Arnold v. Barnhart

Decision Date16 January 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-3462.,05-3462.
Citation473 F.3d 816
PartiesSteven ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Barry A. Schultz (argued), Evanston, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mary L. Senoo (argued), Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before COFFEY, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Steven Arnold applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, claiming that his speed at performing tasks and his ability to cope with stress are impaired from brain damage he received at the time of his 1986 motorcycle accident. He also claimed that due to his accident he is prone to seizures and suffers from impaired short-term memory and headaches. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Arnold's application after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who concluded that Arnold was not disabled because he retains the residual functional capacity to perform several jobs in the Wisconsin area including machine cleaner, cleaner and polisher, electro-cleaner, and steamer. Arnold appeals the district court's decision upholding that determination. He contends that the ALJ's decision is not supported with substantial evidence and that the ALJ failed to determine the credibility of four lay witnesses; failed to follow the requirements of SSR 96-7p when determining the plaintiff's credibility; and failed to give proper weight to the opinion of the examining psychologist, Dr. Hoffman. We affirm.

I.

Arnold was 40 years old at the time of his hearing before the ALJ. He graduated from high school in 1979. Afterwards he completed a technical program in automotive maintenance, although he was unsuccessful at gaining employment in an automotive-repair shop. During the seven year span between his high school graduation and his motorcycle accident in 1986, he worked seasonally as a "pulp cutter," splitting timber with a chainsaw, and his annual earnings were anywhere from $1,400 to $6,000.

At the time of the accident Arnold was 25 and riding his motorcycle without a helmet. He sustained closed-head injuries as a result of his being thrown from his motorcycle to the pavement. After undergoing brain surgery he demonstrated memory problems but achieved "excellent improvement" during his six weeks of rehabilitation according to his treating psychologists. Upon discharge Arnold had regained what the attending psychologists thought was "close to his pre-morbid range of cognitive/intellectual abilities." Three years later, though, he began experiencing auras,1 which were followed on two separate occasions by "grand mal" epileptic seizures, resulting in his uncontrollably and violently jerking his body. Arnold visited the emergency room after the second seizure and was prescribed Dilantin, a seizure-control medication. Emergency room tests at that time showed some softening and atrophy of his temporal lobes, and doctors advised him that he might continue to have seizures until the healing process had run its course. Arnold received no further medical or psychological treatment after 1989 because he lacked funds to pay for health care or medical insurance, and he also stopped taking seizure-control medication some time in the early 1990's because "it did not agree with [him]."

In 2000 Arnold applied for disability benefits, claiming that the suffering he endured from his head injury caused him difficulty when called upon to concentrate and when required to do so under pressure, which in turn brought on nervous headaches that he feared could precipitate a seizure if he did not take a break. Psychologist Marcus Desmonde examined him at the request of the SSA. Tests performed by Dr. Desmonde confirmed a mild to moderate "amnestic disorder," or memory impairment. Dr. Desmonde thought that Arnold's long absence from the work-force might interfere with his ability to tolerate "the stress and pressure of full-time, competitive employment" and to interact appropriately with others. But Dr. Desmonde concluded that Arnold could understand and follow simple instructions and carry out tasks with reasonable persistence and pace. In addition, two state psychologists jointly reviewed his medical record and concluded that Arnold was "not significantly limited" in most work-related areas, including his ability to work with others. Though characterizing him as "markedly limited" in understanding, remembering, and executing detailed instructions, the psychologists opined that Arnold could handle "basic work stress."

In administrative filings and his testimony before the ALJ, Arnold related the effect of his impairment on his work and other daily activities. He had continued to work seasonally as a full-time pulp cutter for five years after his accident (including two years after the onset of his seizures). The range of his yearly earnings following the accident varied between $1,300 and $4,900 and roughly matched the range of his earnings before the accident—$1,400 to $6,000. In 1990, during the off-season for cutting pulp, he had attempted to work full-time as a meat packer and as an auto mechanic, but had to quit both jobs after one week because he would get tired and experience headaches from being "pushed [too] hard." After 1991 he stopped returning to the seasonal work of cutting pulp and explained that he gave up trying to work for others because he could not handle the long hours without frequent breaks and the pressure to produce on a schedule.

