Arndt v. Griggs
Decision Date | 17 March 1890 |
Citation | 33 L.Ed. 918,10 S.Ct. 557,134 U.S. 316 |
Parties | ARNDT et al. v. GRIGGS |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
W. J. Lamb and Ricketts & Wilson, for plaintiffs in error. [317]
N. K. Griggs, for defendant in error.
The statutes of Nebraska contain these sections: Section 57, c. 73, Comp St. 1885, p. 483: 'An action may be brought and prosecuted to final decree, judgment, or order by any person or persons, whether in actual possession or not, claiming title to real estate, against any person or persons who claim an adverse estate or interest therein, for the purpose of determining such estate or interest, and quieting the title to said real estate.' Section 58: 'All such pleadings and proofs and subsequent proceedings shall be had in such action now pending, or hereafter brought, as may be necessary to fully settle and determine the question of title between the par- ties to said real estate, and to decree the title to the same, or any part thereof, to the party entitled thereto; and the court may issue the appropriate order to carry such decree, judgment, or order into effect.' Section 77, Code Civil Proc., (Comp. St. 1885, p. 637:) Section 78 of the Code: Section 82, of the Code: 'A party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication in a newspaper may, at any time within five years after the date of the judgment or order, have the same opened, and be let in to defend; * * * but the title to any property, the subject of the judgment or order sought to be opened, which by it, or in consequence of it, shall have passed to a purchaser in good faith, shall not be affected by any proceedings under this section, nor shall they affect the title to any property sold before judgment under an attachment.' Section 429b of the Code: 'When any judgment or decree shall be rendered for a conveyance, release, or acquittance, in any court of this state, and the party or parties against whom the judgment or decree shall be rendered do not comply therewith within the time mentioned in said judgment or decree, such judgment or decree shall have the same operation and effect, and be as available, as if the convy ance, release, or acquittance had been executed conformable to such judgment or decree.' Under these sections, in March, 1882, Charles L. Flint filed his petition in the proper court against Michael Hurley and another, alleging that he was the owner and in possession of the tracts of land in controversy in this suit; that he held title thereto by virtue of certain tax-deeds, which were described; that the defendants claimed to have some title, estate, interest in, or claim upon the lands by patent from the United States, or deed from the patentee, but that whatever title, estate, or claim they had, or pretended to have, was divested by the said tax-deeds, and was unjust, inequitable, and a cloud upon plaintiff's title; and that this suit was brought for the purpose of quieting his title. The defendants were brought in by publication, a decree was entered in favor of Flint quieting his title, and it is conceded that all the proceedings were in full conformity with the statutory provisions above quoted.
The present suit is one in ejectment, between grantees of the respective parties to the foregoing proceedings to quiet title; and the question before us, arising upon a certificate of division of opinion between the trial judges, is whether the decree in such proceedings to quiet title, rendered in accordance with the provisions of the Nebraska statute, upon service duly authorized by them, was valid, and operated to quiet the title in the plaintiff therein. In other words, has a state the power to provide by statute that the title to real estate within its limits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which the defendant, being a non-resident, is brought into court only by publication. The supreme court of Nebraska has answered this question in the affirmative. Watson v. Ulbrich, 18 Neb. 186, 24 N. W. Rep. 732, in which the court says: Section 57, enlarging, as it does, the class of cases in which relief was formerly afforded by a court of equity in quieting the title to real property, has been sustained by this court, and held applicable to suits in the federal court. Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495. But is is earnestly contended that no decree in such a case, rendered on service by publication only, is valid, or can be recognized in the federal courts; and Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586, is relied on as authority for this proposition. The propositions are that an action to quiet title is a suit in equity, that equity acts upon the person, and that the person is not brought into court by service by publication alone. While these propositions are doubtless correct as statements of the general rules respecting bills to quiet title, and proceedings in courts of equity, they are not applicable or controlling here. The question is not what a court of equity, by virtue of its general powers, and in h e absence of a statute, might do, but it is, what jurisdiction has a state over titles to real estate within its limits, and what jurisdiction may it give by statute to its own courts to determine the validity and extent of the claims of non-residents to such real estate? If a state has no power to bring a non-resident into its courts for any purposes by publication, it is impotent to perfect the titles of real estate within its limits held by its own citizens; and a cloud cast upon such title by a claim of a non-resident will remain for all time a cloud, unless such non-resident shall voluntarily come into its courts for the purpose of having it adjudicated. But no such imperfections attend the sovereignty of the state. It has control over property within its limits; and the condition of ownership of real estate therein, whether the owner be* stranger or citizen, is subjection to its rules concerning the holding, the transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing titles thereto. It cannot bring the person of a non-resident within its limits,—its process goes not out beyond its borders,—but it may determine the extent of his title to real estate within its limits; and, for the purpose of such determination, may provide any reasonable methods of imparting notice. The well-being of every community requires that the title to real estate therein shall be secure, and that there be convenient and certain methods of determining any unsettled questions respecting it. The duty of accomplishing this is local in its nature. It is not a matter of national concern, or vested in the general government. It remains with the state; and, as this duty is one of the state, the manner of discharging it must be determined by the state, and no proceeding which it provides can be declared invalid, unless in conflict with some special inhibitions of the constitution, or against natural justice. So it has been held repeatedly that the procedure established by the state, in this respect, is binding upon the federal courts. In U. S. v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 320, it was said: 'The power of the state to regulate the tenure of real property within her limits, and the modes of its acquisition and transfer, and the rules of its descent, and the extent to which a testamentary dispotsition of it may be exercised by its owners, is undoubted. which a testamentary disposition of it law, everywhere recognized, arising from the necessity of the case, that the disposition of immovable property, whether by deed, descent, or any other mode, is exclusively subject to the government within whose jurisdiction the property is situated.' See, also, McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 202; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497; Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352; Lathrop v. Bank, 8 Dana, 114.
Passing to an examination of the decisions on the precise question, it may safely be affirmed that the general, if not the uniform, ruling...
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