Arneson v. Sullivan, 90-2300
| Decision Date | 07 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-2300,90-2300 |
| Citation | 946 F.2d 90 |
| Parties | 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 127 A.L.R.Fed. 781, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,071, 2 A.D. Cases 31, 2 NDLR P 108 Stephen A. ARNESON, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael J. Hoare, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Joseph B. Moore, argued (Stephen B. Higgins and Joseph B. Moore, on brief), St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and URBOM, * District Judge.
This dispute involving a disabled former employee and the Social Security Administration (SSA) comes before us a second time. The facts surrounding this matter are set forth in our initial opinion, Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1989), and we adhere to the holdings and conclusions in that decision, except as they may be modified by this judgment. We will repeat the facts only as they are necessary for our discussion of the issues raised in this new appeal. We will mention additional evidence from the record created on remand as it may be needed to explain our current rulings.
Essentially, Arneson claims that he is an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" for whom the SSA refuses to make reasonable accommodations as required by law. We agree, and as a result, we reverse and remand this case with specific directions to the district court.
Arneson suffers from a neurological disorder known as apraxia. This disease affects his ability to discharge his duties as a claims representative for the SSA. Prior to his termination by the SSA, Arneson worked at the Clayton office in suburban St. Louis. At that location, he performed in a generally satisfactory manner. He was transferred to a smaller office in Maryland Heights and performed satisfactorily through at least two evaluation periods. His new supervisors at Maryland Heights, as time went on, viewed his work with disappointment. There is some evidence that a new employee evaluation system may have contributed to this change in perception by personnel at Maryland Heights.
To give the government the benefit of the doubt in describing apraxia, we borrow a characterization by the dissenting judge in our earlier opinion. Judge Whipple, quoting Dr. William M. Landau, Chief of Neurology at Washington University/Barnes Hospital, points out that apraxia in non-medical terms, can be described as a "difficulty in bringing ideas together, difficulties in writing, distractibility, motor awkwardness." Arneson, 879 F.2d at 399. Arneson claims that the major problem involves distractibility, that is the inability to bring ideas together in the noise, stress and turmoil of a busy office. This seems to be borne out by the fact that while at Clayton, he was provided a semi-private space in which to work, and his ratings were consistently satisfactory. At Maryland Heights, this accommodation was not made and his work obviously suffered.
We do not consider this set of facts to be sufficient in itself to establish that Arneson is an otherwise qualified handicapped individual within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As we stated in Arneson, Arneson, 879 F.2d at 396.
We also pointed out that [i]n determining what kinds of accommodations are reasonable, courts are permitted to "take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the availability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1982). An unreasonable accommodation is one which "would impose undue hardship on the operation of its program." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1988).
Id. at 397. We remanded this case because we were not satisfied that Arneson had been given the benefit of the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act. We think the evidence on remand now establishes that he is an otherwise qualified handicapped individual who has not been afforded reasonable accommodation. We think that he should be returned to the work force, if possible.
At the continued proceeding, the government called several witnesses who had responsibility for supervising Arneson or for programs for the handicapped. Their testimony, in our view, established or reinforced the existence of several critical points.
First, very little was done to attempt to accommodate...
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