Arndt v. Hatfield, Case No. CV-20-181-R
| Decision Date | 20 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV-20-181-R |
| Parties | DAVID ARNDT, Plaintiff, v. BARBARA HATFIELD, individually, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 59) filed by Plaintiff in response to the Court's Order dated June 2, 2020, wherein it struck his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 51).1 The Court has considered Plaintiff's newest submission in conjunction with the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) in light of his in forma pauperis status and finds as follows.
This Court has the discretion to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua sponte under § 1915(e)(2) "at any time" if the action "is frivolous or malicious; [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). This provision applies to actions filed by prisoners and nonprisoners, such as Plaintiff. See Judy v. Obama, 601 F. App'x 620, 621 (10th Cir. 2015). The Court also may dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim if "it is 'patently obvious' that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowinghim an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991)(quoting McKinney v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ("Twombly").
The Court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir.2006). On the other hand, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is appropriate. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. A pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The complaint must offer "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Its "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 570. The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir.1997).
The Court notes that in the context of a civil rights complaint specificity in pleading is essential. A complaint must clearly state what each defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App'x 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff filed this action asserting that he has been victimized by a state legal system that is inequitable to men in the context of divorce and family law issues. Unhappy with the proceedings or the results in an apparently contentious divorce in which Plaintiff alleged he was the victim of domestic violence by his now ex-wife, Mr. Arndt seeks relief from this Court. At bottom, the eighty-eight-page Second Amended Complaint is a laundry list of grievances about the legal system in Oklahoma, the particulars of Plaintiff's personal situation, and a list of complaints that Plaintiff demands state officials address. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies seven claims and thirty-three named Defendants.2 The Defendants can be categorized for purposes of construing the pleading: (1) Judges of the District Court of Canadian County—Defendants Hatfield, McCurdy, Hesse, and Hughey; (2) state legislators—Defendants McCall, Treat, Echols, Stark, Lawson, West, Dahm, Brewer, Baker, and Paxton; (3) DHS officials and employees—Defendants Brown, Dillard, Berry, Monte, Mallam, Flores, and Davis; (4) private attorneys involved in the divorce proceedings—David Halley, Jeramy Jarman, and Mark Hixson—as well as Halley's secretary, Candice Shultz; and (5) the Canadian County DistrictAttorney, Defendant Fields, and one of his assistants, Defendant Kemp. The remaining Defendants do not fit neatly into these categories: (1) Mike Hunter, Attorney General; (2) Governor Kevin Stitt; (3) Marie Hirst,3 Canadian County Court Clerk; (4) Taylor Henderson, Director of the Counsel on Judicial Complaints; (5) the chief executive of the YWCAOKC, Janet Peery; and (6) the Executive Director of Legal Aid Services of Oklahoma, Inc., Michael Figgins. The claims Plaintiff identifies are: Claim One—Unequal Services to Men as to Women (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 69); Claim Two—Failure to Protect4 (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 94); Claim Three—Best Interest of the Children is Not being Considering and Punishing Protective Parents (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 116); Claim Four—Fraud (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 139); Claim Five—Constitutional Violations of Due Process and Right to be heard (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 213); Claim Six—Constitutional Violations of Failing to Address Remonstrance/Failure to Act/Failure to Perform Duty, Violation of Oath of Office (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 262); and Claim Seven—Failure to Allow Me to File Paupers Affidavit and Failure to Provide Court Reporter (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 317). As the Second Amended Complaint includes no particular prayer for relief, in contravention of the requirements of Rule 8(a)(3), it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks damages,declaratory relief, and/or injunctive relief from any particular defendant, each of whom is sued in both their official and individual capacity.
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is approximately half the size of his Amended Complaint. He asserts in the initial paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint a belief the Court will find he has cut too much fat and that his Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim.5 The Court finds, however, that the problems with Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint are more fundamental, despite two prior attempts at pleading Mr. Arndt's filing still fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 8(d), as well as Rule 10(b), deficiencies identified in the Court's June 2, 2020 Order. (Doc. No. 51).
Plaintiff cites federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and civil rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The specific statutes upon which he premises his claims are 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1943, et seq., and 18 U.S.C. § 1621.6 At the outset, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Section 12131 is a definition section of theAmericans with Disabilities Act, as it applies to public services. Section 12132 provides, "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Although Plaintiff cites this section, his allegations regarding disability discrimination are conclusory, at best. "Establishment and enforcement tactics used have discriminated against me on the basis of my gender and disabilities, the court has systematically deprived Petitioner of his civil rights during the divorce, DHS hearings, child custody and contempt hearings." (Doc. No. 59, ¶ 16). Plaintiff makes no other reference to any alleged disabilities, nor does he identify a particular defendant to any such claim. Plaintiff's reliance on 29 U.S.C. § 794, part of the Rehabilitation Act, is misplaced for the same reasons. The Court turns to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the only remaining basis for federal question jurisdiction set forth in Plaintiff's jurisdictional statement.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the vehicle by which a person seeks relief for violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right so secured and further must allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992).
Because Plaintiff must allege that a defendant was acting under color of state law to support a § 1983 claim, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against certain Defendants. Defendant Halley represented Plaintiff's ex-wife in their divorce proceedingsand Defendant Candice Shultz is his legal secretary. Jeramy Jarman served as Plaintiff's divorce counsel for at least a portion of those proceedings, and Mark Hixson was appointed by Judge Hatfield to represent Mr. Arndt in contempt proceedings related to his divorce. It is well established that neither private attorneys nor public defenders act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when performing their traditional functions as counsel. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Ellibee v. Hazlett, 122 F. App'x 932, 934 (10th Cir. 2004). Similarly, there is no basis for concluding Defendant Shultz was a state actor. Accordingly, Defendants Halley, Shultz, Jarman and...
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