relationship. Armstrong claimed that the board members interfered with his business relationship with the township, which relationship had a reasonable likelihood of future economic benefit to him. Count VIII asserted the board members were grossly negligent concerning their conduct and treatment of Armstrong, including alleged false accusations and statements made by the board members concerning him. Count IX was a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress concerning defendants' conduct and treatment of Armstrong during his employment. Count X asserted violation of Armstrong's constitutional rights.⁵ Armstrong claimed that, before his employment was terminated, he engaged in constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern by speaking with administrative assistants of various departments regarding forming a union and that his exercise of his constitutional rights was one reason for the termination of his employment. Count XI asserted a separate violation of Armstrong's constitutional rights.⁶ Armstrong claimed that, before depriving him of his constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, defendants did not conduct a hearing or otherwise afford him either notice of the grounds for the termination of his employment or a meaningful opportunity to respond. Count XII asserted a violation of the Michigan Constitution with respect to due process and fair treatment in investigations. Armstrong claimed that defendants failed to adequately investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged false accusations.⁷ Count XIII was a conspiracy claim. Armstrong contended that the tortious conduct asserted in the complaint was done in concert by the board members in order to violate his legal and constitutional rights.

In mid-March 1999, the township moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). In early April, the trial court held a hearing on this motion but delayed ruling until a final decision was made on the judicial disqualification matter hereinafter outlined. In late April 1999, the board members filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). In early June 1999, the trial court held a hearing on this motion and took the matter under advisement.

C. The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court addressed and granted both motions for summary disposition in an order and opinion entered on September 29, 1999, stating:

Plaintiff ... alleges that defendants wrongfully eliminated funding for the Administrative Assistant to the Ypsilanti Township Supervisor, a position which plaintiff held. The four individual defendants were Township board members who voted for the resolution....

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For his claim against the township, plaintiff argues that the Township Supervisor position is analogous to that of a chief executive position and that [the] board's action to eliminate funding thereby violates the separation of powers doctrine. He urges the Court to find that the Supervisor is the chief executive with the exclusive authority to abolish plaintiff's position.

The Township of Ypsilanti has adopted the Charter Township Act ("the Act"). Pursuant to that Act, all legislative authority and powers of the township are vested in the township board. MCL 42.5(1).

[At this point, the trial court quoted M.C.L. § 42.5 and M.C.L. § 42.9.]

Plaintiff asserts that this section of the statute only allows the board to create a position and does not explicitly grant the board authority to abolish a position. Plaintiff further claims that even if this section is construed to confer authority to abolish a position on the board, that authority would only concomitantly arise at the township supervisor's recommendation. Plaintiff argues that since in this case the supervisor voted against the elimination of the funding for plaintiff's position, the board had no authority to do so.

The construction of the statute urged by plaintiff is without merit. The legislature clearly provides ... that the entire elected township board, which by definition includes the supervisor, has the authority to create employment positions at taxpayer expense. That authority is not conferred by the statute on the supervisor. Inherent in the board's authority to create such a position is its authority to abolish it.

The ensuing sentence in this section of the Act fortifies the interpretation that the board has the power to abolish employment positions in the township. That sentence expressly states that the board may not "abolish" the offices of township clerk or treasurer. The express designation of the offices of township clerk and township treasurer as offices that may not be abolished by the township board is recognition that the legislature intended that the board has the power to abolish other positions not so designated....

Plaintiff also claims that the board's role is to check the power of the supervisor by approving a budget that includes the appropriation of funds for the supervisor's use. He claims that when [the] board eliminated funding for plaintiff's position, the board encroached on the executive's authority. On the contrary, it is the board that has the exclusive authority over budget, appropriation and expenditure for a township under the Act. M.C.L. § 42.27, 42.28. There was no usurpation of supervisor authority by the actions of the board in this case.

As to plaintiff's tort claims against the individual board members, the defendants assert that they are immune from plaintiff's tort claims under Michigan law. The highest elective officials of all levels of government are immune from tort liability when acting within their authority. Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 633, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). The same was codified in 1986 [at this point, the trial court quoted M.C.L. § 691.1407(5) ].

These defendants are clearly the highest elective officials in the township and are immune if they were acting within their authority when they eliminated plaintiff's position.

* * *

... As indicated by the analysis of the board's actions above, the legislature gave the board as a whole the authority to create, combine, and abolish administrative offices as set forth in M.C.L. § 42.9. The actions of the individual trustees were therefore within their legislative authority and they are immune from plaintiff's tort actions by virtue of M.C.L. § 691.1407(5).

D. Disqualification...