Arneson v. Jezwinski

• Decision Date: 20 December 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 95-1592-L,95-2150,UW-M,s. 95-1592-L
• Citation: 206 Wis.2d 217,556 N.W.2d 721
• Parties: Rodney A. ARNESON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marcia JEZWINSKI, Personnel Coordinator, Administrative Data Processing,adison, Durwood Meyer, Assistant Director, Administrative Data Processing,adison and Dan Thoftne, Computer Operations Manager, Administrative Data Processing, adison, Defendants-Petitioners. Rodney A. ARNESON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marcia JEZWINSKI, Personnel Coordinator, Administrative Data Processing, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Durwood Meyer, Assistant Director, Administrative Data Processing, University of Wisconsin-Madison and Dan Thoftne, Computer Operations Manager, Administrative Data Processing, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 721

556 N.W.2d 721

206 Wis.2d 217

Rodney A. ARNESON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marcia JEZWINSKI, Personnel Coordinator, Administrative Data

Processing, UW-Madison, Durwood Meyer, Assistant Director,

Administrative Data Processing, UW-Madison and Dan Thoftne,

Computer Operations Manager, Administrative Data Processing,

UW-Madison, Defendants-Petitioners.

Rodney A. ARNESON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marcia JEZWINSKI, Personnel Coordinator, Administrative Data

Processing, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Durwood Meyer,

Assistant Director, Administrative Data Processing,

University of Wisconsin-Madison and Dan Thoftne, Computer

Operations Manager, Administrative Data Processing,

University of Wisconsin-Madison, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 95-1592-LV, 95-2150.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Oct. 18, 1996.

Decided Dec. 20, 1996.

For the defendants-appellants-petitioners the cause was argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by James C. Murray and Jacobson & Macaulay, Madison, and oral argument by James C. Murray.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, Justice.

This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis.Stat. § 809.61 (1993-94). ¹ Petitioners Marcia Jezwinski, Durwood Meyer, and Dan Thoftne seek leave to appeal a circuit court order denying their claim of qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), ² and alternatively assert that they have a right to appeal. The sole issue on certification is under what circumstances the court of appeals should grant a petition for interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying a state official's claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action. Pursuant to our constitutional superintending power over lower state courts, we direct the court of appeals to grant every petition of this kind, so long as the circuit court order is based on an issue of law, such as whether the federal right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time the action was taken, and the defendant initiates the appeal within the time specified in Wis.Stat. § 808.04. We find that the court of appeals should grant such petitions as a matter of course because they will always fall within the criteria of Wis.Stat. § 808.03(2)(a) and (b).

I.

In granting the present certification, we indicated that we would not address any of the underlying issues Petitioners raise on appeal. Nonetheless, we provide a general background of the facts surrounding this dispute. In 1990, Rodney Arneson was a permanent employee of the University of Wisconsin on probationary status as a newly-promoted supervisor. On March 19, 1990, an employee whom Arneson supervised filed a complaint of sexual harassment against him. As a result, Petitioners placed Arneson on unpaid suspension for thirty days and demoted him to a lower position.

On May 15, 1990, Arneson filed an administrative appeal of this disciplinary action with the State of Wisconsin Personnel Commission (Commission). The Commission found that Petitioners had denied Arneson's due process rights to hear the charges against him and to present his version of the facts, and that the discipline imposed was excessive. Therefore, the Commission voided the disciplinary action and ordered Petitioners to reinstate Arneson to his previous position.

On July 29, 1993, Arneson commenced an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Dane County Circuit Court, claiming that Petitioners did not have "just cause" to impose the disciplinary action, and had failed to reinstate him properly. Petitioners moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including qualified immunity. On April 21, 1995, the Honorable Moria G. Krueger granted the Petitioners' motion for summary judgment in part, but deferred ruling on their claim of qualified immunity.