Arnold testified that since approximately 1988, he has worked for himself, repairing the automobiles of friends and neighbors in his mother's garage. His business grew by word of mouth—according to the records he kept, he took in only $700 from repairs in 1993, but earned between $2,000 and $3,000 each of the subsequent years. He could do anything from an oil change, to a brake repair, to an engine overhaul on cars without fuel injection. He usually worked up to five hours at a time at repairs without getting tired and on occasion would work two five-hour shifts in one day to get a job done. Nevertheless, he averaged just 50 to 60 hours of paid work per month due to down times in business.

Arnold testified that he slept eight hours a night and took a nap daily of about one hour. He played computer chess, owned and maintained his own car, which he drove when shopping for groceries. He did some household chores, although he would tire after about an hour of vacuuming or sweeping and then rest for an hour. Arnold testified that he continued to experience auras approximately once a month and was forced to lie down for several minutes when they occurred to avoid a seizure. He was not sure when he last had a seizure, although he thought he had at least one in the five years before his hearing. However, he added that, if the most recent event was a seizure, it had been "milder than the other ones I had earlier, because I think it's finally healed up here." To avoid nervous headaches, seizures, and angry outbursts, he said, he worked at a slow pace, taking breaks whenever he felt pressured, and taking a day off every couple of weeks. When pressured, he explained, he sometimes lost his temper and cursed out loud, occasionally while in the company of others.

Four of his neighbors wrote letters to the SSA in support of Arnold's application, and two of them appeared at his hearing and testified. They generally agreed that Arnold had attained a remarkable degree of success in coping with his impairment, but only by rigidly structuring his life to avoid stress. Crucial to that success, in their opinions, was his ability to "walk away" from stressful situations as often and for as long as he deemed necessary. And although he got along well with those he knew, they doubted his ability to behave appropriately with strangers in a work setting. They added that "very rarely" would he display an angry outburst. All four volunteered that Arnold could not work in any competitive employment setting due to deficits in his memory, concentration, and his lack of ability to cope with stress.

A psychologist, Dr. Mary Louise Stevens, testified at the hearing as a medical expert, after Arnold conceded that she was qualified to give opinion testimony concerning his medical condition. She based her opinion on the medical records of Arnold's treatment following his accident and Dr. Desmonde's report of his current examination—but not the lay testimony of his neighbors, which she deemed to be "subjective." Dr. Stevens stated that her opinion was tentative, however, because Arnold had not seen fit to undergo a complete neuropsychological evaluation in the past eleven years, thus she recommended a current neuropsychological evaluation.2 Based on the records from twenty years ago documenting his dramatic recovery during his hospital stay following the accident, Dr. Stevens opined that Arnold's impairment fell short of meeting a listed impairment at the time of his discharge. Although Dr. Stevens never personally examined Arnold, she reviewed all the available records and had an opportunity to observe his conduct during the administrative hearing and tentatively concluded that during the period for which he was seeking benefits Arnold was able to perform simple, repetitive duties with low production standards while in a low-stress environment. She acknowledged Dr. Desmonde's comment that Arnold might have some difficulty tolerating work stress, and commented that her assessment specifically took that limitation into account by restricting him to low production standards and a low-stress environment.

Finally, a vocational expert testified that a person with the limitations described in Dr. Stevens's tentative opinion could work full-time as a pulp cutter or as one of several types of cleaners, such as a...

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    ..., 814 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (W.D. Tex. 1993), § 106.10 Arnett v. Astrue , 676 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2012), 7th-12 Arnold v. Barnhart , 473 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. Jan. 16, 2007), 7th-07 Arnone v. Bowen , 882 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1989), § 205.7 Arocho v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs. , ......

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