Subsequently, on June 2, 1995, the circuit court judge denied Petitioners' motion for summary judgment based on their claim of qualified immunity. Specifically, the circuit court judge found that Arneson's due process rights were clearly established at the time of his suspension; therefore, Petitioners could not maintain a claim of qualified immunity. ³ The circuit court judge noted that although there were factual disputes between the parties, "even viewing the facts most favorably to defendants, due process does not appear to have been afforded Mr. Arneson." (R. 38 at 2 n. 1.)

On June 12, 1995, Petitioners filed a Petition for Leave to Appeal from Nonfinal Order with the court of appeals. The court of appeals denied the petition on July 24, 1995. On August 2, 1995, Petitioners submitted a motion for reconsideration of this denial with the court of appeals, and also filed a notice of appeal from the same circuit court order. Arneson moved the court of appeals for an order dismissing the second appeal. The court of appeals then certified the matter to this court, to determine under what circumstances the court of appeals should grant an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying a state official's claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit.

II.

Although this certification presents a matter of first impression in Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the same issue on the federal level. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a district court order denying a claim of qualified immunity on summary judgment is immediately appealable, to the extent it turns on an issue of law. Specifically, the Court relied on the "collateral order doctrine" ⁴ to find that such an order is a "final decision," since 28 U.S.C. § 1291 vests federal courts of appeal with jurisdiction over appeals only from "final decisions" of district courts. ⁵ Id. at 524-30, 105 S.Ct. at 2814-18.

The Mitchell Court considered several aspects of qualified immunity persuasive to its holding. First, the Court explained that qualified immunity is intended to protect government officials from "the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial--distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service." Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). According to the Court, qualified immunity entitles officials to avoid trial, as well as the other burdens of litigation, such as broad-reaching discovery. Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815-16. The Court therefore determined: "The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. The Court further emphasized that a district court's denial of qualified immunity should be subject to interlocutory appeal because "the district court's decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2816.

Second, the Court determined that an order denying qualified immunity should be immediately appealable because it conclusively determines the disputed question. The Court stated, "[T]here are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred." Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977)). Finally, the Court was persuaded by its finding that a claim of qualified immunity "is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim" if the claim turns on an issue of law, because the reviewing appellate court will not need to consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, or even determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim. Id. 527-28, 105 S.Ct. at 2816-17. ⁶

III.

Petitioners argue that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution ⁷ requires us to find that state officials have a right to appeal a circuit court order denying a claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action in Wisconsin appellate courts. Although we are persuaded by Mitchell, we do not reach the issue of whether the Supremacy Clause requires us to follow it. ⁸ We also do not consider whether such an order constitutes a final order under § 808.03(1). Instead, we make this decision pursuant to our constitutional superintending power over lower state courts, set forth in article VII, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, ⁹ and in accord with the power we share with the legislature.

We therefore review the nature and scope of this power. The Wisconsin Constitution grants three separate and distinct branches of jurisdiction to this Court: (1) appellate jurisdiction; (2) general superintending control over inferior courts; and (3) original jurisdiction at certain proceedings at law and in equity. WIS. CONST. art VII, § 3; State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis.2d 560, 564, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960); In re Brand, 251 Wis. 531, 536, 30 N.W.2d 238 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 802, 69 S.Ct. 34, 93 L.Ed. 359 (1948); State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611-12, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899) (hereinafter "Johnson "). The constitutional grant of superintending authority endows this court with a power that is indefinite in character, unsupplied with means and instrumentalities, and limited only by the necessities of justice. In re Kading, 70 Wis.2d 508, 519-20, 235 N.W.2d 409, 238 N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975); Reynolds, 11 Wis.2d at 564-65, 105 N.W.2d 876; In re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 320-21, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); Johnson, 103 Wis. at 611, 79 N.W. 1081. In addition, this power enables the court to control the course of ordinary litigation in the lower courts of Wisconsin. ¹⁰ Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320, 274 N.W. 411; Johnson, 103 Wis. at 613, 79 N.W. 1081. As we have stated, "The...